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Abstract
This thesis analyses the growth of regulation in the National Health Service 
(NHS) between 1985 and 2004. It argues that the development of the NHS 
over this period conforms to the pattern, asserted more generally in existing 
scholarship, of a rise of the regulatory state in Western European countries. 
One conventional explanation for the pattern of development—the 
increasing importance placed on establishing credible policy 
commitments—is shown to be compatible with observed patterns of 
development in the NHS. Building on earlier work, which argued that the 
organisation of the NHS was underpinned by an implicit concordat between 
politicians and the medical profession, it is argued that regulatory state type 
institutions potentially reconcile the imperative of credible commitment to 
the concordat with demands for greater governmental intervention in the 
provision of health services. Adapting an analytical framework developed 
by Brian Levy and Pablo Spiller, this thesis argues that regulatory reforms 
in the NHS are unlikely to achieve their publicly pronounced objectives if 
the legal and administrative framework for regulation does not demonstrate 
credible commitment to the implicit concordat. This is labelled the 
‘regulatory commitment hypothesis’. In order to assess the plausibility of 
this hypothesis, three episodes,of regulatory reform are examined which, on 
the basis of the modified Levy and Spiller framework, can be said to 
engender varying degrees of commitment. The three episodes are: (1) the 
Limited List of NHS Drugs; (2) The National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence; and (3) the Commission for Health Improvement. Overall, an 
examination of these three episodes of regulatory reform provides grounds 
for cautious support for the regulatory commitment hypothesis.
Chapter 1 
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Context
In the UK and elsewhere, the last two decades have witnessed an 
unprecedented growth of regulation of health services. Whereas regulation 
of health care professions, mainly in the form of self-regulation by 
professional bodies, has been a longstanding feature of the organisation of 
health care, regulation of health services has not until recently been 
particularly prominent. Since the 1980s, however—and particularly in the 
years since 1997—there has been a marked extension of regulatory 
intervention in the UK into aspects of health care provision not previously 
subject to formal state regulation. Ostensibly, this has been motivated by a 
number of concerns, including cost-saving, eliminating poor clinical 
performance and assuring patient safety, and a desire to ensure that ‘best 
practice’ is quickly and effectively extended to all parts of the health 
service. Moreover, other countries in the OECD and elsewhere, facing 
similar concerns, have looked to the UK as a source of lessons in how to 
introduce regulatory reforms into their own national systems.
This thesis examines the changes that have taken place in the way 
the NHS was governed between 1985 and 2004. It argues that lessons from 
the UK experience are likely to prove elusive if they dp not explicitly take
1
2into account the broader institutional context in which regulatory reforms 
have been implemented. In particular, it claims that the rise of the regulatory 
state inside the NHS may lead to disappointing outcomes if the legal and 
regulatory framework of health care regulation may undermine existing 
understandings on which the provision of health services is founded. On the 
positive side, one implication of the findings of this thesis is that increased 
regulatory intervention in the provision of health care may be both feasible 
and desirable, provided that reforms engender credible commitment to these 
understandings.
The following section of this introductory chapter briefly sets out 
more explicitly the hypotheses advanced in this thesis, and attempts to 
justify the particular research question and choice of hypotheses. A third 
section deals with the organisation of this thesis.
1.2 The Argument of this Thesis
1.2.1 Two Related Hypotheses
There have been a number of empirical studies of change in the NHS, and a 
range of theses have been put forward to explain these changes, within a 
variety of analytical frames. Drawing on the work of Hood et al.}  one 
perspective, from which many of the more prominent changes in the NHS 
can be understood, is as a domain of ‘regulation inside government’. As the 
previous section noted, the last twenty years have witnessed an 
unprecedented growth of regulation in the NHS. Notwithstanding this
1 Hood, Scott, James, Jones and Travers (1999). Regulation Inside 
Government: Waste-Watchers, Quality Police, and Sleaze-Busters. Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, p. 19.
3growth, relatively few studies, however, have sought to understand health 
care in the UK specifically as a regulated domain.2
Adopting the ‘lens’ of regulation, specifically the ‘regulatory design’ 
frame, is not to deny the value of alternative approaches, such as those 
which characterise changes over the last twenty years or so in terms of the 
rise of the ‘new public management’.4 Applying this frame does however 
offer an advantage over existing approaches in that it focuses its attention on 
an aspect the governance of health care that has been relatively under­
emphasised by the existing literature, and can therefore be said to 
complement more conventional approaches.
Two key hypotheses are set out in this research. The first is that the 
development of the NHS over the twenty-year time-span covered in this 
thesis corresponds to the pattern, asserted more generally, of a ‘rise of the 
regulatory state’ in Western European countries, and in the EU itself.5 It is 
argued here that one conventional explanation for this pattern of 
development, namely that it is a response to an increase in the importance 
attached by governments to the establishment of credible policy 
commitments, is also capable of explaining developments in the UK health 
sector.
2 For a prominent exception, see Walshe (2003). Regulating Healthcare: A 
Prescription for Improvement? Buckingham, Open University Press. Walshe 
applies a framework for the evaluation of health care regulation based on seven 
areas of evaluation. The approach is not primarily evaluative, but rather aims to 
explain regulatory change, and to relate institutions to regulatory outcomes.
3 For a review of the leading approaches in the analysis of regulation, see 
Lodge (1999). "Competing Approaches to Regulation", in Eliassen and Sjovaag 
(ed.) European Telecommunications Liberalisation. London, Routledge.
4 For example, Ferlie, Ashbumer, Fitzgerald and Pettigrew (1996). The New 
Public Management in Action. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
5 This claim is, above all, associated with the work of Giandomenico Majone. 
See for example Majone (1994). "The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe." 
West European Politics 17 (1): 77-101.
4The second, and related, hypothesis concerns the design of 
regulatory institutions. Adapting a framework developed by Brian Levy and 
Pablo Spiller and their collaborators,6 this thesis puts forward the following 
argument: regulatory reforms in the NHS are unlikely to achieve their 
intended, publicly pronounced objectives unless the legal and administrative 
framework of regulation is capable of securing credible commitment to 
implicit understandings between the medical profession and government 
concerning the scope of regulatory intervention, its effects, and other key 
variables of regulatory policy. Furthermore, the capacity of a regulatory 
regime to achieve credible commitment depends not only on the detailed 
regulatory enactments setting out the powers, duties and procedures of 
regulatory authorities—that shall later be termed ‘operational rules’—but on 
the interaction between these operational rules and the broader institutional 
setting.
The idea of institutional commitment closely links these two 
hypotheses. Institutional commitment is understood here is the capacity of 
legal and political institutions to enforce inter-temporal political bargains, 
specifically an ‘implicit concordat’ which, according to existing 
scholarship,7 existed between the medical profession and the Department of 
Health, and which has underpinned the organisational structure of the NHS 
since its inception. On the one hand, an emphasis on administrative 
regulation over alternative policy instruments is, according to the first 
hypothesis, one strategy for reconciling (to the extent to which this is
6 See Levy and Spiller (1994). "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory 
Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation." 
Journal o f Law, Economics and Organization 10 (2): 201-246; Levy and 
Spiller, eds. (1996). Regulations Institutions and Commitment: Comparative 
Studies o f Telecommunications. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
7 Notably Klein (1983). The Politics o f the National Health Service. London, 
Longman. The most recent edition is Klein (2001). The New Politics o f the 
NHS. 4th Edition, Harlow, Prentice Hall.
5possible), public and political demand for greater intervention by 
governments in the health care sector with the continued extension to the 
medical profession of privileges and entitlements as part of a public service 
bargain or implicit concordat. On the other hand, this thesis attempts to 
show that, as a strategy reconciling these potentially contradictory demands, 
this particular approach to instrument choice is only likely to be successful 
where a number of complementary institutional mechanisms are present. In 
particular, this thesis analyses the features of the legal and administrative 
framework for health care regulation that are conducive to credible 
commitment and consequently, to successful outcomes within 
‘Westminster-Whitehall’ style constitutional arrangements.
In order to assess the plausibility of these arguments, the thesis 
analyses regulation in the NHS on two levels. Firstly, it looks at the broad 
pattern of NHS reforms over the last twenty years, taken as a whole. 
Second, it examines in detail three episodes of regulatory reform. These 
three episodes are: (1) The Limited List of NHS Drugs (later known as the 
Selected List scheme); (2) The National Institute for Clinical Excellence 
(NICE); and (3) the Commission for Health Improvement (CHI). The basis 
for the selection of these three episodes for detailed analysis is discussed in 
Section 1.2.3, infra. An observation about the jurisdictional scope of this 
study is in order: this thesis restricts its focus to the NHS in England and 
Wales. At the same time, since the first detailed episode of regulatory 
reform examined in this thesis—the Limited List—was common throughout 
Britain, Chapter 5 looks also at developments in Scotland.
61.2.2 Justification of Research Topic and Hypotheses
It has been argued that, in general, academic research in law and political 
science ought to fulfil two criteria: first, it should address matters of real- 
world importance; second, it should make a contribution to (at least one)
o
existing scholarly literature. In terms of real-world importance, the sheer 
size of the NHS, in terms of expenditure and activity ought to be sufficient 
to justify the present inquiry. Revenue expenditure for the NHS in England 
was £57.129 billion in 2002-03 (with an estimated outturn of £64.305 
billion in 2003-04).9 In terms of activity, in 2002-03, there were some 241 
million GP consulatations,10 while in secondary care there were 9.13 million 
‘finished consultant episodes’ in general and acute care alone.11 Not 
surprisingly, given the sheer size of the NHS in terms of resources and 
activity, health care is one of the most salient electoral issues, repeatedly
19ranking among the top one or two issues m terms of importance to voters. 
Moran has identified three aspects (or ‘faces’) of health politics, namely,
13‘consumption politics’, ‘production politics’ and ‘professional politics’. It 
is, he argues, the intersection of these three aspects that gives health care its 
peculiar political significance.
8 King, Keohane and Verba (1994). Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton, Princeton University Press, pp. 
15-18; Epstein and King (2002). "The Rules of Inference." University o f 
Chicago Law Review 69 (1): 1-133, pp. 55-61.
9 Department of Health (2004) Departmental Report 2004, Cm 6204, London, 
The Stationery Office, p. 38.
10 Ibid. p. 100.
11 Ibid. p. 96.
12 Worcester and Mortimore (2001). Explaining Labour's Second Landslide. 
London, Politicos, 29-31.
13 Moran (1999). Governing the Health Care State: A Comparative Study o f the 
United Kingdom, the United States and Germany. Manchester, Manchester 
University Press.
7Understanding the particular significance of regulation inside the 
NHS, is more problematic, raising important definitional and 
methodological difficulties. There is no doubt that regulation of NHS 
organizations consumes a significant amount of financial resources— even 
on the narrowest definition, well over £100 million was spent by 
government on independent regulation of NHS organizations in 2002- 
2003.14 This figure does not take into account the undoubtedly large but 
difficult to measure costs to regulatory organisations of regulatory 
compliance. The contribution that health care regulation makes to the 
performance of health care providers is even more difficult to assess. 
According to Walshe, existing research into the regulation of health services 
suggests that it:
... has both positive (desirable) and negative (or undesirable) effects; 
and that those effects are not highly predictable or deterministic, in 
that they vary not only from regulatory programme to programme, 
but also within any one programme between organisations and over 
time.15
Given the significant resources devoted to health care regulation, as 
well as the uncertain outcomes associated with this investment of resources, 
the present effort to understand the regulation of the NHS is eminently 
justifiable in terms of real-world importance. Furthermore, because issues of 
regulatory governance, and in particular the problems associated with 
securing credible commitment, have been neglected in existing studies of 
health care regulation in the UK, a focus on these issues affords the 
potential for improving on existing understandings, derived from alternative 
approaches, of the relationship between regulatory activities and outcomes.
14 See Section 3.3.3 infra.
15 Walshe, op. cit., p. 162.
8In terms of contribution to the existing scholarly literatures, this 
thesis adds to existing scholarship in a number .of distinct ways. The first 
literature to which the present study adds is the literature on the so-called 
regulatory state. This literature has mainly focussed on privatised sectors, 
notably the public utilities, with relatively little attention to health services. 
The case of health care may be regarded as something of a ‘crucial case’ for 
the literature asserting the rise of the regulatory state, due to the political 
and social significance of health care noted in Section 1.2.1, above. 
Furthermore, as Chapter 3 argues, the case study of the NHS offers clues as 
to the resolution of one particular difficulty in the literature, namely that 
explanations for the rise of the regulatory state in Western Europe 
emphasise restrictions on the scope of state intervention, while in Britain at 
least, the regulatory state has been associated with expanded rather than 
diminished ambitions.16 The present account argues that in the case of 
health, the imperative of credible commitment to the implicit concordat 
meant that an expansion of intervention was likely to produce positive 
outcomes only in the presence of effective restraints on the use of regulatory 
authority.
Second, and conversely to this first contribution, this thesis 
contributes to the extensive existing literature on health policy change, by 
positing a new interpretation of existing knowledge about the changes that 
have occurred in the NHS over the last two decades. Specifically, it is 
argued that the ‘regulatory state hypothesis’ can explain trends towards the 
separation of policy-making and service delivery functions, the proliferation 
of regulatory agencies as well as the shift towards increasingly formalised 
modes of decision-making, all of which have been noted in existing
16 This problem was first identified in Moran (2003). The British Regulatory 
State. Oxford, Oxford University Press. See further Section 2.2 and Section 3.4 
infra.
9literature, without much recognition of any underlying connection such as is 
suggested by the regulatory state hypothesis.
Third, this thesis extends existing scholarship in the law and 
economics concerned with the design of regulatory institutions by extending 
the analytical approach of Levy and Spiller and their collaborators into the 
context of health care regulation. The framework developed by Levy and 
Spiller was originally used to examine the willingness of private investors to 
undertake financial investment in a regulated sector, telecommunications, 
particularly in developing countries. Although publicly financed through 
taxation, the NHS nonetheless requires investments and commitments of 
other sorts, notably from staff and professional groups. This thesis argues 
that a modified version of the Levy and Spiller framework set out in detail 
in Chapter 4 can be used to analyse these other sorts of commitments. At the 
same time, this thesis suggests that, viewed through the ‘microscope’ (as 
opposed to Levy and Spiller’s ‘telescope’ approach), certain departures 
from Levy and Spiller’s assessment of the UK’s ‘institutional endowment’ 
are warranted.
1.2.3 Relationship Between Hypotheses and Case 
Study Evidence
The influential ‘Popperian’ tradition in the philosophy of science 
emphasises the cycle of ‘bold conjecture’ and refutation of hypotheses in the 
process of scientific advancement. According to this view, theoretical 
hypotheses about the real world can never be ‘proved’ right; however, as 
hypotheses are subject to more and more rigorous testing, without 
refutation, then we have increasingly firm grounds for confidence in a 
hypothesis. Conversely, if empirical investigation reveals observations that
10
are inconsistent with those ‘predicted’ by the hypothesis, especially under 
‘most favourable’ conditions, then the hypothesis is likely to be false.
In legal and policy research, the issues that matter to the real world 
usually involve considerable complexity. Case study research in these areas 
frequently confronts the ‘many variables/few cases’ problem, because the 
complexity of the problem under analysis is not matched by the complexity 
of the research design, so that hypotheses can never be falsified—it is 
always possible to ‘explain away’ inconvenient cases by arguing that ceteris 
paribus assumptions do not hold up in a particular case by appealing to the 
inevitable peculiarities that arise in all cases. This limits the level of 
confidence that we can have in a ‘positive’ result, i.e. one in which the 
evidence is consistent with the observable implications of the theory. Some, 
such as King Keohane and Verba place great emphasis on improving 
empirical methods and a rigorous approach to the principles of scientific 
inference—in particular, they point to the risk that researchers will mislead 
themselves if  they add restrictive conditions where more general hypotheses 
do not hold up, and then proceeding as if the modified hypothesis were
1 7shown to be correct.
An alternative approach, advocated by Fritz Scharpf involves a shift
away from ‘brute empiricism’, towards a greater emphasis on the careful
deduction of new hypotheses from existing knowledge:
[S]ince our methods for subjecting hypotheses to quantitative 
empirical tests are inherently weak, this requires a shift of emphasis 
in the methodological discussion—away from the dominant focus on 
the quality of testing procedures and towards a greater concern for
17 King, Keohane and Verba, p. 21.
11
the quality of the hypotheses that we bring to our empirical 
material.18
On this view, ex post facto restrictions on hypotheses are not regarded as
illegitimate in themselves—indeed, because much policy research is
interested in explaining outcomes in particular cases, this is likely to be
unavoidable. What matters is that distinctions invoked to explain such
outcomes are themselves indicated by the theoretical considerations.
Scharpf puts the point elegantly:
In exactly the same manner in which common-law courts must deal 
with divergent precedents, our “distinctions” must also “make a 
difference,” which is to say that they themselves must be based on 
the identification of a causal mechanism that could generally 
produce the different outcome.19
Thus, although it may always be possible to explain away the failure of
general hypotheses to explain the features of specific cases by pointing to
specific features of ‘problematic’ cases, not all such attempts to explain
away inconvenient outcomes would be regarded as convincing.
Scharpf s approach is in many ways similar to the approach put
forwards some fifty years ago by Friedrich von Hayek.20 According to
Hayek, while generating and testing a hypotheses is a central part of
scientific activity, a substantial part of the enterprise of science is concerned
with extending our knowledge into new areas, both to advance our
understanding of these areas, as well as to help identify the scope of
application of a hypothesis:
The question of what is the range of application or the capacity of a 
theory, whether it can or cannot account for a certain group of 
observed phenomena, or whether observed events are within the
18 Scharpf (1997). Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in 
Policy Research. Boulder CO, Westview, p. 28.
19 Scharpf, op. cit. p. 33.
20 Hayek (1967). "Degrees of Explanation", in Hayek (ed.) Studies in 
Philosophy, Politics and Economics. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
12
range of what might have been predicted from it if all the relevant 
factual data had been known and if we were capable of manipulating 
them adequately, is often as interesting a problem as that whether the 
particular conclusion derived from the theory can be confirmed; and 
it is clearly independent of that question.21
Hayek adds that although it is desirable in applying theories into new areas
it is desirable to check ones conclusions against observations, to the extent
that this is possible: “The conclusions which we can draw from a
combination of well-established hypotheses will therefore be valuable
though we may not be in a position to test them.”
The approach of the present thesis is much closer to the approach of 
Scharpf and of Hayek than with that advocated by King, Keohane and 
Verba, both in the relative emphasis it places on theory-building and the 
selection of hypotheses in order to generate confidence in conclusions, as 
well as in the interpretation of case-study data. As the discussion in Section
1.2.2 has indicated, the two hypotheses investigated in this thesis have 
proved fruitful in other areas—the regulatory state hypothesis has, as noted, 
been put forward by Majone as a high-level explanation for the changes in 
the mode of economic governance in Western Europe. Similarly, the 
regulatory commitment hypothesis has had some success in explaining the 
impact of regulatory design on the willingness of firms to make financial 
investments. The objective of the research is less to establish whether these 
hypotheses are true, but rather to establish whether these “sometimes true 
theories” hold up within the specific institutional conditions of the NHS, 
and can explain observed phenomena in that domain.
21 Ibid. pp. 5-6.
22 Ibid p. 6. See also Hayek, F. (1964) “The Theory of Complex Phenomena”, 
also reproduced in Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics at pp. 22-42.
23 Scharpf, op. cit., attributes the phrase “sometimes true theories” to 
sociologist James Coleman.
13
Another, closely related, reason for choosing hypotheses that have 
proved fruitful in other areas is that this fits better with the presumption (not 
‘assumption’) of simplicity than the alterative approach, which would have 
been to develop health-sector specific hypotheses. This can be seen as an 
application of Occam’s razor, or its modem interpretation in the form of the 
Jefffeys-Wrinch simplicity postulate, namely that: “Simple theories have 
higher prior probabilities.”24 In other words, by presuming that health is not 
‘different’ from other sectors (with respect to those features identified by the 
hypotheses as significant), this thesis brings to the empirical material 
hypotheses that have a higher ex ante likelihood of being correct. It goes 
without saying that empirical investigation may reveal evidence that rebuts 
this presumption.
The advantages of case study research over alternative 
methodologies include the ability to control for relatively few but explicitly 
specified rival hypotheses, and the ability to illuminate ‘how?’ and ‘why?’ 
questions concerning decisions, or sets of decisions; hence, case study 
research has flourished in the areas of political science, public policy and 
public administration. Case study research is particularly appropriate to 
this thesis, which as noted seeks to assess the capacity of the two hypotheses 
outlined in Section 1.2.1 can account for patterns of change in the NHS. The 
particular case study research design used here corresponds to what Yin 
calls ‘embedded single-case’ design; that is to say, a single case—regulation 
inside the NHS—is analysed at a relatively general level. Within this case, 
several sub-units are analysed in depth. Such designs are said to have a
24 Jeffreys, quoted in King, Keohane and Verba, op. cit. p. 20.
25 Yin (2003). Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Thousand Oaks, CA, 
Sage, pp. xiii-xiv.
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number of advantages over more common ‘holistic’ designs, notably that 
they are less abstract, more flexible and more focussed.
As noted in Section 1.2.1, the three episodes of regulatory reform 
that make up the sub-units of analysis are: (1) the Limited List of NHS 
Drugs; (2) the National Institute for Clinical Excellence; and (3) the 
Commission for Health Improvement. These three sub-units were chosen, 
first, because they capture differences in policy over time as well as 
differences of approach between the two main political parties in the UK. 
Perhaps more importantly, on the basis of the framework of analysis set out 
in detail in Chapter 4, the three cases can be said to embody different 
degrees of institutional regulatory commitment.
A final reason for this particular choice of sub-units relates to the 
theoretical goal of assessing the applicability of the commitment frame to 
different issues in health care regulation. The first two episodes, the Limited 
List and NICE are more obvious cases for analysis along the lines of the 
particular approach advanced in this thesis, involving in different ways
7 7issues of ‘cutting waste’ and ‘rationing’ central to the implicit concordat. 
The third episode, CHI, is rather intended to assess whether the approach 
works in a less obvious setting, where the ultimate regulatory goal is the 
more general one of improving the quality of health care. As Chapter 7 
shows, the approach claims a partial success in this respect. These 
episodes are not therefore intended to be representative, and for good
26 Ibid., pp. 39-46.
27 The terms ‘waste’ and ‘rationing’ are used here as terms of art, and are 
explained in detail in Chapter 4.
28 The approach adopted here, of assessing the limits of a theoiy by beginning 
under more favourable conditions and then extending empirical analysis in 
small steps from more to less favourable conditions has been common—though 
not without criticism—in the social sciences. For a colourful defence of this 
approach against one critic see Dowding and John (1997). "Fairy Tale Critiques 
and Political Science: A Reply to Kenneth Newton." British Journal o f 
Political Science 27 (1): 152-155, p. 153.
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reasons. As Yin puts it: “ ...cases are not ‘sampling units’ and should not be 
chosen for this reason. Rather, individual case studies are to be selected as a 
laboratory experimenter selects the topic of a new experiment.” They 
provide, according to Yin, the basis for analytic rather than statistical 
generalisation analogous to the way in which researchers in laboratory 
sciences generalise from experiments to theory.
Stephen Vogel’s Freer Markets, More Rules illustrate the strength of
*5 A
this general approach to the context of the analysis of regulatory reform. 
Freer Markets, More Rules first undertakes a broad analysis of regulatory 
politics in Britain and Japan, before proceeding to more specific analyses of 
a range of sectors in these countries. Analyses of further countries are then 
used to bolster his conclusions finding, namely that differing degrees of 
liberalisation in different countries can be explained in terms of the differing 
national ‘state traditions’. The present approach cannot claim all of the 
sophistication of Vogel’s approach—it does not attempt a comparative 
analysis of the claims put forward. Nevertheless, within the context of a 
single-country study, it attempts to assimilate the strengths of Vogel’s 
analysis, particularly his approach of proceeding at both the broad and 
detailed levels, and selecting examples for analysis that incorporate 
sufficient variation.
29 Yin, op. cit, p. 32.
30 Vogel (1996). Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform in Advanced 
Industrial Countries. Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press. For an analysis of 
Vogel’s methodological approach, see Levi-Faur (2004). "Comparative 
Research Designs in the Study of Regulation: How to Increase the Number of 
Cases Without Compromising the Strengths of Case-Oriented Analysis", in 
Jordana and Levi-Faur (ed.) The Politics o f Regulation: Institutions and 
Regulatory Reform in the Age o f Governance. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar.
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1.2.4 Sources of Data
This thesis draws on a variety of data-sources. The main source of 
information were official sources: these included official policy 
pronouncements, notably White Papers and legislation, comprising a small 
number of Acts of Parliament and a rather larger number of statutory 
instruments, and various forms of ‘tertiary legislation’ emanating from the 
Department of Health. Information on the performance of policy was 
gleaned primarily from official evaluations of policy, especially Select 
Committee reports, studies of the National Audit Office (NAO) and, to a 
limited extent, judicial reviews of policy decisions. The professional 
response to government policies was gleaned primarily from an examination 
of the responses of professional organisations, notably the British Medical 
Association (BMA) to official policy pronouncements. Reference was made 
to Hansard for accounts of debates over the implementation of regulatory 
reforms, but also for politicians’ commentary on the performance of NHS 
regulation.
In addition, and mainly to assist in the interpretation of these 
sources, 24 interviews were conducted in relation to each of the three policy 
episodes investigated in detail in this thesis. Interviewees included current 
and former holders of ministerial office, civil servants, consultants, health 
service managers, doctors and allied professionals. These were mostly 
conducted on a one-to-one basis, lasted around an hour in length and were 
mostly recorded and transcribed for analysis. Some interviewees preferred 
not to be recorded. Others preferred to be interviewed in the presence of 
others. This usually occurred where politicians and senior civil servants 
requested to be interviewed in the presence of colleagues or advisors. On 
occasion, one-to-one interviews turned effectively into small focus groups 
when interviewees ‘pulled in’ colleagues whose perspectives were regarded
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as particularly relevant by the primary interviewee. A coded list of 
interviews is provided in an Appendix. For examination purposes, 
interviewee names are linked to these codes in a separate statement.
Secondary sources from published academic journals, books and 
book chapters supplemented this primary data. Extensive reference was 
made to newspaper sources and the news and op. ed. sections of the 
professional medical journals, especially the BMJ and (to a lesser extent) 
The Lancet. Newspapers consulted included all the UK national daily 
broadsheets, Financial Times, The Times, The Guardian, The Independent, 
The Daily Telegraph (and their Sunday versions), as well as specialist 
professional publications, principally the Health Service Journal.
1.3 The Organisation of this Thesis
The remainder of this thesis is organised in seven chapters. Chapter 2 
reviews those existing themes in the literature on health policy and on 
regulation, which the thesis draws upon in later chapters. First, it points to 
the growth of academic interest in regulation, and to the increasing 
recognition in the literature of the ‘maturation’ of regulation both as an area 
of practice and of scholarly interest. Health care regulation, it is argued, is a 
partial exception to this trend. The chapter locates this growing scholarly 
interest in the context of assertions of the rise of the regulatory state in 
Western European countries over the last quarter of a century or so. It 
suggests that the more recent identification of a ‘regulatory state inside the 
state’ and the attendant development of scholarly- interest in regulation 
inside government lends greater visibility to the phenomenon of health care 
regulation. It is further argued that one particular tradition in the regulation 
literature, the ‘regulatory bargains’ approach leads naturally to a focus on 
regulatory commitment issues and also shares important similarities in
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approach and concerns with existing analyses in health care and in public 
administration more generally. For this reason, the regulatory bargains 
approach is well suited to a ‘reading over’ into the context of regulation 
inside the NHS. Finally, Chapter 2 points to existing analyses of health 
policy which have, to a greater or lesser extent, used the commitment frame 
as a basis of analysis, and suggests how a commitment-based analysis of 
regulation adds to these approaches.
Chapter 3 takes up the theme of the rise of the regulatory state, and 
assesses the extent to which changes in the NHS over the last twenty years 
or so conform to the pattern, asserted more generally, of a rise of the 
regulatory state in Western European countries. The chapter follows the 
approach of public lawyers Martin Loughlin and Colin Scott, who identify 
the rise of the regulatory state with three specific institutional trends, 
namely separation of policy-making from service provision, the 
proliferation of independent regulatory agencies and the increasing 
formalisation of regulatory relationships. Assessed against these criteria the 
analysis in Chapter 3 shows that the case of the NHS fits these claims very 
well. The chapter further argues that developments in the NHS are 
consistent with explanations for the rise of the regulatory state, such as those 
put forward by Majone, in which the renewed emphasis on regulation over 
other policy instruments is seen as a functional response to changing 
demands in public policy.
Chapter 4 sets out a framework for analysing regulatory commitment 
in the NHS, drawing heavily on Levy and Spiller’s framework for analysing 
regulatory commitment in telecommunications. This chapter first sets out an 
account of the implicit concordat that is said to have underpinned the initial 
organisational structure of the NHS. Adopting a taxonomy of waste 
proposed by Blunstein and Marmor, it shows how regulatory reforms, can
19
under some circumstances vitiate the medical profession’s historic 
privileges under the implicit concordat, particularly where the objective is 
eliminating ‘waste’. Even ‘well-intentioned’ reforms can lead to 
professional opposition unless adequate institutional safeguards against 
bureaucratic and coalitional drift are built into the legal and administrative 
framework. Such professional opposition is likely to undermine the 
effectiveness of regulation in achieving its publicly espoused policy goals. 
Following Levy and Spiller, it is argued that the legal and administrative 
framework for regulation can provide the necessary reassurance, provided 
certain complementary institutional mechanisms are in place. Chapter 4 then 
sets out the observable implications of the theory, as a prelude for the 
detailed sub-case analysis in the following three chapters.
Chapter 5 investigates the Limited List of NHS Drugs, introduced in 
1985. In line with the framework of Chapter 4, the thesis sets out the initial 
legal and administrative framework of the Limited List, and its subsequent 
development, including the extension of the prescribing categories covered 
by the Limited List scheme in 1992, and the sidelining of the Advisory 
Committee on NHS Drugs (ACD) after 1997. Following Blunstein and 
Marmor’s taxonomy of waste, Chapter 5 argues that over a period of twenty 
years or so, the Limited List evolved from an initiative primarily intended to 
eliminate harmful or ineffective treatment into a mechanism for regulating 
the prescription of drugs that were not allocatively efficient (not cost- 
effective). After the side-lining of the ACD, the scheme further developed 
into a mechanism of pure rationing, i.e. it was used to restrict the 
prescribing of one treatment, sildenafil (Viagra) that was arguably not 
wasteful within any of Blunstein and Marmor’s senses. This, it is argued, 
provides strong evidence that the legal and administrative framework of the 
Limited List scheme did not engender credible commitment. In line with the
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observable implications of the theory Chapter 5 finds evidence that the 
Limited List scheme performed poorly.
Chapter 6 is a study of NICE, between 1999 and 2004. In contrast 
with the other two sub-case analyses in this thesis, NICE has been examined 
in detail in existing research, notably by Keith Syrett. The commitment 
frame, it is argued, provides an alternative explanation to the ‘legitimacy 
problems’ analysis of Syrett, although the two approaches yield relatively 
similar conclusions. Compared with the Limited List, it is argued that the 
legal and administrative framework of the Institute was relatively more 
credible. Although there was some evidence of slippage, and criticisms of 
NICE focussed on the need for reforms to make the Institute more credible, 
bureaucratic and coalitional drift were less pronounced than in the Limited 
List case study. Such drift that was observed occurred partly in terms of a 
legislative expansion in terms of Blunstein and Marmor’s categories of 
waste, but perhaps more importantly in terms of the effect of NICE 
guidance on NHS organisations. In line with the observable implications of 
Chapter 4, the thesis argues that NICE was relatively more successful in 
achieving what were more ambitious objectives by any measure. Although 
these conclusions are similar to those of Syrett’s analysis, it is argued that 
the commitment frame is preferable to Syrett’s on the grounds that the 
present approach is purely positive, while Syrett’s attempts to explain 
positive outcomes in terms of a normative assessment of the legitimacy of 
NICE.
Chapter 7 examines the establishment, operation and replacement of 
the Commission for Health Improvement. This chapter is more exploratory 
in nature, and its conclusions more tentative. The aim is to assess the 
applicability of the framework set out in Chapter 4 to an NHS inspection 
regime, where regulatory goals were relatively more amorphous, and which
21
raised commitment issues in rather different ways compared with the 
preceding two chapters. With respect to CHI, moreover, evidence of 
performance was both limited and ambiguous. The chapter puts forward 
reasons for this outcome, including the short lifespan of the Commission 
and the fact that, during CHI’s brief life, it was subject to major legislative 
reform. Nonetheless, although the evidence of Chapter 7 does not provide 
strong support for the theory set out in Chapter 4, neither does it undermine 
it. Moreover, the analysis of Chapter 7 shows how the framework can yield 
interesting insights and questions for further investigation beyond the 
narrower context of the other two case studies.
Chapter 8 draws together the different analytical and empirical 
strands of the thesis. First, it draws together the findings of this thesis in 
terms of the two hypotheses outlined in Section 1.2.1 and developed further 
in Chapters 3 and 4. Second, returning to the starting point that good 
research in law and political science should both be important in the real 
world and contribute to scholarly literature it concludes on two levels. It 
reviews the contribution that this thesis has made to the scholarly literatures 
on the regulatory state, on health policy change, and on the law and 
economics of regulatory design. It then draws out some of the implications 
for policy of the findings of this thesis, reiterating the importance of credible 
commitment as a factor in the design of regulatory reform initiatives in the 
NHS. Finally, it suggests avenues for further research to build upon these 
findings, and to increase the confidence in those findings.
Chapter 2
A Selective Review of the Literature on 
Health Policy and Regulation
In every displacement of an old theory to a new situation there is a 
feeling of transition from helplessness to power. Before, we were 
aware only of what was puzzling and disturbing; now, suddenly, 
there is something like clarity and a basis for action.1
2.1 Introduction
The existing literature on health policy is vast; the literature on regulation, 
while relatively more modest, has experienced unprecedented growth in the 
last two decades or so. It would be impossible, within the space available, to 
provide anything approaching a comprehensive review of all the relevant 
literature. This chapter attempts to undertake the more limited task of setting 
out the central ideas and arguments in the existing literature which form the 
basis and intellectual context for what follows in the remainder of this 
thesis. First, it examines the increasing visibility of the phenomenon of 
regulation in the literature generally, and points, in addition to the increasing 
volume of literature on regulation, to the ‘maturation’ of this literature. It is 
argued, however, that at least until relatively recently, the literature on
1 Schon (1963). Displacement o f Concepts. London, Tavistock Publications, p. 
60.
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health care regulation has been a partial exception to these developments. 
Section 2.3 then examines one strand of the growing literature on regulation 
literature, according to which, the last quarter of a century has seen the rise 
of a ‘regulatory state’. One distinctive facet of this has been the claimed 
emergence of a ‘regulatory state inside the state’, identified by the 
regulation inside government scholarship of Christopher Hood and his 
collaborators. Drawing on this literature, it is suggested that transposing 
analyses of private sector regulation to the health care sector can be a 
fruitful source of insights into the evolution of the NHS, and of specific 
hypotheses for further investigation. Section 2.4 focuses on one particular 
approach in regulation and in public administration more generally— 
labelled the ‘exchange paradigm’ in this study—and argues that the 
literature on regulation of the private sector which follows this approach is 
well-suited to adaptation to the context of health care regulation, despite 
substantial criticism of this paradigm from scholars working within the 
disciplinary perspective of public law. Section 2.5 points further to the 
resonance between the exchange paradigm in regulation, and its attendant 
emphasis on establishing credible commitment to negotiated understandings 
between regulator and regulated, identifying a number of studies within the 
broader health policy literature that have, implicitly or explicitly, adopted 
the commitment frame. By way of conclusion, this chapter points to a 
number of questions which, it is argued have been under-emphasised in the 
literature on the reform of the NHS, which are taken up in the remainder of 
this thesis.
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2.2 Regulation as an Academic Growth 
Industry
The study of regulation has become an ‘academic growth industry’ in recent 
years. As a review of Baldwin and McCrudden’s landmark Regulation and 
Public Law points out, the word ‘regulation’ was not prominent m the UK 
literature surveyed by these authors until the very late 1970s, with a 
proliferation of articles and books containing the word ‘regulation’ in their 
titles occurring since the late 1980s. The search hits for regulation and 
related terms in the International Bibliography o f  Social Sciences database 
are presented in Table 2.1 which shows that between 1990 and 2004, this 
proliferation continued apace.4 Table 2.1 also shows the growth of interest 
in regulation of health and (by way of comparison) of telecommunications 
regulation. Interest in the regulation of health has exhibited a level of 
growth broadly consistent with the overall growth in the regulation 
literature, although this has in general been less pronounced than in the case 
of utilities, as demonstrated by the comparison with telecommunications.
What explains this earlier apparent neglect of regulation, and the 
more recent proliferation of interest? Arguably, what appears as neglect in 
fact reflects only changing linguistic usage. Daintith himself notes a number
2 Baldwin and McCrudden (1987). Regulation and Public Law. London, 
Weidnefeld and Nicolson.
3 Daintith (1989). "A Regulatory Space Agency?" Oxford Journal o f Legal 
Studies 9 (4): 534-545, p. 534.
4 Available at http://www.ibss.bids.ac.uk. This is admittedly a crude measure 
because it contains false positives and false negatives. False positives include 
articles containing the term ‘regulation’ used in senses not relevant here (the 
‘regualtionist’ school of French political economy, uses in psychology). False 
negatives here include relevant articles not included in the International 
Bibliography o f the Social Sciences, as well as articles about regulation that do 
not use the term (or any variant of it) in the title. The wildcard (*) operator 
captures all endings, such as regulating, regulated, regulatory, etc.
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of earlier studies, such as the work of Gabrielle Ganz, that address similar 
issues to Baldwin and McCrudden, without apparently feeling the need to 
resort to the term ‘regulation’.5 Similarly, Michael Moran has asked more 
recently whether talk of the ‘regulatory state’ (discussed more fully in 
Section 2.3, below) is merely, “a linguistic ‘tic’: “part of the mania for 
pinning an adjective on the traditional focus of inquiry in political science, 
the state?”6 Along the same lines, it could be argued that concern with the 
governance of health care has been a longstanding focus of academic 
research, without distinguishing regulation from other modes of 
governance.7
Table 2.1: Growth of Research into Regulation Over A Fifteen- 
Year Period. Source: Compiled from International 
.______ Bibliography o f the Social Sciences._______________
Year
Hits from the search string:
regulat* regulat* + health - 
safety
regulat* + tele­
communications
1990 438 2 0
1991 536 1 5
1992 485 9 6
1993 403 4 3
1994 416 10 6
1995 404 7 2
1996 573 7 14
1997 466 11 11
1998 606 3 14
1999 624 5 11
2000 668 5 13
2001 650 10 22
2002 698 13 18
2003 652 8 14
2004 682 8 18
Total 8301 103 157
5 Daintith, op. cit, p. 534
6 Moran (2002). "Understanding the Regulatory State." British Journal o f  
Political Science 32 (2): 391-413, p. 391.
7 For a relatively recent example of a study which focuses on the regulation of 
health care, without use of the term in the title (and with little mention in the 
text) see Harrison and Pollitt (1994). Controlling Health Professionals: The 
Future o f Work and Organization in the NHS. Buckingham, Open University 
Press.
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Alternatively, it is possible that this growth of academic interest 
merely reflects changing priorities among the major sponsors of research in 
the social sciences. For example, from 1997, ‘Regulation and Governance’ 
became one of the thematic priorities of the Economic and Social Research 
Council (ESRC) for the funding of research postgraduate students. Part of 
the volume of literature on regulation after this time could be attributed to 
this.
At the same time, the development of regulation scholarship is 
reflected not only in its increasing volume. As Baldwin, Scott and Hood 
argue, there has been a ‘maturation’ of regulation in two separate but related 
senses.8 First, they identify an intellectual maturation, by which they mean 
the development over time of “distinct analytic approaches and generic 
understandings that are capable of being applied over different regulatory 
sectors.”9 Second, Baldwin Scott and Hood point to a maturation of practice 
whereby “ ...administrative processes which were once seen as sector 
specific, and peculiar to individual domains... are coming to be seen as part 
of a generic set of instruments and strategies deployed by the state.”10
This double maturation—of analysis and of practice—did not fully 
penetrate the health care arena until relatively recently.11 While the 
professional (self-) regulation of doctors and other allied professions has
8 Baldwin, Scott and Hood (1998). "Introduction", in Baldwin, Scott and Hood 
(ed.) A Reader on Regulation. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
9 Ibid., p. 1.
10 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
11 While this section is concerned primarily with Baldwin, Scott and Hood’s 
second sense, of intellectual maturation, it is worth noting briefly that health 
has been a laggard in terms of practice. Interviews at the Department of Health, 
NICE and the Commission for Health Improvement all pointed to a reluctance 
to recognise the 1999 NHS reforms as introducing administrative processes 
analogous to governmental regulation of the business sector into the NHS (116, 
119,122).
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been an established field of academic inquiry by lawyers and public 
administration scholars, as well as being a matter of interest within the 
professional journals, there has been a relative paucity of academic literature 
which applied to analysis of health care the distinct analytic approaches and
17generic understandings to which Baldwin, Scott and Hood refer. Only 
relatively recently have a number of studies begun to share a common 
understanding of regulation with those examining comparable developments 
in other sectors, suggesting that, as an area of intellectual inquiry, health 
care regulation has been a ‘late developer’.13
The self-conscious nature of the attempt of some of these 
contributions seek to draw lessons from other sectors, such as the public 
utilities, to the health care sector points arguably to an intellectual 
‘adolescence’.14 Extending the metaphor still further, the emergence of a 
number of recent studies, such as Kieran Walshe’s Regulating Healthcare15 
and Allsop and Mulcahy’s Regulating Medical Work16 which incorporate 
the insights of political scientists and socio-legal scholars interested in 
regulation in a variety of settings arguably therefore marks the eventual 
‘coming of age’ of health care regulation. Other studies applying a generic
12 Studies of professional regulation include Stacey (1992). Regulating British 
Medicine: The General Medical Council. Chichester, Wiley.
13 For example, see Maynard (1995). "Reforming the National Health Service", 
in Bishop, Kay and Mayer (ed.) The Regulatory Challenge. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press; Propper (1998). "The effects of regulation and competition in 
the NHS internal market: the case of general practice fundholder prices." 
Journal o f Health Economics 17 (6): 307-336; Rico and Puig-Junoy (2002). 
"What Can We Leam From the Regulation of Utilities?" in Saltman, Busse and 
Mossialos (ed.) Regulating Entrepreneurial Behaviour in European Health 
Care Systems.
14 See for example Rico and Puig-Junoy, op. cit.
15 Walshe (2003). Regulating Healthcare: A Prescription for Improvement? 
Buckingham, Open University Press.
16 Allsop and Mulcahy (1996). Regulating Medical Work: Formal and Informal 
Controls. Buckingham, Open University Press.
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understanding of regulation to aspects of health care include article length 
contributions from Keith Syrett (applying Robert Baldwin’s framework for 
evaluating regulation)17 and Anne Davies (noting the replacement of a ‘light 
touch, self-regulatory paradigm’ to an ‘interventionist, managerial 
paradigm’).18
Notwithstanding these notable contributions, ‘generic’ approaches to 
health care regulation are relatively under-emphasised in the literature as a 
whole. As an indication of its ‘late developer’ status, it is worth noting that 
while generic textbooks on regulation have appeared in the UK with a focus 
on industrial regulation19 and on public utilities,20 no UK textbook has so far 
focussed on regulation in the health sector, or even on the regulation of 
welfare services more generally. The recent emergence of postgraduate 
programmes in this area, such as Anglia Polytechnic University’s M.Sc. and 
Diplomas in Health and Social Care Regulation, suggests that this may be a 
niche in the market that remains to be filled.
In order to explore more fully the reasons for the growth in volume 
and maturity of the regulation scholarship, as well as the late development 
of health care regulation scholarship, the next section looks to one strand in 
this literature which asserts that the last quarter of a century has witnessed 
the rise of the regulatory state in Western European countries, and—as one 
facet of this—of the emergence of a ‘regulatory state inside the state’.
17 Syrett (2002). "NICE Work? Rationing, Review and the 'Legitimacy 
Problem' in the New NHS." Medical Law Review 10 (1): 1-27.
18 Davies (2000). "Don't Trust Me, I'm a Doctor: Medical Regulation and the 
1999 NHS Reforms." Oxford Journal o f Legal Studies 20 (3): 437-456.
19 Ogus (1994). Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory. Oxford, 
Clarendon Press.
20 Baldwin and Cave (1999). Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and 
Practice. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
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2.3 The Regulatory State
2.3.1 The Rise of the Regulatory State21
Alternatively to the two possible ways of ‘explaining away’ the growth of 
the regulation scholarship raised in the previous section (reflecting changing 
linguistic usage or research funding priorities), it has been argued that 
growth of academic interest in regulation in European countries reflects 
profound changes in the way societies are governed: “The relative neglect of 
regulatory analysis in the past corresponded to the low visibility of 
regulatory activities.”22 Majone argues that policies of privatisation and 
deregulation in the 1980s and 1990s created the conditions for the rise of the 
regulatory state in the countries of Western Europe, and in the European 
Union itself.23 Following the introduction of these policies, according to 
Majone, a renewed emphasis on economic and social regulation, 
administered by specialised agencies operating outside hierarchical 
ministerial control and oversight has replaced patterns of public ownership, 
national planning and centralised administration characteristic of the 
‘positive state’. This, in turn, has directed the focus of public policy away 
from macro-economic stabilisation and redistributive welfare policies 
towards a greater concern with competitiveness and economic efficiency.
Martin Loughlin and Colin Scott further develop this idea by 
contributing an analysis of the precise nature of the regulatory state,
21 A comprehensive review of the literature on the regulatory state can be found 
in Moran (2002). "Understanding the Regulatory State." British Journal o f 
Political Science 32 (2): 391-413.
22 Majone (1994). "The Rise of the Regulatoiy State in Europe." West 
European Politics 17 (1): 77-101, p. 78.
23 Ibid. See also Majone (1996). "Public Policy and Administration: Ideas, 
Interests and Institutions", in Goodin and Klingemann (ed.) A New Handbook 
o f Political Science. Oxford, Oxford University Press; Majone (1997). "From 
the Positive to the Regulatory State." Journal o f Public Policy 17 (2): 139-167.
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identifying three specific institutional changes associated with the rise of the 
regulatory state, namely: (1) the separation of policy-making from service 
delivery (‘provision’ and ‘production’ in their terminology); (2) the creation 
of free standing regulators; and (3) increasing formality of rules, roles and 
relations within the ‘regulatory space’.24 As Chapter 3 discusses at length, 
although each of these trends has been identified within the NHS in existing 
scholarship, these have not previously been analysed as related aspects of 
underlying changes in governance. The regulatory state literature potentially 
therefore provides for a new interpretation of existing understandings of 
organisational change in the NHS.
For Majone, a set of complex historical, institutional and 
motivational factors explain the rise of the regulatory state, including the 
exhaustion of earlier modes of governance, constraints on budget-raising 
powers, and (at the EU level) tendencies towards bureaucratic expansionism 
in the Commission. Underlying these proximate causes, however, is a form- 
and-function type argument, based on a particular view o f the changing 
nature of policy-making. According to Majone’s functional analysis, 
traditional positive state institutions are seen as ill-equipped to meet the 
demands caused by the complexity of policy issues, which is itself in part 
due to such factors as the emergence of efficiency as an over-riding policy 
goal, the strategic value of credibility in policy-making and the need for co­
ordination of a large number of activities: “The growth of administrative 
regulation in Europe owes much to these newly articulated perceptions of a 
mismatch between existing institutional capacities and the growing 
complexity of policy problems.”25 Policy-making by expert, non-
24 Loughlin and Scott (1997). "The Regulatory State", in Dunleavy, Gamble, 
Holliday and Peele (ed.) Developments in British Politics 5. Basingstoke, 
Macmillan, pp. 205-207.
25 Majone, op. cit., note 18, p. 85.
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majoritarian institutions and through formal rules is seen as a more 
appropriate way of governing, better suited to these particular kinds of 
challenges where efficiency is a primary policy goal, and especially where 
the credibility (understood in the sense of ‘time-consistency’) of policies is a 
significant constraint.
This interpretation has been challenged, at least with respect to its 
applicability in the British context, by Michael Moran, who argues that: 
“ ...the fundamental forces that seem to be driving change within the British 
system appear to contradict the most important theoretical insights claimed 
by the theory of the European regulatory state.” Three aspects of the 
British regulatory state in particular seem, for Moran, to be at odds with 
Majone’s explanation. First, although the regulatory state in Britain has 
abandoned the encompassing (and to a significant extent, redistributivist) 
ambitions of the Keynesian welfare state, it has at the same time been 
associated with expanded ambitions, in particular in the area of social 
regulation. Second, the shift of emphasis away from informal self-regulatory 
processes towards formal state regulation appears to have, in contradiction 
to Majone, to have led to increased hierarchical oversight. Finally, 
regulation has, perhaps contrary to expectations, been the focus of 
majoritarian politics while the decline of informality has expanded the 
majoritarian arena.27 In short, in Britain, the regulatory state is associated 
with expanded reach as much as with diminished scope, while remaining 
overtly ‘political’ in character. This apparent revolt of the facts against the 
theory raises important questions about the extent to which functional 
arguments, such as those put forward by Majone, can explain the particular
26 Moran (2003). The British Regulatory State. Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, p. 20.
27 Ibid., pp. 20-21.
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historical changes that are captured by the idea of the regulatory state. This 
issue is taken up in more detail in Chapter 3.
2.3.2 Regulation Inside Government
Even more so than the regulatory state in general, the regulation of 
government has only lately been explicitly recognised as an object of 
scholarly interest, in the UK context, most notably by Christopher Hood and 
his colleagues.28 HoQd et al. identify a range of processes by which 
government regulates itself, analogous to the state regulation of the private 
sector. Arguably, this belated recognition can help to explain why health 
care has been a partial exception, or at least a laggard, in terms of Baldwin, 
Scott and Hood’s diagnosed ‘maturation’ of regulation scholarship and 
practice. Hood et al. coin the phrase ‘regulation inside government’ to 
denote this phenomenon, which they distinguish from other forms of 
control, for example by the legislature or the courts, when three specific 
criteria are satisfied:
• one bureaucracy aims to shape the activities of another;
• there is some degree of organizational separation between the 
‘regulating’ bureaucracy and the ‘regulatee’;
• the ‘regulator’ has some kind of official mandate to scrutinize 
the behaviour of the ‘regulatee’ and to seek to change it.29
On the basis of this stipulated definition, Hood et a l find a marked growth
in regulation inside government in the two decades up to 1997 and
continued planned expansion under the post-1997 Labour government.
These trends, they argue, indicate the emergence of a ‘regulatory state inside
the state’. Following the more general example of the regulation inside
28 Hood, Scott, James, Jones and Travers (1999). Regulation Inside 
Government: Waste-Watchers, Quality Police, andSleaze-Busters. Oxford, 
Clarendon Press; Hood, James and Scott (2000). "Regulation of Government: 
Has it Increased, is it Increasing, Should it be Diminished?" Public 
Administration 78 (2): 283-304.
29 Regulation Inside Government, p. 8.
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government literature, the scholarly literature has begun to recognise a 
similar rise of regulation inside the NHS.30
One potentially productive dimension of the regulation inside 
government research agenda has been the strategy, implicit in the regulation 
inside government literature generally, but exemplified in an article by 
Oliver James,31 of transposing to the public sector concepts drawn from the 
literature on business regulation, as a source of insights and hypotheses for 
further investigation. James re-examines in the context of regulation inside 
government the now well-worn debate (in the business regulation literature) 
on public-interest justifications for regulation versus private-interest 
explanations for regulatory failure. Although official discourse on regulation 
of the public sector has focussed on the public interest justifications, James 
identifies three forms of government-regulatory failure, analogous to 
regulatory failure more generally, that offer reasons to question the post- 
1997 Labour Government’s apparent faith in increased regulation inside 
government.
James’s approach—indeed the approach of the regulation inside 
government literature more generally—can be seen as an almost 
paradigmatic instance of Donald Schon’s notion of ‘displacement of 
concepts’.32 Schon uses this formulation to capture the idea that the 
development of new theories is cognate with the process of analogy and 
metaphor in language and with the development of new products in 
industry. For Schon, in the application of concepts to new kinds of situation 
outside their normal use, concepts themselves are transformed: “Through
30 Walshe (2002). "The Rise of Regulation in the NHS." BMJ 324: 967-970,20 
April 2002.
31 See James (2000). "Regulation Inside Government: Public Interest 
Justifications and Regulatory Failures." Public Administration 78 (2): 327-343.
32 Schon, op. cit.
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their displacement they have been transformed. They have been made into a 
new kind of instance.”33 Similarly, it could be argued that only with the 
extension34 of the concept of regulation to include regulation inside 
government does the phenomenon of regulation of NHS organisations and 
activities become ‘visible’. The next section suggests reasons why one 
particular tradition in the literature on regulation of the private sector, the 
‘regulatory bargains’ approach (part of an exchange paradigm in public 
policy and administration more generally), may be particularly appropriate 
as a source of inspiration for an analysis of health care regulation.
2.4 The Exchange Paradigm
An ‘exchange paradigm’ (if that is not too grand a term) underlies many 
existing analyses of regulation, most notably informing what can be termed 
the ‘regulatory bargains’ approach. The fundamental assumption of the 
exchange paradigm is that political and administrative arrangements are the 
outcome of bargaining between contending interests, and that, by 
understanding the conditions under which bargaining took place, one can 
explain the resulting arrangements. At the same time, as discussed below, 
this paradigm also informs much work in health policy, as well as in public 
administration more generally. Because of this, a transposition of this 
particular approach into the context of regulation of the NHS, similar to 
James’s strategy discussed above, can ‘punch into’ existing debates in 
health policy and public administration, and address questions of regulation 
in the NHS in a way that engages with these debates.
33 Ibid. p. 31.
34 For Schon, it is possible only after the fact to speak of an extension of a 
concept in this way.
35
The exchange paradigm has in recent times been most closely 
associated with the public choice school, whose influence has been fiercely 
criticised—and perhaps more often ignored—in the UK public law literature 
because of what some would see as its overtly ideological ‘new right’ bias 
as well as because of its alleged North American assumptions. At the 
same time, the idea that political and administrative arrangements are based 
on exchange has a long and distinguished history, and is not associated only 
with the public choice approach. The studies of Bernard Schaffer and, 
more recently, Christopher Hood into politician-bureaucrat relations, and 
the work of Rudolf Klein in health policy and politics testify to the fact that 
an exchange perspective can contribute interesting insights in the UK 
context, as well as demonstrating that the acceptance of the exchange 
paradigm goes beyond adherents of the public choice school.
The remainder of this section is organised as follows. First, the 
regulatory bargains approach is discussed. Second, the cognate public 
service bargains (PSB) approach in the public administration literature, 
associated with Bernard Schaffer and, more recently, Christopher Hood is 
reviewed. Finally, this section reviews the pioneering work of Rudolf Klein 
which argues that an implicit concordat between the government and the 
medical profession underpins the organisation of the NHS. It is argued here,
35 For a critique of public choice ‘ideology’ as well as an outline attempt to 
understand public choice from a UK legal policy perspective, see McAuslan 
(1988). "Public Law and Public Choice." Modern Law Review 51 (6): 681-705, 
pp. 63, 163-165. See also Prosser (1999). "Theorising Utility Regulation." 
Modern Law Review 62 (2): 196-217, pp. 203-206. In the US context, see 
Kelman (1988). "On Democracy Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical 
and 'Empirical' Practice of the Public Choice Movement." Virginia Law Review 
74(1): 199-273.
36 Terry Moe traces the origins of this approach through the work of Herbert 
Simon to Chester Barnard. See Moe (1984). "The New Economics of 
Organisation." American Journal o f Political Science 28: 739-777.
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that Klein’s conception of the implicit concordat can be seen as a kind of a 
health-specific PSB.
2.4.1 The Regulatory Bargains Approach
The distinguishing feature of the regulatory bargains approach is a focus on 
the exchange which this approach identifies as occurring between regulators 
and regulated. This* approach has been most fully developed with respect to 
regulation of the privatised utilities where it is argued that relations between 
regulators and the privatised utilities can best be understood as a loosely 
specified contract, according to which, in return for undertaking certain 
obligations—for example, to supply a basic level of service at an affordable 
and non-discriminatory price—the firm is rewarded with secure revenue 
streams, specified (in the case of UK regulated utilities) in the form of price 
caps. The terminology of the ‘regulatory contract’ is unfortunate as it 
potentially leads to avoidable confusion, both with the juristic notion of 
contract, and discussion within the economic literature of incentive 
contracts as instruments of regulation. The term ‘regulatory bargain’, which 
is often used interchangeably with ‘regulatory contract’ in the economics 
literature on regulation will be used exclusively hereafter, to avoid this 
potential confusion.
Cento Veljanovski’s analysis of the utilities privatisations of the 
1980s typifies the regulatory bargains approach.38 The sale of the utilities, 
he argues, was based on an implicit understanding between the government
37 Bishop, Kay and Mayer (1995). "Introduction", in Bishop, Kay and Mayer 
(ed.) The Regulatory Challenge. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 2, 6.
38 Veljanovski (1987). Selling the State: Privatization in Britain. London, 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson; Veljanovski (1991). "The Regulation Game", in 
Veljanovski (ed.) Regulators and the Market. London, Institute of Economic 
Affairs; Veljanovski (1993). The Future o f Industry Regulation. London, 
European Policy Forum.
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and shareholders that the initial rules of the game, notably light-touch
regulation in terms of both price and quality would not be radically changed.
Veljanovski sees the behaviour of regulatory agencies as going against the
spirit of this bargain, as they have sought to introduce competition into the
utilities sectors, and having resort to increasingly heavy-handed intervention
to achieve this goal:
As a result many of the regulators have found themselves railing 
against the implicit understanding—the ‘regulatory bargain’—struck 
between the utilities (read shareholders) and the Government at the 
time of floatation. The regulators appear to have come to the 
conclusion: if the structure of industry and much of the regulation 
work against competition, then the ‘regulatory bargain’ must be 
broken by edging the controls against the utilities.39
The result of the breakdown of the regulatory bargain has been, according
to Veljanovski, has been the emergence of a ‘regulation game’ between
industry chiefs and regulators, characterised by informal power struggles
and grandstanding by industry chiefs and regulators alike, as part of a
struggle for control.
The adoption of a regulatory bargains approach naturally leads to a 
focus on the mechanisms by which the regulatory bargain is enforced. 
Veljanovski’s analysis points to an absence of effective safeguards in the 
UK and to the reneging, on the part of Government on what he sees as an 
expectation that “...the prospectus [on privatization] would provide a 
binding commitment or bargain between the Government and 
shareholders...”40 This is odd. While it is not contentious that a prospectus 
for the sale of shares must present a fair and true account of the company 
under offer, it could hardly, on any orthodox legal analysis, be argued to
39 Veljanovski, op. cit. (1991), p. 22.
40 Veljanovski (1993). The Future o f Industry Regulation. London, European 
Policy Forum, p. 59.
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create binding (substantive) undertakings as to the future direction of 
government policy.
The work of Levy and Spiller on telecommunications regulation, which 
focuses on the particularly acute problem faced by many developing countries 
in attracting private sector investment, provides an interesting application of the 
regulatory bargains approach which is far more sophisticated than that of 
Velanovski, especially in terms of its analysis of how the regulatory bargain is 
maintained.41 Drawing on the institutional economics approach developed by 
Coase, North, Williamson and others, Levy and Spiller look at the way in 
which, in the absence of formally binding policy commitments, the governance 
framework for regulation in different constitutional settings can enhance (or 
diminish) the credibility of the government’s commitment to the regulatory 
bargain. Reform-minded policymakers, they argue, must select from a range of 
instruments that can potentially enhance the credibility of regulation, including 
precisely specified legislative provisions, delegation across tiers of government 
to independent regulatory agencies, legally binding licenses and reliance upon 
‘informal’ constraints. Different instruments are appropriate to different 
national regimes, and they construct a decision-tree relating” the appropriate 
choice of instruments to the ‘institutional endowment’ of a country, that is to 
say, its background pattern of legislative, judicial and executive institutions 42 
Elsewhere, with Martin Lodge, I have suggested that there are certain problems 
with the key (Jamaican) case study in Levy and Spiller’s analysis, especially in
41 Levy and Spiller (1994). "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory 
Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation." 
Journal o f Law, Economics and Organization 10 (2): 201-246; Levy and 
Spiller, eds. (1996). Regulations Institutions and Commitment: Comparative 
Studies o f Telecommunications. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
42 Social norms and patterns of interest group organisation are also included by 
Levy and Spiller as contributing to a country’s institutional endowment, and an 
analysis of these factors is included in their co-author’s country studies in Ibid., 
though they are not modelled within the decision-tree framework upon which 
their analysis is based.
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the light of subsequent developments that, at first sight, seem to fly in the face 
of their predictions.43 Nevertheless, their approach provides a rich theoretical 
analysis of the way in which institutional arrangements can help to mitigate 
commitment problem in regulation. For the moment, it is sufficient to note the 
difficulty facing governments of Westminster-style constitutional systems, such 
as Britain—in which the executive dominates the legislature, and where 
different parties compete for exclusive control of executive power—in 
establishing credible commitment to the regulatory bargain. To the extent that 
credible policy commitments are possible, these are likely, on Levy and 
Spiller’s account, to rely on judicial enforcement of property (or analogous) 
rights and on traditions of civil service neutrality to protect against 
‘politicisation’ in the exercise of administrative discretion.
In the context of utilities regulation, the regulatory bargains 
approach, and Levy and Spiller’s approach in particular, has much to 
commend it; as Tony Prosser argues, something like the regulatory bargains 
approach underpinned much of the institutional design for utilities 
regulation adopted on privatisation in the UK.44 As the work of Levy and 
Spiller in particular emphasises, the problem of establishing commitment to 
the initial regulatory arrangements is an acute one, with important real- 
world consequences in the case of utilities, where large sunk costs and asset 
specificity make these industries particularly vulnerable to ‘administrative 
expropriation’. At the same time, Prosser has been a fierce critic of the 
approach for a number of reasons. First, the effect of the ascendancy of this 
view among the original architects of the UK’s system of utilities 
regulation, he argues, was to privilege of dominant firms over other
43 Stirton and Lodge (2003). "Re-Thinking Institutional Endowment in Jamaica: 
Misguided Theory, Prophecy of Doom or Explanation for Regulatory Change?" 
CARR/CRC/ABS Workshop on Risk Regulation, Accountability and 
Development, Hulme Hall, University of Manchester.
44 Prosser (1999). "Theorising Utility Regulation." Modern Law Review 62 (2): 
196-217, pp. 200-3. See also (Prosser, 2005 #186}
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interests, such as new entrants and consumers. Second, whatever its earlier 
empirical content, the regulatory bargains approach made less sense of 
actual regulatory practice over time, especially in the context of more 
competitive markets in which a broader set of stakeholders compete for 
regulatory influence. Put simply, the regulatory bargains approach 
understates the essential (and increasing) pluralism of regulation.
While Prosser’s criticisms hold some force, and cautions against 
inappropriate transposition of this approach into other sectors, his criticisms 
are arguably over-stated for a number of reasons. First, the association of 
the approach with (what for independent reasons may be regarded as) 
undesirable implications for policy, specifically, with the privileging of 
incumbents within the regulatory process, needs to be clearly separated with 
the value of the approach as a way of understanding regulatory reform; 
domination of the regulatory process by incumbents was a feature of early 
post-privatisation utility regulation and any theory that did not account for 
this would itself be problematic. Furthermore, the alleged privileging of 
incumbent firms may reflect underlying power relations and resource 
dependencies, as much as the application by policymakers of a particular, 
(and arguably flawed) theory of regulation. Second, as the commitment 
perspective of Levy and Spiller suggests, the observation that initial 
regulatory bargains in the utilities sectors have broken down over time does 
not invalidate the approach per se. Arguably, once one focuses on the issue 
of commitment to the regulatory bargain, the UK utilities sectors 
demonstrate precisely the pattern of development that the regulatory 
bargains approach would lead us to expect, namely an initial bilateral 
bargain coming under sustained pressure in the face of an opening up of the 
regulatory arena to wider set of interests, leading to a new and broader (and 
perhaps less stable) coalition of ‘stakeholders’. Third, although 
Veljanovski’s work in particular does not demonstrate this subtlety, there is
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no fundamental reason why the regulatory bargains approach applies only 
where regulatory policy is based on bi-lateral relations between 
governments and incumbent providers. Indeed, Hood’s PSB analysis, 
discussed later in this section, explicitly accommodates situations involving 
a menage a trois (or more) suggesting that a regulatory bargains analysis 
might proceed along similar lines if such an approach was suggested by the 
facts on the ground.45 Overall, it could be argued that, by focussing his 
criticisms on Veljanovski’s account in particular, Prosser fails to see the 
best in the regulatory bargains approach.
2.4.2 The Public Service Bargains (PSB) Approach 
and the Implicit Concordat
As noted above, the regulatory bargains approach is highly cognate with 
prominent themes in the public administration literature more generally, 
namely, the public service bargains (PSB) analyses of relations between 
politicians and civil servants. The concept of the ‘public service bargain’ 
was put forward by Bernard Schaffer, who argued that the distinctive 
features of the British civil service, as it emerged in the Victorian era— 
including the politician-official distinction itself—were the result of a 
“highly complicated” and “peculiar” bargain between politicians and 
bureaucrats.46 The essence of this bargain was that in return for granting 
permanent tenure (thus abrogating, in practice at least, the traditional
45 Given the strong similarities between the PSB approach within political 
science and the regulatory bargains literature, it is curious that Prosser does not 
refer to or make use of the work of Hood, Schaffer or Klein, especially given 
also his view that, “... though many of us [i.e. legal scholars] find it easy to 
work within the sort of theoretical approaches adopted by political scientists, 
many of us find it far harder to work with economists.” See (Prosser, 2005 
#186}
46 Schaffer (1973). "Public Employment, Political Rights and Political 
Development", in Schaffer (ed.) The Administrative Factor. London, Frank 
Cass, p. 252.
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doctrine that Crown servants were dismissible at pleasure), civil servants 
gave up certain political rights, including the right to challenge government 
policy publicly. Schaffer argued that many of the salient and enduring 
features of the British civil service, above all its neutrality and permanence 
and generalist competence, owed their origins to this implicit bargain.47 
More recently, Christopher Hood has extended the concept of PSBs as a tool 
for comparative analysis of politician-bureaucrat relations, defining the term 
more broadly as:
any explicit or implicit understanding between (senior) public 
servants and other actors in a political system over their duties and 
entitlements relating to bureaucratic responsibility, autonomy and 
political identity, and expressed in convention or formal law or a 
mixture of both.48
A central insight of Hood (and indeed of Schaffer) is that PSBs emerge, and 
can endure, only under certain historically specific conditions.49 Like the 
regulatory bargains literature, an analysis of the exchange draws attention to 
the issue of commitment to the bargain, the mechanisms through which 
commitment is maintained and the extent to which reforms enhance (or 
undermine) credible commitment. Understanding how contemporary public 
management reforms challenge certain existing bargains, as well as 
analysing the conditions under which bargains underpinning new modes of 
control in the public sector can be sustained emerges as a central part of 
Hood’s research agenda. Used by Hood as a tool of comparative analysis, 
the PSB concept has contributed important insights into various ‘paradoxes’
47 Ibid.
48 Hood (2000). "Paradoxes of Public-Sector Managerialism, Old Public 
Management and Public Service Bargains." International Public Management 
Journal 3 (1): 1-22. See also Hood (2002). "Control, Bargains and Cheating: 
The Politics of Public Service Reform." Journal o f Public Administration 
Research and Theory 12 (3): 309-332.
49 Schaffer, op. cit., pp. 252-3, puts it elegantly: “What we know is that 
ministers shuffle out of their part of the bargain, the demands of proficiency 
increase, and even British civil servants no longer get their old guaranteed 
ration of honours.”
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of public-sector managerialism, including paradoxes of globalisation or 
internationalisation, successful ‘failures’ and, most significantly for present 
purposes, paradoxes of half-hearted managerialism.
A health sector-specific variant of the PSB idea is put forward by
Rudolf Klein in his seminal The Politics o f  the NHS.50 Although Klein did
not explicitly rely on Schaffer’s formulation of the idea (and the first edition
of The Politics o f  the NHS pre-dates Hood’s work on PSBs by nearly two
decades), his analysis is nonetheless highly congruent with the analyses of
Schaffer and Hood and can be considered as part of the same broad
approach. Klein argued that the structure of the NHS reflected an implicit
bargain (or ‘concordat’ as he terms it) between the state and the medical
profession. His analysis of the politics of the NHS thus shares with their
approaches a focus on an initial exchange giving rise to administrative
structures, as well as a concern with the conditions under which the bargain
was maintained, and eventually broke down, only to re-assert itself in
modified form. In a frequently quoted passage, Klein captures the essence of
this professional PSB:
Implicit in the structure of the NHS was a bargain between the State 
and the medical profession. While central government controlled the 
budget, doctors controlled what happened within that budget. 
Financial power was concentrated at the centre; clinical power was 
concentrated at the periphery. Politicians in Cabinet made the 
decisions about how much to spend; doctors made the decisions 
about which patient should get what kind of treatment.51
The core of the bargain was thus that the profession agreed to support the
NHS, and within a framework of policy set by the Government, including
budgetary constraints set by the Government. In return for this, doctors
50 Klein (1983). The Politics o f the National Health Service. London, Longman. 
For the most recent edition, see Klein (2001). The New Politics o f the NHS. 4th 
Edition, Harlow, Prentice Hall.
51 Klein (2001). The New Politics o f the NHS. 4th Edition, Harlow, Prentice 
Hall, p. 64.
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practicing within the NHS continued to enjoy their historic autonomy, 
including the power over resource allocation and prioritisation within those 
budget constraints. As a result, professionals enjoyed a relative absence of 
hierarchical oversight and direction. However, as Klein notes, this was an 
evolving bargain, “ ... not so much a fixed settlement as a truce: an 
accommodation to what was, for both parties, a necessary rather than a 
desirable compromise.”52 This accommodation endured for a considerable 
period of time, but was increasingly challenged, beginning in the 1980s, 
with the managerial reforms recommended to the Secretary of State by Roy 
Griffiths (who subsequently became Sir Roy). Finally, the Working for  
Patients White Paper,53 which re-organised the NHS along the lines of an 
internal market model, represented the imposition of a “new constitutional 
settlement” which the medical profession “proved powerless to prevent”.54 
But although this was something of a unilateral modification of the pre­
existing bargain, it was not an abrogation of it: following the introduction of 
the implementing legislation (which became the National Health Service 
and Community Care Act 1990), the implicit concordat, including a 
commitment to clinical freedom continued, albeit in modified form. This 
was symbolised for Klein by the creation of a multi-professional Clinical 
Standards Advisory Group, which reflected the reality, in his view, of 
continuing professional dominance in matters of clinical standards.55 Klein 
interprets the Labour Government’s NHS reforms of 1999 in similar terms, 
as a kind of ‘forced renegotiation’ (my term, not Klein’s) of the terms of the 
concordat, and a reinterpretation of the idea of clinical autonomy. As a 
result of these reforms:
52 Ibid.
53 Secretaries of States for Health Wales Northern Ireland and Scotland (1989) 
Working for Patients, CM555, London, HMSO.
54 Klein, op. cit., p. 172.
55 Ibid.
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Self-regulation had survived, but it had been made accountable; 
collegial control over the performance of doctors had largely been 
maintained but at the cost of sacrificing the autonomy of individual 
doctors. Once again, it was apparent that there had been a shift in the 
balance of power between the state and the profession.56
What explains this pattern of development, of an enduring bargain that 
showed increasing signs of strain in the 1980s, leading to the imposition of a 
new settlement first by the government of Margaret Thatcher, and later by 
the post-1997 Labour government? For Klein, a large part of the answer 
clearly lies in the institutions of health policy, including the structures of the 
NHS, within which the profession effectively enjoyed a veto on any matters 
of significance. But the protection afforded to the initial bargain was limited 
by the fact that these institutions and structures were themselves nested 
within a wider context, which had the potential to upset the stability of the 
bargain. Moreover, to the Government, broadening out health policy­
making into its wider context was a strategy to overcome the power that the 
profession enjoyed in private. Speaking of the profession’s inability to resist 
the Working for Patients reforms (although the point is arguably more 
general), he says:
Its power, it turned out, was contingent on the arena in which it was 
exercised and the issues involved. When the health care policy arena 
was widened out—when reforms of the NHS were put in the wider 
context of modernising Britain’s institutions—the medical 
profession lost its central place on the stage: it simply became an 
actor, and not necessarily the most influential, among many.57
There are obvious parallels here with Michael Moran’s thesis that much of
the ‘hyper-innovation’ in British Government over the last quarter of a
century has been due, not only to a crisis of policy, but also to a crisis of
‘club government’, a system of rule he characterises as “oligarchic,
56 Ibid. p. 211.
57 Ibid.
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informal, secret... and highly pervasive.”58 At the same time, even if these 
periodic episodes have been due to a crisis of club government, the implicit 
concordat has re-asserted itself, albeit with a shift in power relations 
between the Government and the profession. Drawing the comparison with 
the work of Hood still further, one could interpret Klein’s analysis as 
providing a resolution to a paradox of half-hearted managerialism: despite 
bold policy initiatives, successive attempts to transform the dynamics of the 
NHS have had limited effect.
Klein’s contribution to social policy in general, and to the analysis of 
health policy in particular has been enormously influential, and a substantial 
body of literature has developed the idea of the implicit concordat, and its 
implications. One strand of this body of literature goes further than Klein’s 
own analysis in charting the demise of the concordat over time. Another, 
closely related strand points to the positive practical contribution that the 
concordat has made to health policy in the UK, and look to the restoration of 
the concordat or a new variant of it. The work of Ham and Alberti and Brian 
Salter respectively, exemplifies each of these closely related strands. In 
Ham and Alberti’s account, the “implicit compact” (as they term it) is 
analysed as a menage a trois—the third party in the relationship was the 
public—and which served to establish expectations as to the rights and 
responsibilities of the different parties.59 Confronted with the breakdown of 
the implicit compact, they seek to identify the basis of a new, explicit 
compact emphasising the rights and responsibilities of each of the three 
parties—the profession, the government and the public—and setting out 
more realistic expectations about what the NHS can deliver. Salter’s
58 Moran (2003). The British Regulatory State. Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, p. 4.
59 Ham and Alberti (2002). "The Medical Profession, The Public, and the 
Government." BMJ 324: 838-842, 6 April 2002.
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account, on the other hand, places primary emphasis on the purpose served 
by the implicit concordat as a means of resolving certain contradictions in 
the UK health care system, as a consequence of which competing political 
parties promise citizens ever-increasing access to better health care, and 
which exceeds the capacity of the state to deliver.60 Rather than involving 
the public, for Salter, the implicit concordat was a form (albeit, he argues, a 
necessary one) of collusion against it, in which the profession acted as 
‘gatekeeper’, moderating impossibly high demands for care engendered by 
electoral competition and by the principles of the welfare state. But, as 
Salter argues, the concordat has been undermined first, by social changes, 
making it more difficult to maintain the pretence that access to health care is 
unlimited and second because of the Griffiths managerial reforms and the 
Working for Patients reforms. These reforms violated the implicit concordat 
by imposing a degree of managerial control on clinical standards in (what 
Salter sees as) a misplaced attempt to resolve the tension between finite 
supply and potentially unlimited demand through greater operational 
efficiency. They were therefore self-defeating because they only served to 
reinforce expectations about the level of performance of the NHS, and to 
increase the visibility of rationing decisions. The solution, as he sees it, is 
for a concerted effort to revise the concordat: “Unchanged for 50 years, the 
concordat is in need of serious revision if its considerable political utility to 
both sides is to be retained.”61 Building on these ideas, Salter has in 
subsequent work attempted to identify criteria for a politically sustainable 
way of regulating health services.62
60 Salter (1998). The Politics o f Change in the Health Service. Basingstoke, 
Macmillan, pp. 11-15.
61 Ibid., p. 125.
62 Salter (2002). "Medical Regulation: New Politics and Old Power Structures." 
Politics 22 (2): 59-67.
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As the discussion of the previous section has demonstrated, the issue 
of commitment figured within Klein’s formulation of the implicit concordat. 
Specifically, he highlighted the importance of the capacity of the 
organisational structure of the NHS to support the concordat by allocating 
decision-making authority over different issues to different groups—though 
this capacity was limited to the extent that it was open to the Government to 
alter the structure of the NHS and, furthermore, to move the debate over the 
organisation of the Health Service into the wider political arena in which 
professional interests were not dominant. By contrast, the issue of credible 
commitment does not figure prominently either in the account of Salter or 
Ham and Alberti. By neglecting the commitment issue, Salter’s exhortation 
for a renewal of the concordat is unrealistic; and while Ham and Alberti 
attempt to write an explicit concordat, the regulatory bargains literature 
suggests that identifying more clearly and transparently the respective duties 
and entitlements of different groups is not sufficient for their maintenance 
(though it may arguably be necessary outside the earlier context of a 
bilateral bargain). The issue of credible commitment relates, implicitly or 
explicitly, to prominent themes in the health policy literature more 
generally. The following section reviews briefly existing work in the area of 
health policy which, while not explicitly following Klein’s implicit 
concordat analysis, contributes related ideas in the politics of health care 
reform.
2.4.3 Commitment and the Politics of Health Care 
Reform
Analyses of the politics of health care reform which contribute important 
insights into the nature of credible commitment in the health care arena
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include Carolyn Hughes Tuohy’s Accidental Logics, Theodore Marmor’s 
The Politics o f Medicare64 and the work of Andrew Hindmoor, extended by 
Adrian Kay, on policy networks in the health care sector.65 Only in the latter 
case is the commitment frame explicit (though this is developed in a manner 
that is substantially different from the present account). This section 
discusses each of these three contributions in turn.
In Accidental Logics, Carolyn Hughes Tuohy presents a comparative 
analysis of the introduction of market-based reforms into the health care 
systems of the United States, Canada and Britain.66 The general claim made 
by Tuohy is that the development of health policy is shaped by a series of 
discrete and decisive policy episodes which may occur only during 
relatively rare ‘windows of opportunity’ at which point external events (a 
decisive election victory, perhaps or some kind of ‘crisis’ in the provision of 
health care) make it possible to overcome the institutionalised interests 
within the health care arena. The specific mix of three dominant 
institutional forms—hierarchy, market and collegium—chosen during these 
relatively rare moments determines the general direction of incremental 
reform that occurs during long periods of ‘normal’ policymaking. Applying 
this analytical frame to the UK case, Tuohy interprets the establishment of 
the NHS in 1948 as embedding within the UK health sector a system of
63 Tuohy (1999). Accidental Logics: The Dynamics o f Change in the Health 
Care Arena in the United States, Britain and Canada. New York, Oxford 
University Press.
64 Marmor (2000). The Politics o f Medicare. Second edition, New York, Aldine 
de Grutyer.
65 Hindmoor (1998). "The Importance of Being Trusted: Transaction Costs and 
Policy Network Theory." Public Administration 76 (1): 25-43; Kay (2001). 
"Beyond Policy Community: The case of the GP Fundholding scheme." Public 
Administration 79 (3): 561-577.
66 Tuohy (1999). Accidental Logics: The Dynamics o f Change in the Health 
Care Arena in the United States, Britain and Canada. New York, Oxford 
University Press.
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“hierarchical corporatism”. This is the term she uses to denote a peculiar 
institutional mix in which collegial institution of social control by (primarily 
medical) professional interests tempered political and bureaucratic 
leadership in health policy. Although professional interests were 
antagonistic towards the introduction of market elements into the 
institutional mix of the NHS, the internal market reforms were possible, for 
Tuohy, due to the opening of a rare window of opportunity in the late 1980s. 
Reform, she argues, was possible due to a momentary concentration of 
political will generated by a third Conservative electoral victory, combined 
with the perception of ‘crisis’ in the NHS which persuaded Mrs Thatcher 
and her senior colleagues that the costs of inaction exceeded the costs of 
conflict with the medical profession and other producer interests. Although 
the Conservative government was able, in this exceptional moment, to enact 
these reforms, their implementation required a return to normal 
policymaking, the effect of which was to minimise the intrusion of market 
mechanisms into the institutional mix of the UK health care system. 
Although Tuohy does not explicitly adopt Klein’s formulation of the 
implicit concordat, she develops a similar understanding of the role of the 
organisational structure of the NHS in constraining the development of 
policy. The initial institutional form of the NHS is seen to have afforded the 
medical profession a voice, in normal circumstances amounting to an 
effective veto over non-incremental policy change. Tuohy’s analysis 
contributes an understanding of how health policy change becomes path- 
dependent (as well as demonstrating how similar issues arise in different 
national contexts). This approach may have the potential to inform PSB- 
type analysis by contributing an improved understanding of how political 
bargains can be maintained. At the same time, her focus on the market- 
based reforms of the early 1990s comes at the cost of a neglect of the rise of 
regulation in the NHS, and how new forms of policy-making might change 
this essential path-dependency.
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The role of commitment in a legislative context emerges as a major 
theme in Theodore Marmor’s seminal work, The Politics o f  Medicare. 
Marmor shows how, following the defeat of President Truman’s plans for a 
universal health insurance scheme, a more modest hospital insurance 
programme for the elderly—Medicare—eventually became a ‘policy 
success’ (in the sense of making it ‘off the drawing board’ and into actual 
policy) in 1965, despite sustained and committed opposition that had 
prevented the adoption of the Medicare proposal in the preceding decade 
and half. Following the unusual Democratic control of House, Senate and 
Presidency that resulted from the landslide election of 1964, the enactment 
of Medicare became, according to Marmor a “legislative certainty”. Faced 
with the infeasibility of cutting back on the administration’s programme, 
opponents of Medicare Bill instead proposed an expanded “three-layer pie” 
comprising Medicare Part A (hospital insurance from the elderly), Medicare 
part B (physician coverage for the elderly) and Medicaid (medical 
assistance for the poor, not restricted to the elderly), and this was what was 
enacted. This apparently paradoxical conclusion to a long struggle is 
explained, for Marmor, by the combination of a coalition of supporters of 
universal health care willing to take what they could get, and opponents of 
‘socialised medicine’ anxious to restrict the scope for future, incremental 
expansion of health care provision. Marmor’s first edition thus posits the 
explanation for one of the major puzzles in the expanded second edition, 
namely why Medicare did not expand into a system of universal health care 
coverage, as its supporters had hoped. As Bruce Vladeck puts it, in a 
contribution to the symposium on The Politics o f Medicare cited above, 
“You can’t get from the three-layer cake... to the whole pie.”67 One of 
Marmor’s central insights was to show how bargaining between fiercely 
opposed interests, led to a stable compromise that has survived the
67 Vladeck (2001). "Medicare and the Politics of Incrementalism." Journal o f 
Health Policy, Politics and Law 26 (1): 153-160, p. 157.
52
ideological climate of the Reagan and elder Bush administration, the ‘New 
Republicans’ led by Newt Gingrich in the mid-1990s and the first term of 
the younger Bush presidency.68 Marmor’s account therefore shows (without 
explicitly using the analytical frame of commitment) how the shape of 
Medicare was determined by the importance, to opponents as well as 
supporters of a federal health care system, of making the deal stick. At the 
same time, Marmor’s specific focus does not easily translate into the UK’s 
majoritarian unitary political system and majority party and electoral 
system, where (as Levy and Spiller’s argue, discussed in Section 2.4.1) 
legislation may not be as well-suited to generating credible commitment. 
His analysis does, however, demonstrate the value of institutional process 
analysis to understanding policy outcomes, including the extent of policy 
stability; this, more than Marmor’s substantial conclusions, does profitably 
translate across national contexts.
One of the few conscious attempts explicitly to place the 
commitment issue in the foreground of health policy analysis is provided by 
Andrew Hindmoor who looks at negotiations between the Ministry of 
Health and the British Medical Association (BMA) over the implementation 
of the National Health service legislation prior to 1948.69 Hindmoor notes 
how the BMA and the MoH eventually overcame the commitment problem 
and reached an agreement, “ ... without the use of either legally binding 
contracts or the exercise of authority.”70 Hindmoor models relations 
between the BMA and MoH as a prisoners’ dilemma. Rather than the usual
68 Compare Marmor’s account with Michael Moran’s assertion that in the US, 
“The reforms of the 1960s were not to produce a stable settlement in health 
care.” Moran (1999). Governing the Health Care State: A Comparative Study 
o f the United Kingdom, the United States and Germany. Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, p. 80.
69 Hindmoor (1998). "The Importance of Being Trusted: Transaction Costs and 
Policy Network Theory." Public Administration 76 (1): 25-43.
70 Ibid., p. 26.
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prediction that in a one-shot game it is not rational for either party is to co­
operate , Hindmoor argues that relations between the parties were embedded 
within a network of ongoing relations (a ‘policy community’) that 
effectively transformed a one-shot into a repeated game, in which co­
operation and trust can develop. Building on this approach, Adrian Kay has 
examined the breakdown of co-operation between the medical profession 
and the DoH following the introduction of the Limited List in 1985, and the 
effect of this break down on the implementation of the GP fundholding 
scheme.71
The approach of Hindmoor, and the additional contribution made by 
Kay are both interesting, but can be criticised on two counts. First, although 
they focus attention onto the impediments to mutually beneficial co­
operation between the medical profession and to the government, and to the 
possibility that trust can be established over time as a result of repeated 
interaction between actors within the policy community, these accounts do 
not explain when co-operation will occur and (in Kay’s case, in particular) 
why the collapse of the health policy community occurred when it did. 
Secondly, in these analyses the ‘game’ in question occurs between 
organisational actors, the BMA, on the one hand and MoH/DoH on the 
other. But if elected politicians are included as actors in the analysis distinct 
from the organisational interests of the MoH/DoH, the assumptions of a 
repeated game analysis may not represent the true situation, because 
politicians face the perpetual possibility of replacement as a result of an 
election or cabinet re-shuffle.
For present purposes, the importance of these three strands in the 
literature—Tuohy, Marmor and Hindmoor/Kay is that they point to the
71 Kay (2001). "Beyond Policy Community: The case of the GP Fundholding 
scheme." Ibid. 79 (3): 561-577.
54
more general importance of the commitment within the wider health policy 
literature (although, with the exception of Hindmoor and Kay, this has not 
generally been explicit). The brief review of these works undertaken in this 
section suggest that a regulatory bargains analysis of regulation in the NHS, 
in particular, one which focuses on the institutional basis of regulatory 
commitment, can contribute to existing debates, by showing how 
commitment (and its absence) can contribute to the development of health 
policy.
2.5 Conclusions
This brief review points to a number of emergent themes and questions for 
further investigation, upon which the present thesis will attempt to shed 
light. First, why was health a ‘late developer’ in terms of the maturation of 
regulation identified by Baldwin, Hood and Scott? The regulatory state 
literature, discussed in Section 2.3.1 points to the, until recently, low 
visibility of regulatory activities in Western European countries. Could it be 
argued that the health care sector has seen a rise of the regulatory state, 
similar to patterns asserted more generally in the regulatory state literature? 
Secondly how far can the existing literature on the regulatory state describe 
and explain patterns of development in the NHS, especially given the 
potential difficulties of the literature on the European regulatory state in 
accounting for UK developments? Third, how far can transposing analyses 
of business regulation—in the manner suggested by the regulation inside 
government literature—contribute to an understanding of regulation of the 
NHS? In particular, how can a regulatory bargains analysis illuminate the 
relationship between the design of regulatory institutions and the 
performance under regulation of NHS organisations? Finally, how, if at all 
does the shift towards the regulatory state impact on existing NHS
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institutions, and the maintenance of the implicit concordat, which is 
understood here as a kind of health-specific PSB? These themes are taken 
up in what follows in the next five chapters.
Chapter 3
The Health Care State Meets the 
Regulatory State?
To what extent should, or can, the welfare state be replaced by the 
regulatory state?1
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter identified a puzzle in the development of the literature 
on regulation: despite the increasing volume, as well as the ‘maturation’ of 
the regulation scholarship in general, and the emergence of a focus on what 
Hood et al. term ‘regulation inside government’ as an area of scholarly 
interest, these developments have largely by-passed the field of health, at 
least until very recently. As evidence of this, Chapter 2 pointed to the 
relative dearth of literature on health services sharing a common analytical 
approach with studies of other regulatory sectors, and which regarded the 
setting, monitoring and achieving compliance with standards of 
performance within the NHS as instances of a generic activity of regulation. 
This is all the more surprising because there is an established tradition of 
scholarly interest in professional regulation in the health sector, not to 
mention in the licensing of pharmaceutical products, etc. A number of
1 Day and Klein (1987). "The Business of Welfare." New Society: 11-13, 19 
June 1987, p. 12.
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potential explanations for this late developments were put forward, 
including the possibility that talk of regulation and of the regulatory state 
was, as Daintith and Moran have suggested, merely an academic fad, from 
which (it might be added), academics working in the field of health policy 
have been (mostly) spared.2 Alternatively, if the usage accurately captures a 
genuine shift in the patterns of governance in Britain over the last quarter of 
a century or so, have the changes been absent, or at least not particularly 
prominent, in health services? The purpose of this chapter is to interrogate 
the second possibility, by outlining, in the abstract, the features that are said 
to be associated with the regulatory state, and by investigating the extent to 
which these features have become present in the NHS. A second aim of this 
chapter is to assess the functional explanation for the rise of the regulatory 
state put forward by Majone, which argues that the increasing perception of 
the necessity of making credible policy commitments led to a search for 
more appropriate modes of policy-making.
This line of inquiry is of general interest, as well as providing an 
essential preliminary to the more detailed analysis of specific regulatory 
reform initiatives that follows in Chapters 5-7 of this thesis. As well as 
advancing a relatively broad understanding of the development of health 
care regulation over two decades, within which these specific regulatory 
reforms are later understood, it also provides an important challenge to the 
more general scholarship on the regulatory state. As Section 1.2.2 noted, the 
provision of health care is central to the politics of modem industrial 
societies, not only in terms of welfare provision, but also as a locus of 
professional power, and of productive economic activity. Recognising this, 
Michael Moran speaks of a “co-penetration” of state and health care 
institutions, and has coined the term “health care state” in an attempt to
2 See Section 2.2, above.
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capture this interconnectedness. Given these considerations, it matters to an 
understanding of the regulatory state whether health care fits the pattern 
asserted more generally. If not, then claims of a rise of the regulatory state, 
even if true, might be regarded as at best capturing what amounts to a 
peripheral development—a valid description of developments within some 
(arguably more marginal) sectors, but inapplicable to one of the largest, 
most central and most salient areas of state activity. Furthermore, the health 
care sector in the UK exemplifies some of the potential inconsistencies 
between theory and facts identified by Moran with respect to the literature 
on the European regulatory state and the UK experience, discussed in 
Section 2.3.1. If the theory of the European regulatory state can account for 
patterns of change under these less-than-favourable conditions, then this 
says something important about the value of the theory.
This chapter addresses these questions in three steps. Following 
closely the work of Loughlin and Scott, Section 3.2 outlines in more detail 
the features that are said to be associated with the regulatory state, and 
identifies the functional imperatives that are said to underlie the shift 
towards the regulatory state. In line with the overall focus of this inquiry, 
emphasis is placed on the explanation posited by Majone that the perceived 
need for greater policy credibility explains much of the changes associated 
with the regulatory state. Section 3.3 then examines the changes in the NHS 
over a twenty-year period, and attempts to identify trends in relation to the 
features associated with the regulatory state in Loughlin and Scott’s 
analysis. Accordingly, Sections 3.4.1 through 3.4.3 assess the extent of 
separation of policy-making from service delivery, creation of free-standing
3 Moran (1995). "Three Faces of the Health Care State." Journal o f Health 
Policy, Politics and Law 20 (3): 767-781; Moran (1999). Governing the Health 
Care State: A Comparative Study o f the United Kingdom, the United States and 
Germany. Manchester, Manchester University Press.
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agencies and increasing formalisation of standards within the NHS. Section 
3.4 then assesses these trends against the theory, assessing first the extent to 
which there has been a rise of the regulatory state inside the NHS, and 
secondly the extent to which the theory of the European regulatory state can 
account for identified trends.
3.2 Criteria for Identifying the Regulatory 
State
As discussed in Section 2.3.1, at its most general, the rise of the regulatory 
state describes a change in policy emphasis from macro-economic 
stabilisation and redistributive welfare policies towards a greater concern 
with competitiveness and economic efficiency. As discussed in that section, 
Majone explains the rise of the regulatory state in functional terms. The 
growth of administrative regulation, in his analysis, is in part a response to 
“ ...newly articulated perceptions of a mismatch between existing 
institutional capacities and the growing complexity of policy problems.”4 A 
key reason for this mismatch is the lack of credibility of ‘positive state’ 
institutions, which he regards as essential where the object of policy is the 
co-ordination of different (state and non-state) actors in the pursuit of 
efficiency, rather than the (zero-sum) distribution between different groups: 
“In this new context, credibility becomes an essential condition of policy 
effectiveness.”5 It is the imperative of credibility which, for Majone, 
explains both the emphasis on rules, and the use of agencies operating 
outside central administration oversight for their promulgation. Within the 
health sector, this form of explanation has to contend with the objections
4 Majone, op. cit., p. 85.
5 Majone (1996). "Public Policy and Administration: Ideas, Interests and 
Institutions", in Goodin and Klingemann (ed.) A New Handbook o f Political 
Science. Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 616.
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levelled by Moran. There has been no significant ‘rolling back’ of state 
provision of public services (though, as Section 3.3.1 discusses, there has 
been an, albeit limited, shift towards private production of these services). 
Moreover, as Moran discusses, since the 1980s, medical practice within the 
NHS has been increasingly incorporated within managerial hierarchies, 
leading in turn to greater politicisation of a previously ‘non-political’ arena.6 
At first sight, therefore, the theory of the European regulatory state is 
potentially not applicable, either as a description or as an explanation for the 
changes that have occurred in the NHS over the last twenty years, despite 
the increased significance of regulation in the NHS recognised by existing
n
scholarship.
In contrast with the grandes systemes perspective on the regulatory 
state of Majone and Moran, public lawyers Loughlin and Scott’s more 
detailed, fine-grained approach, attempts to identify the specific institutional 
features that distinguish the regulatory state from other forms of
o
governance. Following closely the lead of Louglin and Scott, the following 
three general trends can be said to be associated with the rise of the 
regulatory state:
1. The separation of ‘provision’ from ‘production’, that is, the 
separation of policy-setting and operational, service delivery 
activities. The transfer of state-owned enterprises to the private 
sector might be regarded as the ‘classic’ form of separation, but the
6 Moran (2003). The British Regulatory State. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
pp. 139-141.
7 Davies (2000). "Don't Trust Me, I'm a Doctor: Medical Regulation and the 
1999 NHS Reforms." Oxford Journal o f Legal Studies 20 (3): 437-456; Walshe 
(2002). "The Rise of Regulation in the NHS." BMJ 324: 967-970,20 April 
2002.
8 Loughlin and Scott (1997). "The Regulatory State", in Dunleavy, Gamble, 
Holliday and Peele (ed.) Developments in British Politics 5. Basingstoke, 
Macmillan, pp. 205-7.
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restructuring of public services through the creation of ‘corporatised’ 
service providers would fall within this heading;
2. The creation of free standing (semi-) independent agencies which 
perform such activities as setting standards of provision, monitoring 
compliance with standards and handling complaints from service 
users; and
3. The formalisation of relationships within the policy domain, 
including a shift from an implicit understanding of norms of 
adequate service, towards greater reliance on explicit formal rules, 
service standards and performance measures.
This ‘meso-leveT approach has a number of advantages. First, Loughlin and 
Scott’s formulation is neutral between Moran and Majone’s competing 
views, and therefore allows for a separate consideration of the descriptive 
and explanatory claims in the regulatory state literature. Second, the specific 
identifiable institutional features of the regulatory state, identified in 
Loughlin and Scott’s formulation, provide a useful basis for an empirical 
assessment of the extent to which the regulatory state has penetrated the 
health care state. Third, it avoids the flaws, inherent in some studies, of 
identifying the regulatory state with vague and overly broad phenomena, 
and in which the concept of the regulatory state consequently loses some of 
its analytical bite.
3.3 The Regulatory State Inside the NHS
This section examines the development of the NHS, in order to assess 
whether assertions concerning the rise of the regulatory state apply in the 
health care context. It takes each of the three ‘dimensions’ of the regulatory
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state identified by Loughlin and Scott in turn, namely separation of policy­
making from service delivery, use of semi-independent agencies and 
increasing formalisation of relationship within the regulatory domain, in 
order to arrive systematically at an assessment of whether the health care 
state has become a regulatory state. Although this chapter adopts a twenty- 
year perspective, it is necessary, from time to time, to situate the discussion 
in an even broader historical perspective. This is done by reference to the 
now substantial secondary literature on the history of the NHS.
3.3.1 Separation of Policy-Making From Service 
Delivery
In a sense, an institutionalised separation of policy-making and service 
delivery has been a long-standing feature of health services in the UK, 
reflecting in part the legacy of the pre-NHS era in which local authorities 
were the main providers of health services, with the Ministry of Health 
acting as the main agent of policy-making. Based on this earlier experience, 
the Ministry’s image of itself was, according to Klein, “a department with a 
tradition of regulatory rather than executive functions, reluctant to take oh 
direct administrative responsibilities for a complex service.”9 The original 
structure of the NHS preserved this pattern: policy—in the form of (mostly 
delegated) legislation and health service circulars—emanated from the 
Department of Health, while responsibility for implementation lay with 
NHS organisations at various levels. At the same time, these arrangements 
sat uncomfortably with Aneurin Bevan’s oft-quoted assertion of ministerial 
responsibility for even the most trivial details of NHS performance.10 Thus
9 Klein (2001). The New Politics o f the NHS. 4th Edition, Harlow, Prentice 
Hall, p. 7.
10 Bevan famously argued that, “when a bedpan is dropped on a hospital floor, 
its noise should resound in the Palace of Westminster.” See for example Day
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what in structural terms was a fairly clear separation between policy-making 
and service delivery functions, was in practice much more amorphous.
The perception that there was a confusion of roles (and following 
from this, insufficient attention given to service delivery) was central to the 
findings of the Griffiths Report into the management of the NHS.11 In order 
to institutionalise a more robust separation between the national setting of 
policy and its implementation, the Report of the Inquiry recommended the 
establishment of a Health Supervisory Board, chaired by the Secretary of 
State, as well as a full-time multi-professional Management Board, whose 
chairman was effectively to fulfil the role of chief executive of the NHS. 
These two bodies were to be responsible respectively for policy-making and 
management within the NHS, with the latter to be accountable to the former 
for the implementation of policies established by the former. Significantly, 
the Inquiry recommended that the Health Services Supervisory Board and 
the NHS Management Board should be established informally, effectively, 
as Day and Klein note, as agencies within the DHSS, rather than as statutory 
authorities.12 This was ostensibly a pragmatic decision, reflecting a desire to 
avoid the need for legislation, which would have delayed, and arguably 
watered down the implementation of the proposed reforms. The 
recommendations of the Griffiths Inquiry were accepted in full by the then 
Secretary of State for Social Services, Sir Norman Fowler, and were 
formally implemented in 1985.
and Klein (1997). Steering But Not Rowing? The Transformation o f the 
Department o f Health. Bristol, The Policy Press, p. 2.
11 Griffiths (1983) NHS Management Inquiry: Report to the Secretary o f State 
for Social Services, London, DHSS. See also Wistow and Harrison (1998). 
"Rationality and Rhetoric: The Contribution to Social Care Policy Making of 
Sir Roy Griffiths 1986-1991." Public Administration 76 (4): 649-668, 
especially pp. 650-652.
12 Day and Klein, op. cit., note 4, p. 7.
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If the objective of the proposed structures was to remove ministers 
and civil servants from the day-to-day running of the NHS, this was to 
prove illusory. From the outset, there was some cross-membership of the 
two boards. Furthermore, following the resignation of the first Chief 
Executive of the NHS, Mr Victor Paige, the Minister of State for Health, Mr 
Tony Newton, assumed the chairmanship of the Management Board. This 
ran directly counter to the intended separation of policy-making and service 
delivery functions. Whether or not as a direct result, the Supervisory Board 
failed to establish a role for itself and, despite repeated attempts at revival, 
first in 1991 (at which point it was re-christened the NHS Policy Board) and 
again in 1994, eventually fell into abeyance. For its part, the NHS 
Management Board increased in stature, though this was at the cost of 
giving the Management Board an increasing emphasis on matters of policy. 
The Working fo r  Patients White Paper13 (while, as discussed below, 
institutionalising a ‘purchaser-provider split’) established the principle of a 
clear chain of hierarchical command within the NHS, with the NHS 
Management Executive (as the Management Board was re-named) at the 
apex. At the same time, the original intention that it should have 
responsibility for management, with policy-making responsibilities^ 
remaining with the Department of Health lost favour. Following a review of 
the organisation of the Department by a team led by retired civil servant 
Teri Banks,14 it was accepted that the NHS Executive (‘Management’ was 
dropped from the name at this time) ought to have responsibility over all 
‘stages’ of the formulation and implementation of policy.15 “The post-Banks 
settlement”, according to Day and Klein, “ ...appears (fairly unequivocally)
13 Secretaries of States for Health Wales Northern Ireland and Scotland (1989) 
Working for Patients, CM555, London, HMSO.
14 Banks (1994) Review o f the Wider Department o f Health, London,
Department of Health.
15 Department of Health (1995) Statement o f Responsibilities and 
Accountabilities, London, Department of Health.
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to mark an acceptance that policy and management cannot be separated.”16 
This acceptance arguably became complete in October 2000 when Nigel 
Crisp assumed the combined role of Permanent Secretary at the Department 
of Health as well as Chief Executive of the NHS.
If the institutionalisation of a separation between policy-making and 
service delivery proved unsustainable at the level of the Department of 
Health and the NHS, the development of policies of contracting out, and 
later the internal market arguably provided for a more robust separation. 
Initially, contracting out was limited to ‘support’ services such as laundry, 
cleaning and catering, but soon extended to porter services, transport and 
computing and even clinical services in areas such as diagnosis and 
pathology. More important than the financial savings from contracting out 
(the ostensible justification), arguably, was its symbolic importance. As 
Butler puts it:
The real importance of these developments... lay less in the 
financial gains that were achieved, though these were by no means 
negligible, than in the principle they established; the core 
responsibility of health authorities is not to provide and manage 
services directly themselves, but rather to ensure that they are 
available where and when required at least cost to the authority and 
at least cost to patients using them.17
To this extent, contracting out was a direct antecedent to the NHS internal
1 ftmarket, established by the Working for Patients White Paper. Although 
the term ‘internal market’ never, in fact, appeared in the White Paper, the 
reforms were closely based on the ideas put forward in a pamphlet written 
by a US Health Economist, Alain Enthoven, in which he proposed the 
restructuring of the NHS along the lines of an ‘internal market model’ in
16 Day and Klein, op. cit„ note 4, p. 16.
17 Butler (1994). "Origins and Early Develpment", in Robinson and LeGrand 
(ed.) Evaluating the NHS Reforms. London, King's Fund Institute, p. 15.
18 Op. cit., note 13.
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order to increase performance and efficiency through the pressure of 
competition.19 The reforms were subsequently enacted in the National 
Health Service and Community Care Act 1990.
The basis of the internal market was the separation of the roles of 
purchasing and provision of services in the NHS. On the purchasing side, 
the reforms first and foremost involved a re-focussing of the role of District 
Health Authorities (DHAs) on assessing local health needs, and on placing 
contracts with NHS providers and, if appropriate, from the private or 
voluntary sectors. Second, the reforms contained provisions—not 
originating in Enthoven’s proposal, but from a proposal of UK health 
economist Alan Maynard20—for the establishment of ‘fund-holding’ GP 
practices who managed a budget from which they purchased certain hospital 
and community services on behalf of their patients.
On the provider side, hospitals were given greater autonomy from 
DHAs, and were expected to fund themselves by negotiating contracts with
^ i
the Districts for the provision of care. An additional, and subsequently 
significant innovation was that under certain conditions, hospitals had the 
option of opting out of direct DHA control.22 These ‘self governing’ NHS 
Trusts were given certain freedoms over and above those enjoyed by
19 Enthoven (1985). Reflections on the Management o f the National Health 
Service, Occasional Paper 5. London, Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust.
20 Ibid., Sections 14-17. On the origins of the fund-holding idea, see 
Glennerster, Matsaganis, Owens and Hancock (1994). Implementing GP 
Fundholding: Wild Card or Winning Hand? Buckingham, Open University 
Press, pp. 7-11.
21 On the nature and type of contracts used between NHS purchasers and 
providers, see Hughes (1991). "The Reorganisation of the National Health 
Service: The rhetoric and reality of the internal market." Modern Law Review 
54 (1): 88-103; Allen (1995). "Contracts in the National Health Service Internal 
Market." Modern Law Review 51 (3): 321-342.
22 NHS and Community Care Act 1990, Sections 5-11.
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‘directly managed units’ (DMUs)—i.e. those hospitals that chose to remain 
under DHA control. These included increased autonomy in relation to 
personnel policies, capital expenditure and management structures, as well 
as the fact that NHS Trusts were excluded from much central regulation.
In terms of introducing competition to the NHS, the establishment of 
the internal market may be regarded as having somewhat disappointed the 
expectations of its proponents (as well as perhaps the fears of its most vocal 
critics).24 In other respects, including what is, for present purposes, more 
important, the separation of policy-making from service delivery in the 
NHS, the reforms were perhaps even more far-reaching than the government 
at the time could have foreseen. Despite initial hostility within the service, 
by 1994 some 400 provider organisations, accounting for 95 per cent of 
NHS activity had been given Trust status. Likewise, it was initially assumed 
that fund-holding practices would be somewhat marginal to the reforms, but 
by 1994 a third of the population were served by fund-holding GP practices 
(eventually, over half the population were covered by the scheme). At the 
same time, GP fund-holding evolved not as a single, uniform scheme, but 
became differentiated into a number of distinct variants. In order to expand 
the reach of the scheme different ‘models’ were introduced. For example 
smaller practices could elect to hold funds over a more limited range of 
hospital services. Community fund-holding emerged as an option for 
practices that wished to purchase community but not hospital services. In 
1996 the scheme was extended with the establishment of a number of ‘Total
23 Smee (1995). "Self-Governing Trusts and GP Fundholders: The British 
Experience", in Saltman and Von Otter (ed.) Implementing Planned Markets in 
Health Care. Buckingham, Open University Press, p. 180.
24 LeGrand, Mays and Mulgan, eds. (1998). Learning From the NHS Internal 
Market. London, King's Fund; Tuohy (1999). Accidental Logics: The Dynamics 
o f Change in the Health Care Arena in the United States, Britain and Canada. 
New York, Oxford University Press, Chapter 6.
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Purchasing Pilots’, as a means of experimenting with allowing GPs to 
purchase a far wider range of services. This reflected the Conservative 
government’s view that, “...GP fund holders were the more effective
• 25purchasers of services and should become the purchasers of choice.”
The development of the internal market had in turn prompted further 
reforms of the structure of the NHS hierarchy. In 1993, Secretary of State
for Health, Mrs. Virginia Bottomley put forward proposals for further
•  26 organisational reforms, designed to simplify the structure of the NHS.
Legislation was introduced to Parliament and enacted in the Health
Authorities Act 1995. The main thrust of the reform was to create unitary
Health Authorities, merging the existing functions of Family Health Service
Authorities (FHSAs)—responsible for oversight of the provision of services
required of GPs under their Terms of Service—with DHAs. At the same
time, the Act also provided for the abolition of the 14 existing Regional
Health Authorities (RHAs). Some of their functions were devolved to the
new Health Authorities, while at the same time 8 Regional Offices,
‘outposts’ of the NHS Executive, took over the remaining functions. The
reforms were presented as the consolidation of the devolution initiated by
the internal market reforms. Others, saw the reforms as “ ...the apotheosis of
a process of centralisation that had gradually, almost stealthily been
creeping up... Instead of the loose conglomeration of different services...
there was to be one unified managerial structure.”27
The reforms to the NHS introduced by the New Labour government 
following its election in May 1997 are arguably best interpreted as building
25 Smee (2000). "United Kingdom." Journal o f Health Policy, Politics and Law
25 (5): 945-951, p. 948.
26 Department of Health (1993) Managing the New NHS, London, Department 
of Health.
27 Klein, op. cit., p. 182.
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on the earlier Conservative reforms, despite the rhetoric of “replacing] the 
internal market with integrated care.”28 The division introduced by the NHS 
and Community Care Act 1990, between purchasers and providers of care 
remained—although the language of “purchasing” (of hospital and 
community health services) gave way to that of “commissioning” or 
“planning”, and the structure of the provider side remained unchanged, 
initially. On the purchaser side, two significant reforms were introduced. 
First, Health Authorities were abolished, and in their place 28 Strategic 
Health Authorities were established. At the same time the NHS Executive 
Regional Offices were abolished. Second, the reforms abolished the GP 
fundholding scheme. In its place, some 500 Primary Care Groups (PCGs), 
were established to commission services for local patients. Reflecting the 
proliferation of different ‘models’ of fundholding, described above, 
different options of PCGs were created, appropriate to different local 
circumstances, ranging from supporting Health Authority commissioning, to 
establishment as “freestanding bodies accountable to the Health Authority 
for commissioning care”, and potentially “with added responsibility for the 
provision of community services for their population.”31 For these options, 
the Health Act 1999, Section 2 provided for the establishment of Primary 
Care Trusts (PCTs) by order of the Secretary of State. Each PCGs and PCTs 
was expected to consult with its respective Health Authority, over the 
development of Health Improvement Programmes (HimPs), three-year plans 
covering the assessment of local needs and requirements and service
28 Secretary of State for Health (1997) The New NHS: Modern, Dependable, 
Cm 3807, London, The Stationery Office, p. 2.
29 National Health Service Reform and Health Care Professions Act 2002, 
Section 1.
30 Secretary of State for Health (1997) The New NHS: Modern, Dependable, 
Cm 3807, London, The Stationery Office, Chapter 5.
31 Ibid. para. 5.12.
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provision. These were subsequently re-badged Health Improvement and 
Modernisation Programmes (HIMPs).
In one important respect, the reforms of the post-1997 Labour 
Government extended the approach of the previous Conservative 
government, in terms of the separation between policy-making and service 
delivery at the level of purchaser-provider split. Whereas (as noted) the 
Working for Patients reforms allowed purchasers to place contracts with the 
private and voluntary health care provider sectors, The NHS Plan, 
introduced in 2000, provided for the expansion of the role of those sectors, 
proposing a new ‘concordat’ between the NHS and private providers, setting 
out a more systematic framework within which Health Authorities could 
make use of independent capacity.32 A concordat was agreed in October 
2000, focussing initially on three areas of joint working: elective care, 
critical care, intermediate care facilities. In 2002, The Health Select 
Committee gave an ambivalent assessment about the effects of the 
concordat, pointing to the threat to public sector resources and wide regional 
variations in the costs of work undertaken under the concordat34
A final development was the provision in the Health and Social Care 
(Community Health and Standards) Act 2003, for the establishment of a
32 Secretary of State for Health (2000) The NHS Plan: A Plan for Investment, a 
Plan for Reform, Cm 4818-1, London, The Stationery Office, paras. 11.5-11.10.
33 Department of Health/ Independent Healthcare Associateion (2000) For the 
Benefit o f Patients: A Concordat with the Private and Voluntary Health Care 
Provider Sector, London, Department of Health, 30 October 2000.; ONeale 
Roache (2000). "Alan Milbum Signs Concordat with the Private Sector." BMJ 
321: 1101,4 November 2000.
34 House of Commons Health Committee (2002) The Role o f the Private Sector 
in the NHS, HC 308-1, London, The Stationery Office, 15 May 2002, paras. 10- 
46.
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new type of provider organisation, NHS Foundation Trusts. Certain NHS 
Trusts will be able to apply for Foundation Trust status, which will give 
them the status of public benefit corporation—a new legal form, analogous 
to a mutual organisation—created by Schedule 1 of the Act. Foundation 
Trusts were to be freed from the Secretary of State’s power over NHS 
Trusts to issue binding directions, but operated under license from the 
Independent Regulator of NHS Foundation Trusts (discussed below). 
Davies notes the Government’s original intention that all NHS Trusts will 
have attained Foundation status in four to five years.37 Although this target 
might seem ambitious, the unexpectedly rapid take-up of NHS Trust 
suggests that, whatever scepticism may be appropriate, commentators would 
be wrong to be incredulous.
In summary, separation of policy-making and service delivery can 
be seen, in the case of the NHS, to derive from a number of overlapping, 
somewhat mutually reinforcing divisions—between the NHS and the 
Department of Health, between commissioners and providers of services, 
between primary and secondary care, and between the NHS and the 
independent sector—none of which by itself could arguably be said to 
establish a robust separation. Seen in this way, the partial reversal of the 
trend, in terms of the abandonment of the attempt to separate policy-making 
and management, between the NHSME and the Policy Board, is less fatal to 
the interpretation of an overall trend. And despite the problems inherent in
35 Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Act 2003,
Section 1. For an analysis, see Davies (2004). "Foundation Hospitals: A New 
Approach to Accountability and Autonomy in the Public Services." Public Law 
(Winter): 808-828.
36 Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Act 2003,
Section 2.
37 Davies, op. cit., p. 810.
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the approach, the Department of Health has remained attached to the
• • • 38principle of separation, renewing its commitment in the NHS Plan.
3.3.2 Creation of free-standing agencies
As discussed in the Section 3.2, a second change associated with the rise of 
the regulatory state is the increasing use of free-standing regulatory 
agencies. In assessing the extent to which changes have occurred, 
definitional issues, of course arise. As discussed in Section 2.3.2 Hood et a l 
speak of ‘regulation inside government’ where the following exist together: 
(1) one bureaucracy shapes the activities of another; (2) there is an 
organisational separation between the regulator and the regulatee; and (3) 
the regulator has some mandate to scrutinise the behaviour of the regulatee 
and some authoritative basis to change it. For the purposes of the present 
analysis, these conditions are neither wholly necessary nor sufficient. The 
National Institute for Clinical Excellence had no direct mandate to scrutinise 
compliance with the clinical standards it sets. Another free-standing 
regulator, the Commission for Health Improvement, and later the 
Commission for Health Audit and Inspection (also known as the Healthcare 
Commission), undertook that function. Furthermore, the analytical interest 
in free-standing agencies, that is, those operating to some extent outside of 
hierarchical oversight by ministers questions raises definitional difficulties. 
Would the NHS Modernisation Agency—an agency wholly within the DoH, 
but considered by the Department to be an arm’s length body, albeit one that
38 Secretary of State for Health (2000) The NHS Plan: A Plan for Investment, a 
Plan for Reform, Cm 4818-1, London, The Stationery Office, para. 6.6.
39 Hood, Scott, James, Jones and Travers (1999). Regulation Inside 
Government: Waste-Watchers, Quality Police, andSleaze-Busters. Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, p. 8.
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is “close to the Department of Health”40— fall within this definition? For 
present purposes it is excluded so as not to inflate the rise of free-standing 
agencies. Even taking a restrictive approach, since the election of the 
Labour Government in 1997, there has been a proliferation of agencies 
regulating various aspects of the NHS 41 At the same time, there are 
important antecedents to these more recent developments, and these need to 
be mentioned briefly.
The first free-standing regulator of the NHS was the NHS Hospital 
Advisory Service (HAS), established following revelations of patient abuse 
and neglect at the Ely Hospital, Cardiff.42 Secretary of State Richard 
Crossman initially favoured the establishment of “some system of 
inspection” of hospitals, but was apparently persuaded by officials that an 
“advisory system” would be more acceptable to the profession 43 HAS was 
formally established in November 1969, to advise and report into conditions 
in long-stay hospitals. In 1975, HAS was amalgamated with the Social 
Work Service, and was re-christened the Health Advisory Service, with an 
extended remit covering hospital, community and local authority care 
services relating to psychiatric and geriatric patients 44 HAS was formally 
abolished in 1997, but continued, albeit in somewhat emasculated form, as 
an NGO, later amalgamated with the Centre for Mental Health Services 
Development to form the Health and Social Care Advisory Service.
40 See Department of Health (2004) Reconfiguring the Department o f Health's 
Arm's Length Bodies, London, Department of Health, p. 22.
41 Walshe (2002). "The Rise of Regulation in the NHS." BMJ 324: 967-970, 20 
April 2002.
42 For details of the circumstances surrounding the establishment of HAS, see 
Webster (1996). The Health Services Since the War Volume II. London, The 
Stationery Office, pp. 231 -239.
43 Ibid., p. 235.
44 Ibid., pp. 635-637.
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A second set of free-standing agency, which also owed its origins to 
the concern about patient neglect and abuse in the 1960s at Ely and 
elsewhere, was the Health Service Commissioners offices, whose function 
was to investigate on behalf of Parliament complaints into 
maladministration in NHS bodies. Originally established under the National 
Health Service Reorganization Act 1973, the powers and responsibilities of 
the Health Ombudsman are set out in the National Health Service 
Commissioners Act 1993. The National Health Service Commissioners 
(Amendment) Act 1996 extended the role of the Commissioner in various 
ways.45 There were separate offices of Health Service Commissioner for 
Wales, Scotland and England, though for a time these were held by the same 
individual.
Under the Conservative governments of 1979-1997, there was some 
expansion of the number of free-standing agencies (in addition to the 
extension of powers of the Health Service Commissioners, just discussed). 
Most notably, this period saw the establishment of the National Audit Office 
(NAO) as a free-standing (from executive government) agency in 1983, as 
well as the extension of the powers of the Audit Commission in relation to 
the NHS as part of the Working for Patients reforms.46 Neither of these 
organisations have a sectoral focus. They are concerned, in different ways 
with the scrutiny of the use of public funds, generally, but their work with 
respect to the NHS falls within the concept of ‘regulation inside 
government’ as understood by Hood et al. (and as elaborated upon, above),
45 Separate legislation covers Northern Ireland. For a recent analysis, focussing 
on the extension of responsibilities, see Harpwood (1996). "The Health Service 
Commissioner: The Extended Role in the New NHS." European Journal o f 
Health 3 (2): 207.
46 For a detailed discussion and comparison of the role of these bodies with 
respect to the NHS, see Walshe (2003). Regulating Healthcare: A Prescription 
for Improvement? Buckingham, Open University Press, pp. 116-122.
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and ought to be considered in this context. The NAO was established by the 
National Audit Act 1983. It is essentially the secretariat of the Comptroller 
and Auditor General, who is an officer of the House of Commons, and who 
reports to the Public Accounts Committee. The Audit Commission was 
created by the Local Government Finance Act 1982, and was originally 
responsible for auditing the financial accounts of local authorities in 
England and Wales, as well as undertaking more general ‘value-for-money’ 
studies. The Working for Patients White Paper proposed to extend the 
functions of the Audit Commission to cover the NHS. Section 20 of the 
National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990, brought about this 
proposed change. More recently, as discussed in detail in Chapter 6, the 
Audit Commission’s value-for money work has been transferred to the new 
Commission for Health Audit and Inspection, leaving the former body with 
a much reduced role, relating mainly to the appointment of auditors of NHS 
organisations.
A second free-standing regulator created under the National Health
Service and Community Care Act 1990 was the Clinical Standards Advisory
Group (CSAG). Originally introduced as an accommodation between the
government and those sceptical of the introduction of the NHS internal
market, CSAG’s legislative mandate was:
to provide advice on the standards of clinical care for, and the access 
to and availability of services to, national health service patients and, 
in this connection, to carry out investigations into such matters (if 
any) and make such reports in relation thereto as the Health 
Ministers may require.47
CSAG eventually found a role for itself in spreading ‘best practice’
throughout the NHS (123). Section 25 of the Health Act 1999 abolished
CSAG, its function replaced by the Commission for Health Improvement.
47 National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990, Section 62 (1) (a).
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The most pronounced growth of free standing agencies followed the 
election of the Labour Government in 1997. This period has seen the 
establishment of the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE), the 
Commission for Health Improvement (CHI), subsequently replaced by the 
Commission for Health Audit and Inspection (CHAI), the National Patient 
Safety Agency, the National Clinical Assessment Authority, and the 
Independent Regulator of NHS Foundation Trusts. This chapter does not 
discuss the work of these free-standing agencies in detail, but simply 
confirms Kieran Walshe’s assertions of a proliferation of regulatory 
agencies with responsibility over the NHS since 1997, even when taking a 
different definition (emphasising the ‘free standing’ criterion), and in the 
light of two additional years of data. Table 3.1 (adapted and updated from 
Walshe) shows the free-standing government-sponsored regulatory agencies 
with an NHS-wide focus, as they existed at the end of 2004. The table 
demonstrates a substantial proliferation of free-standing agencies since 
1997. All of the free-standing regulators created by the Labour government 
which existed prior to 2003 (i.e. excluding CHAI and ‘Monitor’) have been 
described in detail by Walshe.48 CHAI is described briefly in Chapter 7. 
A.C.L. Davies describes the role of the Independent Regulator of NHS 
Foundation Trusts, established by Section 2 of the Health And Social Care 
(Community Health and Standards) Act 2003.49 It is worth stressing that 
although in 2004 there was a degree of retrenchment, with replacement of 
three health care regulators by the single CHAI, this did not signal a change 
in the government’s commitment to inspection by free-standing agencies.
48 Walshe (2002). "The Rise of Regulation in the NHS." BMJ 324: 967-970,20 
April 2002; Walshe (2003). Regulating Healthcare: A Prescription for 
Improvement? Buckingham, Open University Press, pp. 126-144.
49 See Davies (2004). "Foundation Hospitals: A New Approach to 
Accountability and Autonomy in the Public Services." Public Law (Winter): 
808-828, pp. 815-818.
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Table 3.1: An overview of post-1997 regulatory agencies in the NHS50
R egu lator W h o it 
regulates
D ate
established
B udget
2003-04
M ission /purpose L ega l basis
National 
Institute for 
Clinical 
Excellence 
(NICE)
NHS in 
England and 
Wales
April 1999 £17.7
million
To provide national 
guidance to the 
NHS on clinical 
and cost
effectiveness and 
on the effective use 
of available 
resources
A Special Health 
Authority, set up 
by Statutory 
Instrument (SI 
1999/220 and SI 
1999/2219)
National 
Patient Safety 
Agency 
(NPSA)
NHS in 
England and 
Wales 
(initially 
only
England)
April 2001 £16
million
To collect and 
analyse 
information on 
adverse events in 
the NHS, 
assimilate safety 
information from 
elsewhere, learn 
lessons and feed 
back into the NHS, 
produce solutions, 
set national goals 
and establish 
mechanisms to 
track progress
A Special Health 
Authority, set up 
by Statutory 
Instrument (SI 
2001/1743)
National
Clinical
Assessment
Authority
(NCAA)
NHS in 
England and 
Wales 
(initially 
only
England)
April 2001 £5.9
million
To provide a 
support service to 
NHS organisations 
who are faced with 
concerns over the 
performance o f an 
individual doctor
A Special Health 
Authority, set up 
by Statutory 
Instrument (SI 
2001/2961)
Commission
for Health
Audit and
Inspection
(CHAI,
Healthcare
Commission)
NHS and 
privately 
provided 
health care in 
England and 
Wales
April 2004 
(replaced 
CHI, NCSC 
and some 
Audit
Commission
functions)
Expected
total
income
of £75
million
(2004-
05)
To review and 
improve the quality 
o f patient care; to 
conduct value for 
money studies of 
health care; to 
publish
performance data 
on the provision of 
health care; to 
investigate serious 
service failures
A statutory 
authority 
established by 
Health and 
Social Care 
(Community 
Health and 
Standards) Act 
2003, S. 41.
Independent 
Regulator of 
NHS
Foundation
Trusts
(Monitor)
NHS Trusts 
in England 
and Wales 
granted 
Foundation 
Trust status 
by Secretary 
of State
January 2004 £3.4
million
(period
January-
April
only)
To authorise NHS 
Foundation Trusts, 
and to monitor and 
enforce compliance 
with authorisations
A statutory 
authority 
established by 
Health and 
Social Care 
(Community 
Health and 
Standards) Act 
2003, S. 2.
50 Expanded and updated from Walshe (2003). Regulating Healthcare: A 
Prescription for Improvement? Buckingham, Open University Press, pp. 128-9.
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3.3.3 Formalisation of Standards of Performance
Loughlin and Scott’s third characteristic of the regulatory state is an 
increased emphasis on formal rules and explicit standards of performance 
over informal, discretionary or implicit standards. As with the other two 
dimensions, developments in the direction of greater formality conform, 
overall, with the trends predicted by claims of a rise of the regulatory state. 
As with the growth of free-standing regulatory agencies, developments have 
been most pronounced since the change of Government in 1997, though 
trends towards greater formalisation are also evident earlier.
Perhaps the most salient example of formalisation of standards of 
performance in the NHS has been in terms of the development of formal 
performance indicators (Pis). First introduced across the NHS as a whole in 
1983 (previously they had existed in the area of mental health service), they 
were, as Klein has put it, essentially “an extremely crude set of instruments 
using the statistics routinely generated by the NHS”, repackaged and made 
more accessible by advances in information technology.51 Pis took on added 
significance in 1991 with the introduction of thq Patient’s Charter52 which 
enshrined a number of ‘rights’ as well as further secondary (non- 
enforceable) standards of performance. Beginning in 1993-94, the NHSME 
began publishing comparative performance guides on the compliance with 
Patient’s Charter standard and with performance standards established by 
NHSME.
51 Klein (2001). The New Politics o f the NHS. 4th Edition, Harlow, Prentice 
Hall, p. 122. On the origins and development of Pis in the NHS more generally, 
see Harrison and Pollitt (1994). Controlling Health Professionals: The Future 
o f Work and Organization in the NHS. Buckingham, Open University Press, pp. 
51-60.
52 Secretary of State for Health (1991) The Patient's Charter, London, 
Department of Health.
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The Post-1997 Labour Government’s health policy, as set out in The New 
NHS White Paper, and A First Class Service, criticised the earlier emphasis 
on measuring what was readily measurable and proposed a radical overhaul 
of the approach to Pis in the NHS.53 In 1999, the new Performance 
Assessment Framework was introduced, covering key areas of NHS 
performance at Health Authority level.54 From 2001, this was extended to 
all NHS Trusts, and to PCTs providing community services. In the first 
year, assessment was undertaken by the Department of Health, but in 
subsequent years was transferred to the Commission for Health 
Improvement’s Office for Information on Healthcare Performance. 
Complementing this was the declared intention to revise The Patient’s 
Charter. Following a review by Greg Dyke,55 the DoH published its new 
NHS Charter under the title, Your Guide to the NHS.56 In line with ‘New 
Labour’ thinking, Your Guide to the NHS stressed responsibilities as well as 
rights, but also reflected an overall philosophy of basing standards on what 
(it was claimed) ‘mattered’.
A second instance of increasing formality in the NHS can be seen in 
changes to GPs’ terms of service, first in 1990, and again in 2004. 
Traditionally, the terms under which GPs supplied services to the NHS did 
not specify in any detail the standards of performance. The duties of a 
general practitioner were circularly defined in terms of the services “usually 
provided by general practitioners”, and consequently became known
53 Secretary of State for Health (1997) The New NHS: Modern, Dependable,
Cm 3807, London, The Stationery Office, Chapter 8.; Department of Health 
(1998) A First Class Service: Quality in the New NHS, HSC 1998/113, London, 
Deparment of Health, 4.46-4.56.
54 NHS Executive (1999) The NHS Performance Assessment Framework,
Leeds, NHS Executive.
55 Dyke (1998) The New NHS Charter: A Different Approach, London, 
Department of Health.
56 Department of Health (2001) Your Guide to the NHS, London, Department of 
Health.
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colloquially as the ‘John Wayne contract’—a GP’s gotta do what a GP’s 
gotta do! A significant step towards formalisation occurred in 1985 with the 
introduction of the Limited List in 1985 (discussed in detail in Chapter 5) 
into the pre-1992 Terms of Service. Longstanding concern at the inexorable 
rise of the NHS drug budget had been addressed primarily through 
exhortation, and through the provision of information on prescribing to GPs. 
With the Limited List, specific treatments within certain therapeutic 
categories were excluded from use within the NHS (‘black-listed’) or 
restricted to certain specific types of condition, or patient (‘grey-listed’). 
The ‘GP contract’ (in fact a statutory instrument, the National Health
cn
Service (General Medical Services) Regulations 1992 ) introduced explicit 
targets for certain activities, combined with financial incentives for meeting 
those targets, covering such areas as screening cervical cytology, 
immunisation, and check-ups for the elderly and patient education. A new 
GMS contract (now between Health Authorities and GP practices), 
implemented in April 2004, extended this approach, introducing a further 
level of detailed specification of services, including a new quality and 
outcomes framework.58
A third area of increased formalisation has been the growth of 
formal clinical and service standards in the NHS. In terms of clinical 
standards, the work of the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) 
has, as chapter 6 discusses in detail, assumed prominence as the body 
responsible for the development of clinical guidelines, and on the formal 
assessment of health technologies in the UK. An increasing emphasis on 
clinical guidelines pre-dates NICE, with various bodies in the NHS, and
57 National Health Service (General Medical Services) Regulations 1992, S.I. 
no. 635 of 1992.
58 National Health Services (General Medical Services Contracts) Regulations 
2004, S.I. No. 291 of 2004.
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beyond (the medical Royal Colleges, for example) developing clinical 
guidelines since the 1990s.59 In part, the tendency towards formalisation in 
this area may have been the result of the practice of some purchasers, of 
specifying specific guidelines in NHS internal market contracts.
Another significant development towards greater formalisation, occurring in 
the area of service standards, was the development of the Labour 
Government’s programme of National Service Frameworks (NSFs), which 
was based on the model of the Calman-Hine report into commissioning 
Cancer services.60 NSFs were published by the Department of Health with 
the assistance of an “external reference group” comprised of experts in the 
field, and were intended as a “way of being clear with patients about what 
they can expect from the health service.”61 Each NSF contained measures, 
against which progress towards meeting standards could be monitored, 
within an agreed timescale. Monitoring took place through the NHS 
perfomance monitoring framework, through systematic reviews by the 
Commission for Health Improvement (CHI), as well as through the 
framework of the NHS Charter.62
To summarise this section, the last twenty years has witnessed an 
unrelenting trend towards increased formalisation, exemplified in the 
increasing use of performance indicators, ‘charterism’, increasingly 
prescriptive terms of service for GPs, and in the increasing emphasis on
59 Day, Klein and Miller (1998). "Introduction", in Day, Klein and Miller (ed.) 
Hurdles and Levers: A comparative US-UK study o f guidelines. London, The 
Nuffield Trust: 6-10.
60 Expert Advisory Group on Cancer To the Chief Medical Officers of England 
and Wales (1995) A Policy Framework for Commissioning Cancer Services, 
London, Department of Health.
61 Secretary of State for Health (1997) The New NHS: Modern, Dependable,
Cm 3807, London, The Stationery Office, para. 7.8.
62 Department of Health (1998) National Service Frameworks, HSC 1998/074, 
London, Department of Health.
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quality standards, both at the clinical level (in the case of clinical guidelines) 
and at the level of service standards (as in the case of National Service 
Frameworks). The next section analyses these observations, in order assess 
to reach an assessment of how far, and why, there has been a rise of the 
regulatory state inside the NHS.
3.4 Analysing Institutional Change in the NHS
Section 3.2 suggested one important advantage of the approach adopted 
here, of assessing trends in the development of the Health Service against 
the criteria associated, in Loughlin and Scott’s analysis, with the rise of the 
regulatory state. This advantage was that it allows for the separation, for 
analytical purposes, of an assessment of the descriptive and explanatory 
claims of the regulatory state literature. Section 3.4.1 answers in the 
affirmative the descriptive question of whether there has been a rise of the 
regulatory state inside the NHS; Section 3.4.2 argues further that, 
notwithstanding the problems identified by Moran, once the analysis is 
refined to take account of policymakers’ need to contend with the implicit 
concordat, the theory of the European regulatory state can yield a persuasive 
explanation for the rise of the regulatory state inside the NHS.
3.4.1 The Rise of the Regulatory State in the NHS
Assessed against Loughlin and Scott’s three criteria, the changes in the 
organisation of the NHS between 1985 and 2004 point clearly towards a rise 
of the regulatory state inside the NHS, analogous to the growth of regulation 
inside government more generally. This is itself an important conclusion, 
demonstrating that health is not, in any significant respect a special case. 
This interpretation is not diminished by some particular instances of
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retrenchment—for example, the failure to embed the policy-making/service 
delivery split proposed by the Griffiths review, or the amalgamation of the 
functions of some free standing health care regulators. Neither of these 
called into question the commitment of the Department of Health towards a 
separation of policy-making and service delivery, or to the use of free- 
standing regulatory agencies.
This raises the question, alluded to in Section 3.2 as to what kind of 
regulatory state exists in the NHS. The question evokes Moran’s discussion 
of various contrasting ‘images’ of the regulatory state. Arguably, the 
discussion in Section 3.3 also reveals a qualitative shift in the nature of 
regulation in the NHS, reflecting an increased emphasis on regulation of 
clinical issues. For example, whereas the broad value-for-money remit of 
the National Audit Office and the Audit Commission allowed these bodies 
to look at clinical matters, as part of this broader remit, the free-standing 
health care regulators established by the post-1997 Labour Government 
have a sustained focus on clinical issues. Similarly, while Section 3.3.3 
indicated a general increase in formality, the discussion of this section also 
reveals, over time, a shift in emphasis towards greater focus on clinical 
outcomes. This can be seen for example in the shift towards greater 
emphasis on clinical quality reflected in the performance indicators, 
including the targets contained within the GMS regulations. Furthermore, 
these changes have been driven from the centre, apparently reflecting 
differences of approach between the Labour and the earlier Conservative 
governments.
This picture in many ways confirms Moran’s description of the 
British regulatory state, in terms of increasing penetration of hierarchical
63 Moran (2003). The British Regulatory State. Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, Chapter 2.
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state control into areas not previously subject to formal state regulation. The 
extent to which the functional explanation for the rise of the regulatory state 
propounded by Majone can explain changes of this nature will be 
considered in the next section.
3.4.2 Explaining the Rise of Regulation in the NHS
Majone’s explanation for the rise of the regulatory state focuses on a 
perceived mismatch between the capacities of positive state institutions and 
the increasing complexity of policy problems.64 Policy-making by expert, 
non-majoritarian institutions governing through formal rules is, on this 
account, better suited to these challenges, where efficiency is a primary goal 
and where credibility, understood in the sense of time-consistency, is a 
significant constraint. How does this square with the description of the rise 
of the regulatory state inside the NHS, where the effect of the changes 
described in Section 3.3 has been to increase central control over clinical 
decision-making?
Anticipating somewhat the argument of Chapter 4, this paradox can 
arguably be explained, once the analysis takes into account the way in 
which health policy in the UK was underpinned by a peculiar kind of PSB, 
identified by Klein under the rubric of the implicit concordat.65 Part of the 
duties and entitlements originally established by the concordat included, 
according to Klein, an understanding on the part of the Government that it 
. would not become involved in setting clinical priorities, in return for which 
the medical profession accepted the DoH’s responsibility for setting the 
broad framework of policy, including the power to set overall budget limits. 
This was the starting point of an evolving bargain, with subsequent reforms
64 See Section 2.3.1, above.
65 See Section 2.4.2, above.
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moving in the direction of facilitating greater intervention by the DoH in 
clinical decision-making.
Even so, it could be argued that increased intervention in the form of 
explicit standards established by free-standing agencies—whether motivated 
by a desire for cost-saving, to eliminate poor performance or assure patient 
safety, or to spread ‘best practice’—is less disruptive of the implicit 
concordat, compared with other modes of intervention. If this is correct, 
then regulatory state-type governance may be more compatible with the 
continued functioning of the NHS along existing lines, compared with 
approaches which place a greater amount of decision-making directly under 
the control of the Department of Health, or which confer a greater degree of 
administrative discretion on decision-makers. On these assumptions, the rise 
of the regulatory state inside the NHS can be seen, on the one hand, as a 
trend towards greater state intervention and, at the same time, as a search for 
more credible policy instruments necessary to make a more-interventionist 
approach ‘work’ within the existing NHS. Admittedly, this reconciliation of 
facts and theory, comes at the cost of some of the parsimony that is one of 
the strengths of Majone’s approach.
3.5 Conclusions
The main aim of this chapter has been to analyse the extent to which the 
public health care sector in the UK has seen a shift towards the regulatory 
state over the last two decades or so, comparable to changes asserted more 
generally in the countries of Western Europe and at the level of the EU. 
Each of the trends identified by Loughlin and Scott as associated with the 
regulatory state has been the subject of existing scholarship. What this 
chapter has added, using the lens of Loughlin and Scott’s criteria of the
8 6
regulatory state, is an understanding of the broader picture—the 
interconnections between (changes in the) the different features of 
governance that together define the regulatory state. A second contribution 
has been its attempt to assess the plausibility of Majone’s argument that the 
rise of the regulatory state can be understood (in part, at least) to select 
modes of intervention that are better suited to the demands of contemporary 
policy-making, including the perceived need for more credible policies. It 
was argued that this general explanation is plausible once this type of 
explanation is extended to take into account the idea of a PSB—in this case 
the implicit concordat—underpins the provision of public services. These 
observations are not, of themselves, sufficient to demonstrate that Majone’s 
general explanation accounts for these developments, only (with some 
additional assumptions associated with PSB-type analysis) that it could 66
One way of advancing the argument further is to investigate the 
extent to which the institutions of healthcare regulation are credible. To the 
extent that they are not, this may be regarded as calling Majone’s 
explanation into question. The case study chapters of this dissertation 
(Chapters 5-7) address this question at the more detailed level. As a 
preliminary to this, Chapter 4 sets out an understanding of why commitment 
is important to the effectiveness of NHS regulation, and develops a more 
detailed understanding of the features of regulatory governance that make 
regulation in the NHS credible.
66 Thanks perhaps to the efforts of Hood, Mueller’s analysis of the adoption of 
civil service exams in Britain and Prussia is taken as the paradigmatic example 
of how the same reform measures can be adopted for opposite, contradictory 
reasons. See Mueller (1984). Education and Monopoly. Berkeley, University of 
California Press.
Chapter 4
Regulation, Institutions and 
Commitment in the NHS
An implicit contract isn’t worth the paper it is written on.1
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter examined the proposition that in the UK, the evolution 
of health services corresponded to an overall pattern of development 
encapsulated in claims of a shift from the ‘positive’ to the ‘regulatory’ state. 
Following the features identified with the regulatory state proposed by 
Loughlin and Scott, trends towards a ‘regulatory health care state’ were 
identified, namely: (1) the separation of responsibility for health policy and 
for the delivery of health services; (2) the creation of (semi-) independent 
regulatory bodies in the NHS; and (3) the formalisation of standards of 
performance. Furthermore, the previous chapter examined in some detail the 
proposition, associated primarily with the work of Giandomenico Majone, 
that these changes have been a functional response to a perceived mismatch 
between the capacities of positive state institutions and the nature of 
contemporary policy challenges, including the need for credible, time- 
consistent policies.
1 Seen in the window of a high street solicitor in Troon, Ayrshire in 1996.
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This chapter revisits these themes from a different perspective, one 
that will lay out more clearly the analytical framework for an examination 
of specific episodes of regulatory reform which follow in the next three 
chapters. The purpose is to sketch out an account of the institutional basis of 
commitment to implicit understandings between the medical profession and 
elected politicians (and their civil service ‘agents’) which underpinned the 
NHS and to show how increased regulatory intervention can challenge these 
understandings. For the most part, the existing scholarship advancing the 
foundational ideas put forward by Rudolf Klein regarding the implicit 
concordat simply documents the progressive erosion of the concordat, and 
urges the establishment of a new (perhaps, as in the case of Ham and 
Alberti, ‘explicit’) concordat.2 The present account therefore seeks to 
advance the existing scholarship in one important respect: by focussing on 
the issue of credible commitment to the concordat, and to the role of 
institutions in generating credible commitment, the present account can 
potentially contribute our understanding of the institutional requirements for 
effective regulatory reforms in the NHS, and (what is the other side of the 
same coin) to our understanding of why such reforms often fail to achieve 
fully their intended, publicly-espoused objectives.3 Furthermore, in its focus 
on the contribution of legal and administrative arrangements that comprise 
the ‘governance structure’ of NHS regulation to the establishment of
2 Salter (1998). The Politics o f Change in the Health Service. Basingstoke, 
Macmillan, p. 440; Ham and Alberti (2002). "The Medical Profession, The 
Public, and the Government." BMJ324: 838-842, 6 April 2002. The original 
contribution of Rudolf Klein is to be found in Klein (1983). The Politics o f the 
National Health Service. London, Longman. See further Section 2.4.2, above.
3 Arguably, this emphasis on institutional mechanisms for ‘enforcing’ the 
concordat is more faithful to Klein’s original analysis—which emphasised how 
the concordat was built-in to the structure of the NHS—than other existing 
attempts to extend the idea of the implicit concordat. Brian Salter’s more recent 
emphasis on the criteria for a ‘politically sustainable’ model of medical 
regulation is perhaps also shares this same spirit. See Salter (2002). "Medical 
Regulation: New Politics.and Old Power Structures." Politics 22 (2): 59-67.
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credible commitments in the NHS, this analysis builds on existing work in 
administrative law as well as in public administration. The framework 
developed here draws inspiration from the work of Pablo Spiller and his co­
authors on the institutional foundations of regulatory commitment in the 
utilities sectors, especially the work of Levy and Spiller.4 The present 
contribution goes beyond these existing accounts insofar as it adapts them to 
the context of health policy and regulation, where the relevant bargain is an 
implicit concordat between the profession and the government, rather than 
(as in Levy and Spiller’s original account) between the government and 
private investors.
The organisation of this chapter is as follows: first, it reiterates the 
idea that the NHS was based on an ‘implicit concordat’ between the 
government and the medical profession, and that this has shaped the 
subsequent development of health policy; second, it is argued that the rise of 
regulation in the NHS has the potential to further undermine the implicit 
concordat, and that—to the extent that successful reforms depend on the 
support and co-operation of the medical profession—that this presents a 
central challenge that proposed reforms must meet, the problem of securing 
commitment to the implicit concordat, if they are to achieve their intended 
outcomes; third, it shows specifically the ways in which effective regulation 
depends on professional support, focussing in particular on the contribution 
of the profession to effective compliance; fourth, it considers commitment 
strategies available to reformers, emphasising those that rely on the design
4 Levy and Spiller (1994). "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory 
Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation." 
Journal o f Law, Economics and Organization 10 (2): 201-246; Levy and 
Spiller, eds. (1996). Regulations Institutions and Commitment: Comparative 
Studies o f Telecommunications. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. See 
also Spiller (1995). "A Positive Theory of Regulatory Instruments: Contracts, 
administrative law or regulatoiy specificity?" Southern California Law Review 
69 (3): 477-515.
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of the legal and administrative framework for; finally, it sets out some of the 
observable implications of the theory put forward in this chapter. In doing 
so, it prepares the ground for the case study analyses undertaken in the 
following three chapters.
4.2 The Implicit Concordat
As discussed in Section 2.4.2 Rudolf Klein first put forward the idea that the 
UK health care system is based on an implicit concordat between the state 
and the medical profession in the first edition of his seminal The Politics o f  
the NHS’5 It was argued that the concept can be seen as a specific 
application of the more general idea of the public service bargain, first 
proposed by Bernard Schaffer, and developed more recently by Christopher 
Hood. In the context of this study, the implicit concordat refers not 
specifically to the outcome of the negotiations between the BMA and the 
Ministry of Health over the legal and administrative structure of the NHS 
between 1946 and 1948; rather it refers also to the broader principles which 
that legal and administrative structure were intended to enshrine. Indeed, it 
is possible to regard the specific points on which agreement was reached— 
the independent contractor system for GPs, consultants’ contracts, 
professional medical involvement in decision-making at all levels of the 
NHS—as a means of institutionalising the implicit concordat into the 
structure of the NHS. In this sense, like Hood’s implementation of the PSB 
idea, the implicit concordat is an analytic construct, though one which is 
grounded in actual historical agreements, and which is arguably necessary to 
make sense of them.
5 Klein (1983). The Politics o f the National Health Service. London, Longman.
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The implicit nature of the concordat, together with the fact that it 
was to be an evolving bargain means that it is not necessarily possible to 
state with any precision the respective duties and entitlements of the 
profession and Government under the concordat. Drawing on the transaction 
costs economics, we could say that the implicit concordat was a classic 
‘incomplete contract’ in the sense that its meaning, even if transparent to the 
original parties to it, was ambiguous to third parties, including to successor 
generations of politicians and officials and to the leaders of the organised 
interests of the medical profession. If this were the case, then we would 
expect to see relations between the Government and the medical profession 
to be characterised by disagreement over whether certain proposed 
interventions were ‘legitimate’ (although it is perhaps not necessary that 
such disagreements should be couched specifically in the language of 
‘fidelity’ to the implicit concordat). Nevertheless, some generalities are 
hopefully not contentious. For the medical profession, the implicit concordat 
meant acceptance of the principle that decisions regarding the broad policy 
framework, including the overall level of funding for health services were 
political decisions to be taken by Ministers, in return for which the 
profession was to enjoy economic security and the enhanced ability of the 
profession to regulate its own affairs, including the privilege of enjoying a 
large measure of control over the nature of medical work.6 A central 
principle—though one that has subsequently been fiercely contested—was 
that of ‘clinical autonomy’ or ‘clinical freedom’. This refers to the idea that 
the profession’s unique access to, and control over, the body of relevant 
clinical knowledge, made it inappropriate for the Government (or others
6 Salter (1998). The Politics o f Change in the Health Service. Basingstoke, 
Macmillan, p. 125.
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outside the profession) to intervene directly in decisions over what treatment
n
was appropriate for different patients.
As noted in Section 2.4.2, a limited degree of protection to the terms 
of the concordat was afforded by the structure of the NHS, and by the 
relatively stable power relations within it. Nevertheless, a number of 
scholars have pointed to the progressive unravelling of the concordat over
o #
time, and to the detrimental consequences that this raises. In other words, it 
was recognised that it is possible for the respective parties to the 
concordat—the government and the medical profession—to ‘defect’ from 
their respective undertakings. For the purposes of the present account, the 
incursion of the regulatory state into the health care arena constitutes an 
important challenge to the implicit concordat. As the next section attempts 
to demonstrate, the key features of the regulatory state described in the 
previous chapter, creates an environment in which the implicit concordat is 
no longer enforced by the structure of the NHS as it arguably was in an 
earlier era, especially where, as Moran correctly identifies, the rise of the 
regulatory state in Britain has had the effect of extending the reach of state 
control.9 Thus, without denying the relevance of the arguments put forward 
by Majone, and which were discussed in the previous chapter, the 
association between the rise of the regulatory state and the imperative of 
credibility is by no means ‘automatic’; rather it depends on the institutional
7 Hampton (1983). "The End of Clinical Freedom." 1237-8; Calnan
and Williams (1995). "Challenges to Professional Autonomy in the United 
Kingdom? The perceptions of general practitioners." International Journal o f 
Health Services 25 (2): 219-241.
8 Ham and Alberti (2002). "The Medical Profession, The Public, and the 
Government." BMJ324: 838-842, 6 April 2002; Salter (2002). "Medical 
Regulation: New Politics and Old Power Structures." Politics 22 (2): 59-67.
9 The point that compliance with regulation still relies heavily on existing 
structures of hierarchical corporatism is explored below in section 5.
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details of regulatory governance—a theme to which section five, below, 
returns in more detail.
4.3 Regulation, Waste and the Concordat
In terms of the implicit concordat, a central problem in implementing 
regulatory reforms into the NHS is the potential for slippage.10 Once in 
place, mechanisms intended to facilitate intervention for non-controversial 
purposes may be adapted to purposes which are semi-licit or even downright 
violations of existing understandings of duties and entitlements. In the 
absence of credible commitment, this may lead the profession to oppose 
interventions which, on the face of them, do not necessarily offend against 
the concordat. In other words, like the original establishment of the NHS, 
the profession may regard the introduction of regulatory reforms into the 
health care sector as “ ...objectionable far less for what it is than for what it 
might become.”11
The goal of eliminating waste in the NHS provides a good example 
of how regulatory initiatives that are not necessarily inconsistent with the 
concordat may nonetheless give rise to the hostility of the medical 
profession. To a large extent, this problem arises because, as Blunstein and 
Marmor argue, ‘waste’ is not a simple, clearly defined phenomenon; rather 
the term covers a “conceptual hodgepodge” of situations, incorporating a 
number of different senses in which health care can be said to be
10 The term ‘slippage’ is used here in an expansive sense to denote both 
intentional and unintentional expansion of regulatory initiatives. The 
terminology o f ‘bureaucratic drift’ and ‘coalitionaP drift is introduced below to 
denote different types of intentional slippage.
11 Editorial (1948). "Safeguards." The Lancet: 561,10 April. Quoted in 
Hindmoor (1998). "The Importance of Being Trusted: Transaction Costs and 
Policy Network Theory." Public Administration 76 (1): 25-43, p. 37.
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‘wasteful’.12 In order to make sense of these different senses, Blunstein and 
Marmor propose the following taxonomy of waste, summarised in Figure 
4.1, below:13
1. Ineffective or harmful treatment.14 A well-known example of a 
treatment that is both ineffective and harmful is the prescription of 
antibiotics for viral infections, which in addition to having no impact 
on the condition, contribute to anti-microbial resistance, now a major 
public health threat (although it is difficult to diagnose, for example, 
whether a sore throat is caused by a virus or by the bacterium 
Streptococcus pyogenes)}5 For present purposes, ineffective treatment 
can be taken to include treatments providing no net clinical benefit, 
that is, those which provide no additional clinical benefit over other, 
less expensive, therapies. The paradigmatic example of treatments of 
no net clinical benefit is proprietary drugs where exact generic 
equivalents are available. Although arguments have sometimes been 
made to the contrary, restrictions on such treatments cannot be 
considered to be ‘rationing’ in the sense that they deny of beneficial 
care to patients.
12 Blunstein and Marmor (1992). "Cutting Waste By Making Rules: Promises, 
Pitfalls and Realistic Prospects." University o f Pennsylvania Law Review 140: 
1543-1572, p. 1545.
13 Figure taken from Ibid., p. 1572.
14 Ibid., pp. 1548-1555.
15 In 1998, a report of the Science and Technology Committee found evidence 
of widespread misuse, of which “.. .the greatest bulk of imprudent use of 
antimicrobials in human medicine in the United Kingdom is the prescription of 
antibacterials by GPs for self-limiting or viral infections and in other 
inappropriate situations.” See House of Lords Science and Technology 
Committee (1998) Resistance to Antibiotics, HC 81-5, London, The Stationery 
Office, 23 April 1998, para. 11.12. See also the Standing Medical Advisory 
Committee Sub-Group on Antimicrobial Resistance (1997) The Path o f Least 
Resistance, London, Department of Health.
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2. Treatment o f  uncertain effectiveness.16 In addition to treatment falling 
into the first category which covers treatment that is (known to be) 
harmful or ineffective, there exists a broad range of treatments for 
which there is very little data on effectiveness, or concerning which 
there is genuine disagreement over how to interpret the data. There is 
thus ample room for disagreement about the effectiveness of much 
medical treatment, and even the best efforts of the evidence-based 
medicine movement often seem unable to provide specific guidance, 
leading to suggestions of a “stainless steel” law of evaluation, 
according to which the best designed outcome evaluations often seem
17to produce the least evidence that an intervention is effective.
1 fi3. Treatment that is ethically troubling. While many of the most 
controversial ethical questions in medicine concern the decision to 
withhold life-prolonging treatment, many therapies also give rise to 
considerations about whether it is ethical to provide a certain kinds of 
treatment. Although discussion often focuses on controversial new 
(and even not-yet-existing) treatments, there are many real-world 
examples in relation to population control and reproduction, and in the 
field of mental health.
4. Treatment that is not allocationally efficient (not ‘cost-effective’) } 9 
Perhaps the most controversial category of ‘waste’ is the provision of 
treatment that is expensive, but which is nonetheless clinically 
effective (as defined here, confers a net benefit). As Blunstein and 
Marmor argue, within this category, there is an inevitable nexus
16 Blunstein and Marmor, op. cit. pp. 1555-1556.
1 7  •  •
Petticrew (2003). "Why certain systematic reviews reach uncertain
conclusions." BM J326: 756-758.
18 Blunstein and Marmor, op. cit. pp. 1556-1558.
19 Ibid. pp. 1558-1563.
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between eliminating ‘waste’ and ‘rationing’: “I f ‘waste cutting’ means 
‘trimming the fat’ and ‘rationing’ means ‘making rules to limit the use 
of beneficial services,’ it will necessarily be the case that in trimming 
the fat we deny some people beneficial services.20 A controversial 
example, discussed further in Chapter 6 is the treatment of multiple 
sclerosis by prescribing beta interferon and glatiramer acetate, which 
has been estimated to have a cost per QALY of upwards of £42,000.21 
Again, as Blunstein and Marmor have emphasised, judgements about 
whether costly treatments are ‘wasteful’ simply do not make sense 
independently of an assessment of overall resources.
Ineffective or H arm ful
O f  U ncertain Effectiveness
Ethically Troubling
W A STE ?
A llocationally  Inefficient 
(N ot “C ost-E ffective” )
Figure 4.1: Blunstein and Marmor’s Taxonomy of Waste
The value of this particular taxonomy is that it illustrates how 
different regulatory interventions raise different kinds of issues—initiatives 
intended to eliminate waste falling within the first category require only a 
purely ‘technical’ assessment of outcomes, avoiding the ‘hard choice’ of
20 Ibid., p. 1561.
21 Chilcott, McCabe, Tappenden, O’Hagan, Cooperand Abrams (2003). 
"Modelling The Cost Effectiveness of Interferon Beta and Glatiramer Acetate 
in the Management of Multiple Sclerosis." BMJ 326: 522-527, 8 March 2003.
22 Blunstein and Marmor, Op. Cit., p. 1543.
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denying potentially beneficial treatment to patients, for example. 
Restrictions on the availability of treatment in the third and fourth categories 
inevitably involve (albeit on different grounds) denying effective treatments 
to patients.
A major difficulty that follows from this for the design of regulatory 
policies is that many potential interventions cut across the different 
categories of waste, as well as the distinction between wasteful and non­
wasteful care, making it problematic to translate these conceptual
O'Xdistinctions into what Hood calls “robust rule categories.” Put simply, it 
may be difficult or impossible to design a legal and administrative 
framework that confers on regulators adequate powers to deal with any 
particular category that is not also over-inclusive, incorporating other 
categories of waste, or in extreme cases potentially restricting the 
availability of treatments that are not ‘wasteful’ within any of Blunstein and 
Marmor’s four senses. An example (albeit a debatable one) is the 
prescription of sildenafil (Viagra) for the treatment of broad-spectrum 
erectile dysfunction which has been argued to perform well on conventional 
assessments of cost-effectiveness.24
From a purely ‘technical’ standpoint, the problems of distinguishing 
reliably between different categories of waste, and between wasteful and 
non-wasteful care in framing the scope of regulatory authority may lead to 
undesirable outcomes to the extent that a regime designed to address waste 
within one particular category may do a poor job of eliminating waste—and 
of preserving non-wasteful treatment—within other categories, or else may
23 Hood (1986). Administrative Analysis: An Introduction to Rules, 
Enforcement and Organisation. Brighton, Wheatsheaf Press, pp. 35-43.
24 Smith and Roberts (2000). "The Cost-Effectiveness of Sildenafil." Annals o f 
Internal Medicine 132 (12): 933-937.
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lack the authority to deal as effectively as possible with waste arising within 
a single category. In other words, Blunstein and Marmor’s analysis points to 
the importance of paying attention to the legal and administrative 
framework of regulation, if  for no other reason than that failure to do so 
might be expected to lead to a high degree of administrative error.
Seen through the lens of the implicit concordat, and the problem of 
commitment, the difficulties inherent in attempting to reduce different kinds 
of ‘waste’ to robust rule categories give rise to an additional and altogether 
different set of issues, arising from the observation that, while some forms 
of intervention may be compatible with the implicit concordat—after all, the 
Government is responsibile for setting the broad policy framework for the 
Health Service—others potentially constitute ‘illegitimate’ intrusions into 
the medical sphere that are outside the medical profession’s ‘zone of 
acceptance’ of the decision-making authority of the Department of Health. 
Even well-intentioned reforms, if  they confer over-broad regulatory 
authority beyond that which would be regarded as within this ‘zone of 
acceptance’, may over time lead to an erosion of the concordat, as the scope 
of intervention expands as a result of the regulatory policy. The problem of 
bureaucratic drift thus arises where the legal and administrative framework 
of regulation does not adequately constrain regulatory decision-makers.
There is, however, a further threat arising from the fact that, after a 
reform has been implemented, the Department of Health may even have an 
incentive to encourage the extension of regulatory policy, and can do so by
25 The idea that authority is characterised as a two-way relationship, in which 
the subordinate has a ‘zone of acceptance’ within which she submits to the 
direction of the superior is widely recognised to originate with Herbert Simon, 
though precedents are to be found in the work of Chester Barnard. See Moe 
(1984). "The New Economics of Organisation." American Journal o f Political 
Science 28: 739-777, p. 745.
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declining to police the limits on bureaucratic discretion, or even modify the 
legal and administrative framework to allow the extension into other 
categories. In other words, if  it is to secure the support of the medical 
profession for its regulatory reforms, the Department of Health must also 
contend with the problem of coalitional drift. An important consideration 
is that relations between the profession and government are nested within a
7 7broader set of relationships within the ‘regulatory space’. Other interests 
with a ‘stake’ in the regulation of the NHS include the organised interests of 
the allied professions, pharmaceutical companies, patients’ groups, medical 
charities, all of which potentially have a destabilising effect on any bilateral 
understandings. Any of these groups may have objectives that are, on 
occasion, antagonistic to the implicit concordat, and the Department of 
Health may have to choose between retaining the support of the profession, 
and the support of some other affected interest. For example, it has been 
argued that the implicit concordat has been weakened by the increasing
78assertiveness of consumer interests in health policy. Similarly, on 
occasion, professional interests have supported restrictions on prescribing 
that have been opposed by the Association of British Pharmaceutical 
Interests and vice versa.
26 Horn and Shepsle (1989). "Commentary on 'Administrative Arrangements 
and the Political Control of Agencies': Administrative process and 
organisational form as legislative responses to agency costs." Virginia Law 
Review 75 (2): 499-508. For present purposes, the ‘enacting coalition’ includes 
the relevant legislative coalition but all those interests whose support is 
necessary for the success of a reform—including, crucially, organised medical 
interests.
27 Hancher and Moran (1989). "Organizing Regulatory Space", in Hancher and 
Moran (ed.) Capitalism, Culture and Economic Regulation. Oxford, Clarendon 
Press.
28 Ham and Alberti (2002). "The Medical Profession, The Public, and the 
Government." BMJ324: 838-842, 6 April 2002.
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The scope of a permitted intervention, however, represents only one 
dimension along which bureaucratic and coalitional drift can occur. Rules 
possess different dimensions, and slippage along any one of them can 
potentially affect whether an intervention is regarded as compatible with the 
implicit concordat.29 For example, taking Baldwin’s rule-dimension of legal 
force or effect, it is plausible that regulatory intervention to tackle waste 
within Blunstein and Marmor’s second category, treatment of uncertain 
effectiveness, may be regarded as compatible with the respective rights and 
obligations of the government and the medical profession so long as 
compliance with rules is voluntary, but may be regarded as an intrusion into 
clinical freedom if the professional prerogative to disregard standards based 
on their clinical judgement is not preserved. As Chapter 6 will show, the 
effect of NICE guidance within the NHS provides an example. Following 
the decision of a Devon PCT, contrary to the recommendation of NICE, not 
to fund zanamivir (Relenza) the Deparment of Health introduced guidance 
requiring NHS bodies to fund NICE-approved treatments prescribed by 
individual GPs. Alternatively, the prescription or sanction (in Baldwin’s 
terms) may affect the status of an intervention vis-a-vis the implicit 
concordat. The profession may tolerate sanctioning powers by the 
Department of Health provided that enforcement strategies are primarily 
based on supporting professional self-regulation, with more punitive 
measures ‘held in reserve’ in the manner suggested by Ayres & 
Braithwaite’s ‘responsive regulation’ model, for example.30 Of course, these 
are empirical issues for investigation, and such assessments of what is and is 
not consistent with the concordat may be complex* a problem that will be 
encountered repeatedly in the next three chapters.
29 For an account of the different dimensions of rules, see Baldwin (1995). 
Rules and Government. Oxford, Clarendon Press, pp. 7-11.
30 Ayres and Braithwaite (1992). Responsive Regulation: Transcending the 
Deregulation Debate. New York, Oxford University Press, Chapters 2 & 4.
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Given these factors, a major objective of any regulatory initiative, 
where professional support is likely to have a significant impact on the 
success of the initiative, must therefore be to signal credible commitment to 
the implicit concordat. In the absence of credibility, the outcome of 
regulatory reforms may well be unsatisfactory, leading to further changes, 
quite possibly further eroding the implicit concordat. As Spiller puts it, 
“Without credibility, the expectation of a future policy reversal may become
i
a self-fulfilling prophecy, defeating the purpose of the reform.” The next 
two sections take up different parts of this argument. Section 4 addresses in 
more detail how the absence of professional support can undermine the 
effectiveness of reforms, while Section 5 argues that the design of the legal 
and administrative framework for regulation can help to secure credible 
commitment to the implicit concordat.
4.4 Professional Politics and the Effectiveness 
of Regulation
It was suggested above that the incursion of the regulatory state into the 
health care arena challenges the implicit concordat because regulation raises 
the possibility for policy-making outside of the framework of hierarchical 
corporatism that characterised the original structure of the NHS. Why, then, 
does fidelity to the implicit concordat matter? One answer draws inspiration 
from Carolyn Hughes Tuoy’s argument concerning the limited impact of the 
market-based reforms of the 1990s in Britain.32 Tuohy suggests that while
31 Spiller (1995). "A Positive Theory of Regulatory Instruments: Contracts, 
administrative law or regulatory specificity?" Southern California Law Review 
69 (3): 477-515, p. 477.
32 Tuohy (1999). Accidental Logics: The Dynamics o f Change in the Health 
Care Arena in the United States, Britain and Canada. New York, Oxford 
University Press, Chapter 6.
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the Conservatives were able to reconfigure the NHS along the lines of the
internal market in 1990 even in the face of professional opposition, the
underlying balance of professional and state power within Britain’s
‘hierarchical corporatist’ health care regime was largely unaffected:
The introduction of this mechanism [i.e. the internal market] 
changed the formal mode whereby participants in the system related 
to each other and to some extent the sanctions that they could bring 
to bear in seeking to achieve their objectives. But the informal 
networks and modes of relationship that characterised the system 
prior to the reforms continued to exist within the form of the market. 
The prevalence of block contracts, the limited degree of competition, 
the preservation of the clinical arena as a zone of collegial decision­
making, and the continued regulation of managerial behavior 
through central directives and “guidances” all represent the survival 
of an institutional mix in which hierarchy and collegiality had a 
heavy weight.33
Thus, the impact of these reforms was lessened by the continued reliance on 
collegial networks and state authority for decision-making.
In the same way, it can be argued that even if regulatory policies can 
be framed without professional (or indeed Department of Health) support, 
collegial networks as well as state authority is still essential to the task of 
securing compliance with regulation. There is a strong tradition within the 
broader literature on regulation which argues that regulation is most 
effective when there is co-operation between regulators and regulated, and 
which analyses different kinds of problems encountered in engendering co­
operation.34 Building on the work of Ayres and Braithwaite and McBamet 
and Wheelan, Christine Parker argues that the success of compliance-
33 Ibid., p. 197.
34 Scholz (1991). "Cooperative Regulatory Enforcement and the Politics of 
Administrative Effectiveness." American Political Science Review 81 (1): 115- 
136; Ayres and Braithwaite (1992). Responsive Regulation: Transcending the 
Deregulation Debate. New York, Oxford University Press, Chapter 2;
McBamet and Wheelan (1999). "Challenging the Regulators: Strategies for 
resisting control", in (ed.) Regulation and Deregulation: Policy in practice in 
the utilities andfinancial services industries. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
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oriented regulatory strategies requires, among other things, that 
“ ...regulators and regulatees must share some common commitments to the 
goals and purposes of regulation...” in order to avoid the risk of ‘creative 
compliance’, that is, where regulatees comply with the technical 
requirements of regulation (the ‘letter of the law’) in such a way as to 
frustrate the overall objectives of regulation.
Extending this argument, it is reasonable to suppose that regulation 
will not effectively achieve desired outcomes if it is perceived as a form of 
‘cheating’ on (or ‘defection’ from) the implicit concordat on the part of the 
Department of Health. Indeed, building on some of the above-mentioned 
sources, Anne Davies drew attention to a number of “risks of subversion” 
which she claims are inherent in the 1999 NHS reforms. To back up her 
argument (which is prospective), she cites examples of subversion found in 
existing studies of regulation in the NHS, including ignoring regulatory 
requirements, cheating to evade detection in the case of non-compliance, 
and ‘absorbing’ or ‘neutralising’ the impact of standards and monitoring
i
requirements through their translation into professional organisation and
'xnclinical practice. This, then, is why commitment to the concordat is so 
important to policymakers: without sufficient reassurance, such subversive 
strategies may defeat the purpose of intervention.
While it is not suggested here that perceived defection on the implicit 
concordat is the only cause of resistance to regulation on the part of the 
medical profession, it can plausibly be argued to be one major source of
35 Parker (1999). "Compliance Professionalism and Regulatory Community:
The Australian trade practices regime." Journal o f Law and Society 26 (2): 213- 
39.
36 Davies (2000). "Don't Trust Me, I'm a Doctor: Medical Regulation and the 
1999 NHS Reforms." Oxford Journal o f Legal Studies 20 (3): 437-456, p. 454.
37 Ibid., pp. 448-454.
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opposition. It follows that if some way is found of designing regulatory 
institutions so as to minimise the potential for bureaucratic and coalitional 
drift, then this ought to contribute positively to the effectiveness of 
regulatory reforms. How this might be done is considered in the following 
section.
4.5 Designing Credible Regulatory Regimes
4.5.1 Multi-Level Commitment Strategies
Regulation, then, offers substantial opportunities for eliminating waste, but 
also raises problems, including the possibility that even well-intentioned 
reforms may not achieve their publicly espoused goals if  the enacting 
coalition does not take steps to protect its reforms against subsequent 
bureaucratic drift, or from challenge by subsequent coalitions. This section 
considers strategies available to the Department of Health in order to 
reassure the medical profession that regulatory reforms will be faithful to 
the implicit concordat and (consequently) to enable it to retain the 
confidence of the profession.
It should be noted at the outset that, as Breton and Fraschini have 
remarked, two commonly discussed strategies widely discussed in the more 
general analytical literature may be of limited value to democratic 
governments.38 Firstly, as discussed in Section 2.4.2 establishing a 
reputation for trustworthiness may only be regarded as an effective strategy 
so long as one assumes ‘bureaucratic dominance’ over elected officials. 
Second, by itself, the design of substantive written rules is likely to be of 
limited value, not only because of the relative absence of robust rule
38 Breton and Fraschini (2003). "Vertical Competition in Unitary States: The 
Case of Italy." Public Choice 114 (1): 55-77, pp. 62-65.
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categories in the area of health policy, but also because the government 
itself is responsible for enforcing these rules, and it may be difficult or
OQ
impossible to compel it to do so.
Following the lead of Douglass North, who has demonstrated the 
role played by a country’s broader formal and informal institutions in 
relation to the capacity of governments to establish credible policy 
commitments,40 Levy and Spiller have focussed on the role of the 
governance structure of a regulatory system, which they define as “ ...the 
mechanisms that societies use to constrain regulatory discretion and to 
resolve conflicts that arise in relation to these constraints.” 41 In order to 
analyse regulatory governance in the telecommunications sector, they apply 
a three-level analysis of the institutional arrangements restraining arbitrary 
behaviour. Their approach thus explicitly contends with the problem of 
coalitional as well as bureaucratic drift by focussing not only on the 
substantive rules confining regulatory discretion, but also on the question of 
match and mismatch between these rules and the broader ‘institutional 
endowment’ of a country. Their analysis suggests that the governance 
structure of regulation must address three different levels if reforms are to 
be credible, namely:
39 Stiglitz (1998). "The Private Uses of Public Interests: Incentives and 
Institutions." Journal o f Economic Perspectives 12 (2): 3-22.
40 See for example North (1993). "Institutions and Credible Commitment." 
Journal o f Institutional and Theoretical Economics 149 (1): 11-23.
41 Levy and Spiller (1994). "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory 
Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation." 
Journal o f Law, Economics and Organization 10 (2): 201-246, p. 205. See also 
the more recent attempt to ‘broaden’ and ‘deepen’ Levy and Spiller’s original 
approach in Spiller and Tommasi (2003). "The Institutional Foundations of 
Public Policy: A Transactions Approach with Applications to Argentina." 
Journal o f Law, Economics and Organization 19 (2): 281-306.
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(a) substantive restraints on the discretion of the regulator that are 
written into the regulatory system,
(b) restraints on changing the regulatory system, and
(c) institutions for enforcing both the substantive restraints and 
restraints on system changes.42
Although Levy and Spiller’s three-level analysis is developed 
independently of it, there is an obvious correspondence with Elinor 
Ostrom’s multi-level approach to institutional analysis, and the two 
approaches share common strengths43 Ostrom distinguishes between 
operational rules which directly affect decision-making situations, and 
which are themselves made within a set of collective choice rules governing 
policy-making and constitutional choice rules which determine how 
collective choice rules are made. As both of these approaches demonstrate, 
introducing multiple levels of analysis has an additional analytical payoff 
(beyond a single-level focus) because there are inter-linkages between the 
different levels, and because an understanding of institutional change 
therefore depends on an understanding of these inter-linkages. As Ostrom 
puts it:
1. Changes in the rules used to order action at one level occur 
within a currently “fixed” set of rules at a deeper level
2. Changes in deeper-level rules usually are more difficult and 
more costly to accomplish, thus increasing the stability of mutual 
expectations among individuals interacting according to a set of 
rules.44
42 Levy and Spiller, Op. Cit., pp. 202, 211, 220.
43 Ostrom (1990). Governing the Commons: The evolution o f institutions for  
collective action. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 50-55. See also 
Kiser and Ostrom (1982). "The Three Worlds of Action: A Metatheoretical 
Synthesis of Institutional Approaches", in Ostrom (ed.) Strategies o f Political 
Inquiry. Beverly Hills, Sage.
44 Ostrom, Op. Cit., p. 52.
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One further distinction is in order. While Levy and Spiller make it 
clear that what they term “substantive restraints” encompasses procedural 
restraints, in addition to specific substantive rules,45 in practice their 
analysis of substantive and procedural rules is sometimes conflated. To 
clarify matters, in what follows, it is useful to distinguish more sharply 
between substantive and procedural restraints on regulatory discretion. The 
relationship between these complementary commitment mechanisms is 
illustrated in Figure 4.2. Each of these complementary mechanisms is 
discussed in turn below.
Constitutional 
Choice Rules
Collective 
Choice Rules
Operational Rules
(3) Formal and 
informal constraints 
on changing the 
regulatory system
(2) Regulatory 
processes and 
structures limiting 
effective discretion
(1) Substantive 
written restraints on 
the extent of the 
regulator’s discretion
(4) Institutions to 
enforce restraints on 
regulator’s discretion 
and system change
Figure 4.2: Complementary Mechanisms for Restraining Bureaucratic 
and Coalitional Drift
45 Levy and Spiller, op. cit., p, 211.
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4.5.2 Substantive Written Restraints
Together with regulatory structures and processes (discussed immediately 
below), substantive written rules make the operational rules governing the 
day-to-day decisions made by regulators concerning, for example, which 
drugs are excluded from use within the NHS, and which treatments are 
approved.46 As the discussion in Section 3, above, has indicated, because of 
the ‘robust rule categories’ problem of distinguishing different categories of 
waste, and of distinguishing wasteful from non-wasteful treatment, there 
may be limits to the extent that substantive rules can eliminate the potential 
for slippage, without also eliminating necessary discretion to achieve 
intended policy objectives. Nevertheless, attention to substantive written 
rules is vitally important because, while even the best-drafted substantive 
rules may not solve the problem, poorly drafted rules can certainly make it 
worse. Drafting provisions conferring the scope of regulatory discretion will 
in practice be a fine judgement between providing the necessary authority to 
act effectively, and conferring over-broad authority that may threaten the 
ability of a reform to command the support of the profession. This can be 
seen as an application within the domain of health policy of Colin Diver’s 
argument that, while compromises and trade-offs between different 
‘dimensions’ of rule precision are inevitable, failure to achieve a socially 
optimal trade-off between three dimensions {transparency, accessibility and
46 Of course, because we are concerned with regulatory-decision making, these 
decisions will themselves usually be expressed in rules or other standards. 
Distinguishing between different levels of analysis requires further assumptions 
about the ‘standpoint’ and ‘role’ of different actors. From the standpoint of a 
regulator, the decision to exclude a particular treatment from the NHS is an 
operational decision, but from the standpoint of a physician, this same decision 
be seen an exercise of collective choice, pertaining to her decision, e.g. how to 
treat a particular condition. On the importance o f ‘standpoint’ and ‘role’ in 
understanding rules, see Twining and Miers (1999). How to Do Things With 
Rules: A Primer o f Interpretation. Fourth edition, London, Butterworths, pp. 
67-77, 168-175.
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congruence in his terminology) may lead to the failure of many reasonable 
policies to achieve their intended objectives.47
4.5.3 Restraints Based on Structure and Process
Because of the inherent limitations in relying on substantive rules to solve 
the commitment problem, the use of regulatory structures and processes to 
further constrain the exercise of substantive discretion has an important role 
to play in ensuring that operational regulatory choices are faithful to the 
implicit concordat.48 As McCubbins, Noll and Weingast put it, an 
alternative to specific substantive rules, “...is to constrain an agency’s 
policies through its structure and process by enfranchising the constituents 
of each political actor... that is party to the agreement to enact policy...”49 In 
terms of process, the power to set the regulatory agenda, the power to reject 
decisions and the outcome in the absence of a policy decision will all have 
an effect on the ability of the respective parties to ‘enforce’ compliance with 
the implicit concordat.50 For example, with respect to the National Institute 
for Clinical Excellence (NICE), the Department of Health decided (albeit 
latterly in accordance with written guidelines) which treatments were to be 
evaluated (agenda-setting power) and, in addition, had the authority to
47 Diver (1983). "The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules." Yale Law 
Journal 93 (1): 65-110.
48 On the role of processes and structures, see McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 
(1987). "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control." 
Journal o f Law, Economics and Organization 3 (2): 243-277; McCubbins, Noll 
and Weingast (1989). "Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: 
Administrative arrangements and the political control of agencies." Virginia 
Law Review 75 (2): 431-481; Macey (1992). "Organizational design and 
Political Control of Administrative Agencies." Journal o f Law, Economics and 
Organization 8(1): 93-110.
49 McCubbins, Noll and Weingast (1989). "Structure and Process, Politics and 
Policy: Administrative arrangements and the political control of agencies." 
Virginia Law Review 75 (2): 431-481, p. 440.
50 Romer and Rosenthal (1978). "Political Resource Allocation, Controlled 
Agendas and the Status Quo." Public Choice 33 (1): 27-43.
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decide whether NICE’S recommendations were to be disseminated as 
guidance to the NHS (veto power). In the absence of guidance, decisions 
concerning which treatments were to be considered clinical and cost- 
effective lay at the local level (the reversion). Such an arrangement (it shall 
be argued in Chapter 6) gave substantial degree of influence to the 
Department of Health, despite NICE’S status as an ‘arm’s length’ Special 
Health Authority. The ability to design a regulatory agency in different 
ways according to different needs has been described by Macey as “the 
ultimate structural solution” potentially, providing a solution to problem of 
coalitional as well as bureaucratic drift.51 Key design variables identified by 
Macey include the extent to which different interest groups are 
‘enfranchised’ within the agency’s decision-making process, the expertise 
which populates an agency and the extent of competition among agencies. 
An example of the latter variable (discussed in Section 3, above and more 
fully in Chapter 6) was NICE’S technology appraisal guidance which 
‘competed’ with the alternative guidance provided by the Consumer 
Association’s Drug and Therapeutics Bulletin, until guidance from the 
Secretary of State required NHS organisations to fund treatment provided 
by the Secretary of State.
An interesting discussion of the regulatory processes to generate 
credible policy commitments in the health policy arena is to be found in 
Moshe Maor’s comparative analysis of drug reimbursement policies in New 
Zealand, Australia and British Columbia.52 Maor argues that the use of 
evidence-based medicine in the decision to fund particular drugs amounts to 
a ‘gold standard’, that is, to “...a world-wide shared scientific standard
51 Macey, op. cit., p. 99.
52 Maor (2004). "Competing Commitments? Independence versus "gold 
standard" for policy choice in the reimbursement of pharmaceutical drugs".
20th Anniversary SOG Research Committee of the International Political 
Science Association, Vancouver.
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applied when assembling, evaluating, and interpreting evidence in a 
particular policy area.” The requirements of evidence-based medicine, in 
terms of what counts as acceptable justification for decisions injects a 
degree of predictability into the regulatory decision-making process. 
Furthermore, any departures from the standards of evidence-based medicine 
is likely to be transparent to scrutiny. For these reasons, Maor argues that 
embedding an evidence-based medicine standard into the process of 
deciding to fund particular drugs is likely to be more resilient in the face of 
aggressive supply-side policies.
4.5.4 Constraints on System Changes
In Ostrom’s terms, restraints on changing the regulatory system operate at 
the level of collective choice, and comprise both the formal procedural rules 
and the informal institutions through which changes both to the substantive 
rules and the regulatory structures and processes discussed in (1) and (2) 
must be made. These include, most obviously, the procedures for 
amendment of the regulations conferring regulatory authority, including the 
laying of ministerial regulations, or the enactment of primary legislation (as 
the case may be). Following Helmke and Levitsky, informal institutions are 
understood here as “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are 
created, communicated and enforced outside o f  officially sanctioned 
channels.”54 An example of informal constraints on system changes in the 
United Kingdom context offered by Spiller and Vogelsang is the convention 
that significant changes in policy will be preceded by a Government White 
Paper:
53 Ibid. p. 3.
54 Helmke and Levitsky (2004). "Informal Institutions and Comparative 
Politics: A Research Agenda." Perspectives on Politics 2 (4): 725-740, p. 727.
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The commissioning of a report serves to announce the government’s 
intention, providing an opportunity to for interest groups to make 
their positions known. The process prevents hasty changes in policy, 
made without public and political consultation55
In this way, the informal institution of White Papers serves to prevent
changes to regulatory regimes to be presented as a fa it accompli.
Because of the varieties of forms by which substantive and 
procedural rules at the operational level can be enacted, different constraints 
can be invoked by policymakers wishing to design more or less credible 
policies. Most obviously, where regulatory authority is conferred by 
statutory instrument, in the absence of objection from either House of 
Parliament, the Secretary of State can make changes by the ‘laying’ the 
regulation before Parliament, usually for forty days.56 On the other hand, 
primary legislation is required to pass through various stages in each House. 
Again, in this case, it is difficult (certainly compared to delegated 
legislation) for policy changes to be presented as a fa it accompli.
4.5.5 Institutions for Enforcing Lower-Level 
Commitment Mechanisms
At the level of rules of constitutional choice, are the legislative, judicial, and 
executive institutions through which the lower-level rules are enforced. A 
key insight from Levy and Spiller’s analysis is that, due to the different
55 Spiller and Vogelsang (1996). "The United Kingdom: A Regulatory Pace- 
Setter", in Levy and Spiller (ed.) Regulationsf Institutions and Commitment: 
Comparative studies o f telecommunications. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, p. 82.
56 The Statutory Instruments Act 1946 standardised the procedures for making 
and scrutinising delegated legislation. For commentary, see Craig (2003). 
Administrative Law. Fifth edition, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 371-378; Wade 
and Forsyth (2004). Administrative Law. 9th Edition, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 891 -896.
113
background pattern of legislative, and executive institutions in different 
countries, the approach to regulatory governance that is appropriate to one 
country may perform poorly in other settings. At the same time, it is 
possible to take issue with a number of their specific assertions about the
c*7
British constitution in particular.
Taking legislative institutions first, they assume that, compared with 
countries such as the United States in which legislative power is shared 
between two Houses of Congress and the President, legislation is a poor 
means of engendering institutional commitment in Britain’s parliamentary 
system in which the executive controls Parliament, and in which alternate 
parties take turns at forming the executive. As discussed in Section 2.4.3, if 
this were wholly true, studies such as Marmor’s seminal Politics o f
C Q
Medicare, would have limited relevance for the British experience. 
However, it is possible to take issue with Levy and Spiller’s position on two 
grounds.
First, parliamentary time is sufficiently limited that there is a 
significant opportunity cost associated with introducing primary legislation, 
namely that other parts of a party’s programmatic commitments must be 
given lower priority, perhaps dropping off the legislative agenda altogether. 
Much of the legislative business of Parliament (which usually amounts to 
less than fifty pieces of legislation in any parliamentary session) is ‘routine’, 
including finance and appropriations legislation, or is otherwise ‘non-
57 For a critique of their assumptions about the institutional endowment of 
Jamiaca, one of their other country studies, see Stirton and Lodge (2003). "Re- 
Thinking Institutional Endowment in Jamaica: Misguided Theory, Prophecy of 
Doom or Explanation for Regulatory Change?" CARR/CRC/ABS Workshop 
on Risk Regulation, Accountability and Development, Hulme Hall, University 
of Manchester.
58 Marmor (2000). The Politics o f Medicare. Second edition, New York, Aldine 
de Grutyer.
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programmatic’, in that it has to be fitted into the legislative programme in 
response to unexpected occurrences, such as an adverse judicial decision. It 
is not surprising, therefore, that the Health Act 1999 was the only major 
health enactment passed during New Labour’s first term of office. While 
these constraints are far from absolute, they do suggest a level of 
enforcement of restraints on system change that could never be attained by 
delegated legislation. A second argument, is that the UK Parliament is bi­
cameral, with the House of Lords acting mainly as a revising chamber, but 
with the power to reject legislation, subject to the provisions of the 
Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949.59 Though the commitment value of 
legislation may therefore be lower in the UK setting compared with 
constitutions based on divided institutions sharing power, the contrast is 
arguably less stark than Levy and Spiller suggest.
In terms of executive institutions, UK civil servants are permanent 
career civil servants who serve whichever political party is in office 
(compared with the US in which senior civil servants are appointed by the 
President of the day). This gives a degree of neutrality, though at the same 
time civil servants are regarded as the agent of the minister to whom they 
are responsible to the minister (unlike, Germany, which regards civil 
servants as servants of the Constitution). While Levy and Spiller’s 
characterisation of Britain as enjoying a strong respect for bureaucratic 
process is not in itself controversial, the loyalty of civil servants to the 
Government of the day tends to suggest that procedural restraints will have 
a greater effect on outcomes, and thus be more effective in protecting the 
implicit concordat, if decision-making power is vested outside the 
ministerial hierarchy. This may be one reason why the Department of
59 Wade and Forsyth (2004). Administrative Law. 9th Edition, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press., p. 26.
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Health has a strong tradition of arm’s length bodies operating outside 
ministerial control.60
Finally, in terms of judicial institutions, Britain benefits from an 
independent and competent judiciary, capable of enforcing the substantive 
limits on regulatory authority and procedural restaints, and preventing 
changes that do not follow prescribed procedures. Michael Harker has 
emphasised to good effect that Levy and Spiller’s analysis of the UK is 
predicated on the assumption of a ‘weak’ model of judicial review, meaning 
that the Courts will give broad leeway to regulators to interpret their powers, 
especially given the broad delegation of authority that the UK utilities 
legislation has conferred.61 Even so, given the ‘weak’ model of judicial 
review as described by Harker, the courts are most likely to be an effective 
mechanism where their role is explicitly invoked, in terms of precisely 
specified substantive limits to regulatory authority and well-defined 
procedural requirements, on which the courts can adjudicate. Nonetheless, 
even on this ‘weak’ model of judicial review, the courts provide an 
important institutional constraint, policing the boundaries between priority- 
setting in the allocation of resources and clinical decision-making.
A brief review of a number of recent cases involving challenges to 
decisions by Health Authorities to deny certain treatment to patients 
illustrates this latter point. In R v Cambridge Health Authority, ex p  B62 the 
applicant, who suffered from acute myeloid leukaemia, sought to challenge 
a decision of Cambridge HA not to fund a third course of chemotherapy and 
a second bone marrow transplant, after earlier treatments failed. The doctors
60 For a recent account see Department of Health (2004) Reconfiguring the 
Department o f Health's Arm's Length Bodies, London, Department of Health.
61 Harker (2005). "UK Utility Regulation: Licences, Commitment and Judicial 
Review." Annals o f Public and Cooperative Economics 76 (1): 5-33.
62 (1995) 23 BMLR 1 (CA)
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responsible for her earlier treatment took the view that B would not benefit 
from further treatment, other than palliative care, although B’s father sought 
and obtained a medical opinion that estimated the probability of success of a 
course of chemotherapy to be between 10 and 20%, with a similar 
probability of success of a second bone marrow transplant. The Court of 
Appeal overturned a decision in her favour, holding that this was a decision 
which the Authority, on a proper review of all the relevant considerations, 
could reasonably have reached.
A second case, R v North Derbyshire HA, ex p  Fisher 63 concerned 
the decision by the Health Authority to deny additional resources to Central 
Sheffield University Hospitals NHS Trust, to fund the prescription of beta 
interferon to the applicant, who had been diagnosed as suffereing from 
relapsing and remitting multiple sclerosis. Guidance contained in a Circular 
(EL (95) 97) issued by the NHS Executive covered the introduction of this 
new treatment, under which HAs and providers were required to develop 
and implement arrangements to manage the introduction of the drug. Two 
consultant neurologists at the Royal Hallamshire Hosptal had assessed the 
applicant as suitable for beta interferon therapy, but the Trust took the view 
that it could not afford to fund beta interferon treatment within its existing 
block contract with North Derbyshire. The Health Authority maintained a 
policy of funding beta interferon only as part of a clinical trial. Dyson J took 
the view that, as there was no immanent prospect of a trial, and because 
there was no realistic prospect that the Trust could fund the treatment out of 
its block contract with North Derbyshire, its policy effectively amounted to 
a blanket ban on beta interferon, contrary to the guidance set out in EL (95) 
97. The Authority had thus failed properly to take into account the guidance 
of the NHS Executive in adopting and maintaining their policy.
63 [1997] 8 Med LR 327.
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Finally, the case of North West Lancashire HA v A, D & G64 
concerned a challenge by three transsexuals against the refusal by North 
West Lancashire to fund gender reassignment treatment, including surgery 
for ‘gender identity dysphoria’. A & G had been diagnosed by a specialist 
consultant as having a clinical need for gender reassignment surgery, while 
D was awaiting an assessment of suitability for the treatment. The Authority 
maintained a policy under which no treatment, other than general psychiatry 
and psychology was provided, “save in the event of overriding clinical need 
or exceptional circumstances.” Furthermore, expert clinical judgement that 
a patient needed this treatment was not, under the Health Authority’s policy, 
sufficient to fall under this exception. The Court of Appeal upheld a 
decision at first instance in favour of A, D & G. While the setting of clinical 
priorities, and the application of its finite resources to those priorities was a 
matter for the Authority, in reaching its decision it had not treated 
transsexualism as an illiness, and had consequently failed to consider 
properly the circumstances of the applicants’ cases, including the existence 
of clinical need.
Taken together, these three cases support the proposition that, in 
allocating resources to different priorities, Health Authorities can not 
altogether exclude from consideration clinical judgement in individual 
cases. Furthermore, the more that policies of priority-setting discount the 
importance of clinical judgements, the higher the standards of accountability 
to which resource allocation decisions will be held by the courts. In the 
‘Child B’ case, where original team were sceptical about the benefits of 
further treatment, and even the more favourable opinion obtained by B’s 
father held out only a small hope of success, Sir Thomas Bingham MR 
forcefully rejected the suggestion of Laws J at first instance that the
64 [1999] Lloyd’s Rep Med 399.
118
Authority must explain the priorities on which the decision not to fund B’s 
treatment was based. By contrast, in the case of A, D and G, the court made 
it clear that the decision not to provide treatment, for which medical 
diagnosis revealled a clinical need, must be justified. In requiring the 
Authority to reconsider its decision not to find gender reassignment therapy, 
Buxton LJ took the view that, “...to the extent that such procedures continue 
to be subordinated to other claims on the Authority’s resources [it should] 
indicate, at least in broad terms, the reasons for the Authority’s choice.”65 
Fisher focussed on the Authority’s failure proprely to take into account 
NHS Executive guidance, but also supports the principle that a denial of 
funding for treatment may have to be justified by clear reasons where 
clinical judgement supports the provision of the treatment to a particular 
patient. This is emphasised in Dyson J’s comment that: “As for clinical 
decisions, they were not for the responedents [i.e. the Health Authority] to 
take.”66
4.6 Observable Implications
In order for the case studies set out in the next three chapters to demonstrate 
support (or the lack of it) for the theory set out in this chapter, it is necessary 
first to identify the observable implications of the theory, and to delineate
7how they can be observed. In terms of identifying observable implications, 
the theory laid out in this chapter would suggest, first and foremost, that 
regulatory reform initiatives in health policy are more likely to achieve their 
publicly-espoused goals when the legal and institutional framework for
65 [1999] Lloyd’s Rep Med 399 at p. 413.
66 [1997] 8 Med LR 327, at p. 337.
King, Keohane and Verba (1994). Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
Chapter 1; Epstein and King (2002). "The Rules of Inference." University o f 
Chicago Law Review 69 (1): 1-133, 65-76.
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regulation is credible according to the three-level analysis suggested by 
Levy and Spiller, and re-specified in the context of the NHS in this chapter. 
Although instances of unexpected failure (or success) may not, of 
themselves, be regarded as falsifying the theory, they do represent a ‘puzzle’ 
for which specific answers, supported by evidence needs to be given, if  the 
theory is to be ‘saved’. Were the publicly espoused goals of a particular 
initiative unrealistic, making their achievement unlikely? Did other factors 
intervene to lead to unexpected policy failure (or success)? A second 
observable implication derives from the fact that, according to the theory 
developed here, the phenomenon of ‘slippage’ plays a causal role in 
relating institutional arrangements to regulatory outcomes. Consequently, 
the case study narrative ought to identify examples of such slippage 
following less successful reform initiatives (and, correspondingly, ought not 
to find such extensive evidence of slippage in more successful cases) if the 
relationship between institutions outcomes is not to be regarded as spurious. 
Furthermore, to the extent that a reform is judged to have failed, this should 
be associated with some identifiable subversive behaviour on the part of the 
medical profession.
In terms of observing these implications, evidence from official 
sources is the primary evidence on which the case study is based. This 
includes published reports on matters relating to the case studies, as well as 
interviews with officials and representatives of the medical profession. In 
addition, the views published in medical journals such as the BMJ, 
particularly its editorial pages, can be taken to give an indication of the 
views of the medical profession. Evidence of this nature may be regarded as 
mostly ‘reputational’, i.e. it provides evidence of different actors’ 
perceptions of effectiveness, rather than direct observation e.g. of health 
outcomes. Such evidence may nonetheless provide a useful indication of 
policy success and failure, in an area in which it is notoriously difficult to
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gather direct evidence. To mitigate the problem of bias, efforts are made 
whenever possible to draw on evidence from different sources and from 
different institutional viewpoints.
4.7 Conclusions
The key claims of the analytical framework developed in this chapter are (a) 
an implicit concordat between the Department of Health and the medical 
profession established the ‘rules of the game’ for the subsequent 
development of policy in the health care arena; (b) the rise of regulation in 
the NHS constitutes a potential threat to the implicit concordat because 
regulatory authority can be used to develop policies that violate the 
concordat, or which may come to do so at a later point in time; (c) the 
effectiveness of regulatory reforms in the NHS will depend on the ability of 
the Department of Health to credibly commit to the implicit concordat, 
because effective compliance with regulatory goals depends on the 
cooperation of the profession, and there are number of strategies by which 
the profession can subvert regulation if they fear that the regime is 
susceptible to deliberate or unintentional slippage; and (d) the governance 
structure of regulation, understood in terms of a modified version of the 
three-level analysis suggested by Levy and Spiller, can generate credible 
institutional commitment to the implicit concordat, by limiting the 
opportunities for coalitional drift. The following three chapters each apply 
the analysis developed here to a different case study of regulatory reform in 
the NHS. The three cases are each chosen because they represent a range of 
governance structures, providing different degrees of credibility as predicted 
by the modified version of the Levy and Spiller framework presented in 
Section 5. The fact that this analytical approach was developed from 
existing analyses with a proven track record ought to give some confidence
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in its validity. Following the case studies of the next three chapters, the 
overall issue of how well the approach stands up to the evidence is 
considered in the conclusions.
Chapter 5 
The Limited List of NHS Drugs
In Britain, in contrast with many other countries, which have gone 
down different routes, we have resisted any system of limiting the 
freedom of the doctor to prescribe whatever he thinks his patient 
needs. Not for us are such devices as limited lists, black lists, the 
compulsory substitution of generics, or the financial pressures 
involved in reimbursement regimes or the like.1
5.1 Introduction
In 1985, the Conservative Government introduced a national Limited List of 
NHS Drugs, • whereby some 1800 or so products within eight therapeutic 
categories were excluded from the NHS, or else restricted to use for certain 
conditions suffered by certain categories of patients. Several European 
countries operated national ‘selected lists’ of approved drugs, and such 
measures had been considered for introduction in the UK in the 1950s. 
These had been rejected, among other reasons because they were thought to 
be likely to arouse the hostility of the profession. In the UK, efforts to limit 
the range of drugs used by clinicians had therefore been restricted to local
1 Patrick Jenkin, Secretary of State for Social Services, 1981, quoted in GMSC 
(1984). "Limited List of Drugs Opposed." British Medical Journal 289: 1468-9, 
24 November 1984.
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initiatives, mainly in the hospital care sector, to create local formularies. 
This chapter examines in detail the introduction of the Limited List, and its 
subsequent development, applying the framework of analysis developed in 
the previous chapter.
There are a number of reasons why the Limited List episode makes a 
compelling study in the context of this thesis. First, the Limited List was the 
first sustained effort by the Government to regulate clinical behaviour in 
order to limit aspects of NHS expenditure. It therefore provides an early 
example of a regulatory reform initiative within the NHS, and of its effects 
on relations between the Government and the medical profession. Second, 
anticipating the argument that follows, the legal and administrative 
framework of the Limited List performed poorly in terms of the three-level 
analysis of regulatory commitment developed in the previous chapter. The 
episode therefore provides a demonstration of the performance of regulation 
under conditions of inadequate commitment. Furthermore, Adrian Kay, 
whose work was discussed briefly in Section 2.4.3, has claimed that the 
introduction of the Limited List was one of the key events that provoked a 
breakdown of a ‘health policy community’, which had previously sustained 
trust between the profession and the government. If this is correct, then 
from this point onwards, institutional commitment might have been 
expected to become more important. The Limited List therefore provides an 
episode of regulatory reform in which the effects of institutional 
commitment can be studied in relative isolation.
2 Collier and Forster (1985). "Management of a Restricted Drugs Policy in 
Hospital: The First Five Years' Experience." The Lancet: 331-333, 9 February 
1985.
3 Kay (2001). "Beyond Policy Community: The case of the GP Fundholding 
scheme." Public Administration 79 (3): 561-577, pp. 567-8.
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This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 narrates the history of the 
Limited List scheme from its origins in 1985, and traces its development over 
time. Applying the taxonomy of waste proposed by Blunstein and Marmor, 
introduced in Section 4.2, the original purpose of the Limited List could be said 
to have been to eliminate certain ineffective or harmful treatments. Over time, 
it expanded into other categories of ‘waste’ and latterly even included at least 
one drug, sildenafil (Viagra) that was arguably not wasteful within any of 
Blunstein and Marmor’s senses. Section 5.3 assesses the effectiveness of the 
Limited List scheme, concluding that, judged against publicly proclaimed 
intentions the scheme performed poorly. Section 5.4 provides an analysis of the 
regulatory governance of the Limited List, relating diagnosed poor performance 
to the legal and regulatory framework of the scheme. By way of conclusion, 
Section 5.5 considers the extent to which the evidence presented in this chapter 
supports the argument of this thesis.
5.2 The Limited List of NHS Drugs: Origins, 
Implementation and Development
The purpose of this section is to give an account of the background to the 
Limited List scheme, its introduction and subsequent evolution. In line with 
the theoretical aims, attention is focussed on the publicly pronounced policy 
objectives and the legal and administrative framework through which these 
were pursued. Section 5.2.1 considers the background to the Limited List; 
Section 5.2.2 looks at the government’s proposals; Section 5.2.3 examines 
the introduction of the scheme, including the legal provisions through which 
the scheme was implemented. Following the introduction of the Limited 
List, the government agreed to the establishment of an Advisory Committee 
on NHS drugs, considered in Section 5.2.4. Despite earlier assurances to the 
contrary, in 1992, the government extended the scope of the Limited List 
scheme, adding ten further categories. This is considered in Section 5.2.5.
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Finally, Section 5.2.6 considers the decision, in 1998, to have the ACD 
‘stood down’, and the operation of the Limited List scheme without the 
advice of the Committee.
5.2.1 Background to the Limited List
An initial expectation regarding the NHS was that expenditure would be 
self-limiting. As the major problems of ill health were conquered, so the 
argument went, a healthier population would demand fewer services. This 
expectation was, to say the least, over-optimistic and in the decades since 
1948 all aspects of the service have witnessed relentless increases in cost. 
One factor that placed additional pressure on the drugs budget in particular 
is that while most services are subject to overall spending limits, prescribing 
costs were essentially ‘demand-led’; if  GPs prescribed more, or more 
expensive drugs, the drug budget would increase. Furthermore, there were 
few existing instruments through which this could be countered. The 
Conservative government of the 1980s was by no means the first 
administration to contemplate regulatory measures to control the relentless 
rise of the NHS drugs budget. The idea of restricting the range of drugs 
available for use in the NHS had been broached in the 1950s, but was 
rejected by successive expert committees.4 More recently, the idea of a 
limited list was rejected by the Greenfield Report, which favoured a system 
of voluntary generic substitution.5 Ironically, in its evidence to the 
Greenfield Committee a little more than a year before the announcement of
4 On the Guillebaud Report, see Webster (1988). The Health Services Since the 
War Volume I. London, HMSO, pp. 204-211. On the Hinchliffe and Douglas 
reports, see Webster (1996). The Health Services Since the War Volume II. 
London, The Stationery Office, 140-8.
5 Department of Health and Social Security (1983) Report o f the Informal 
Working Group on Effective Prescribing, London, DHSS.
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the Limited List scheme, the Department of Health and Social Security
(DHSS) had argued forcefully against a limited list of drugs, claiming:
It is almost impossible to establish whether the introduction of a 
limited list of drugs will in itself produce any financial saving for the 
NHS. What does seem apparent is that any attempt so to do is likely 
to arouse hostility, result in higher administrative costs, affect the 
pricing of drugs and the industry, generate unwelcome pressures for 
general practitioners and pharmacists, and possibly cast some doubt 
on the government’s intentions towards the standard of provision of 
medical services in the NHS.’6
Too much should not be made of this apparent U-turn, since the label
‘limited list’ has been applied to what were in fact substantially different
schemes. In the conventional understanding of the term, a limited list was a
list o f approved products giving what the Douglas Report7 called the “full
therapeutic armamentarium” of drugs. This was distinguished from a “black
lists” approach in which drugs included in the list were excluded from use.
It was arguably in this sense of the term, that the DHSS had rejected the
introduction of a Limited List just a year earlier.
Despite the successive rejections of proposals for restrictions on GP 
prescribing, the idea for a more interventionist approach was not without its 
advocates. In an influential book, The Wrong Kind o f  Medicine?, Charles 
Medawar made the case for a new Medicines Act providing for the 
elimination of many drugs, and control of many others, within the NHS, 
arguing that: “In Britain, we have far more drugs than we need, and too 
many to use effectively.”8 Listing some 800 drugs which he claimed were 
either ineffective, or inappropriately or extravagantly prescribed, he argued
6 GMSC (1984). "Limited List of Drugs Opposed." British Medical Journal 
289: 1468-9,24 November 1984.
7 Department of Health for Scotland (1959) Report o f the Scottish Committee 
on Prescribing Costs, Edinburgh, HMSO.
8 Medawar (1984). The Wrong Kind o f Medicine? London, Consumers' 
Association/Hodder & Stoughton, p. 15.
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that “ ...little effort would be needed to save at least £100 million a year on 
the national drugs bill...; and with real commitment the NHS could save 
several times that amount.”9 For Medawar, financial savings was only one 
advantage of a restricted drug list. Other benefits included a reduction in the 
number of patients prescribed ineffective or unsafe drugs. Nevertheless, as 
Medawar recognised, the prevailing view at the time was that such a move 
would restrict clinical freedom, and would be countered by the 
pharmaceutical industry.
5.2.2 The Government’s Proposals and the Response 
of the Profession
On 8 November 1984, the Secretary of State for Social Services, Mr 
Norman Fowler announced that he intended to introduce prescribing 
restrictions. This came as a surprise to the medical profession, which had 
not been consulted on the measure. Rejecting the recommendations of the 
Greenfield Report, the Secretary of State argued against a policy of 
“...indiscriminate generic substitution, which would limit the freedom of 
the medical profession and have a serious effect on the research-based 
pharmaceutical industry in Britain.”10 Nonetheless, the Secretary of State 
drew the Commons’ attention to the costs of prescribing in two areas, 
namely branded medicines for minor conditions (such as coughs and colds), 
and sedative and tranquilliser drugs. While rejecting generic substitution 
across the board, the Secretary of State saw “ ...no reason... why in the two 
groups that I have set out the NHS should not limit itself to providing only 
the cheaper generic alternatives which are available.”11 This, it was 
reckoned, would generate savings for the NHS in the order of £100 million 
per year (against a total national drugs bill approaching £2,000 million in
9 Ibid., p. 19.
10 Parliamenrary Debates, Sixth Series, H.C. Vol. 67 col. 226.
11 Ibid.
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1984) and was even predicted to “ ...rise in the near future as generic 
alternatives become available for some of the branded products on our 
selected list.”12
There followed a three-month period for consultation, and as a basis 
for this, the government published a ‘white list’, the Provisional List o f
Medicines Remaining Available for Prescription on the National Health
1 ^Service. The Provisional List covered eight therapeutic categories: 
antacids, laxatives, inhalations, antiussives, analgesics for mild to moderate 
pain, vitamins, tonics and bitters, benzodiazepine sedatives and 
tranquillisers. Although many doctors and some of the Royal Colleges 
supported the measure, the General Medical Services Committee (GMSC) 
of the BMA, under the chairmanship of Dr Michael Wilson, voted in favour 
of opposing the Limited List scheme.14 The GMSC consequently refused the 
government’s offer of discussions over the content of the Provisional List. 
The pharmaceutical industry strongly attacked the proposals, although they 
arguably had little to lose on the face of the proposals, because the loss of 
sales to the NHS of many branded drugs for minor ailments would be offset 
by increased over-the-counter demand. The Association of British 
Pharmaceutical Industries (ABPI) mounted a £1 million advertising 
campaign, the content of which might best be described as ‘scare tactics’. 
There was, in addition, sustained opposition from individual pharmaceutical 
companies. Roche Products Ltd, for example, produced a pre-printed letter, 
which it sent to every GP practice in the country with the request that it be
12 H.C. Vol. 74 col. 275w.
13 Department of Health and Social Security (1984) Provisional List o f 
Medicines Remaining Available for Prescription on the National Health 
Service, London, DHSS.
14 GMSC (1984). "Limited List of Drugs Opposed." British Medical Journal 
289: 1468-9,24 November 1984.
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endorsed with their surgery stamp and forwarded (in the pre-paid envelope 
provided) to their local MP.
The outcome of this titanic struggle was that the number of drugs 
retained on the ‘selected list’ of drugs to be retained for use on the NHS was 
increased from 30 to around 100. In line with this increase, the estimated 
savings from the introduction of the Limited List were revised downwards 
to £75 million in the year 1985-1986. Furthermore, in response to 
parliamentary and more general pressure, the government agreed that the 
scheme should incorporate an appeal mechanism by which decisions to 
restrict particular drugs could be challenged.
5.2.3 The Introduction of the Limited List
Following the conclusion of the three-month consultation period, the Secretary 
of State for Health laid regulations before Parliament, amending the National 
Health Service (General Medical Services Regulations) Regulations 1974, 
which set out GPs’ Terms of Service. The power to make Regulations derived 
from S. 29 (2) of the National Health Service Act 1977, which empowered the 
Secretary of State to make regulations governing “...the definition of the 
personal medical services to be provided...” by general practitioners. 
Regulation 2 (4) of S.I. No. 290 of 1985 introduced into the Terms of Service a 
new Paragraph 36A which stated:
(1) In the course of treating a patient to whom he is providing 
treatment under these terms of service, a doctor shall not order 
on a prescription form a drug or other substance specified in 
Schedule 3A to these regulations but may otherwise prescribe 
such a drug or other substance for that patient in the course of 
that treatment.
(2) In the course of treating such a patient a doctor shall not order on 
a prescription a drug specified in an entry in column 1 of 
Schedule 3B unless—
(a) that patient is a person mentioned in column 2 of that 
entry; and
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(b) that drug is prescribed for that patient only for the 
treatment of the condition specified in column 3 of that 
entry; and
(c) the doctor endorses the face of that form with the 
reference “S3B”.
but may otherwise prescribe such a drug for that patient in the 
course of that treatment.
These provisions gave effect respectively to the establishment of 
‘black’ and ‘grey’ lists. Schedule 3A, the ‘black list’ consisted of “Drugs 
and Other Substances Not to be Prescribed for Supply Under 
Pharmaceutical Services”. The grey list set out in Schedule 3B initially 
contained only one product, Clobazam. The use of this drug was restricted 
to the treatment of patients with epilepsy.15 Corresponding amendments 
were made to chemists’ terms of service preventing them for supplying 
drugs listed under schedule 3A or under schedule 3B without the 
appropriate endorsement from the doctor. The black list contained around 
1800 products, described in the explanatory notes which accompanied S.I 
No. 290 of 1985 as “drugs which are more expensive than others which 
have the same clinical or therapeutic effect, and substances which are not 
regarded as drugs forming part of pharmaceutical services.”
The laying of the Regulations, and equivalent provisions for 
Scotland, gave rise to a fierce debate on the floor of the House of Commons, 
during which the government was heavily criticised for the slovenly way
15 An examination of the form of Schedule 3B helps to make sense of the 
drafting of S. 36A (2):
D r u g s  t o  b e  P r e s c r i b e d  f o r  S u p p l y  u n d e r  P h a r m a c e u t i c a l  S e r v i c e s  
O n l y  i n  C e r t a i n  C i r c u m s t a n c e s
Drug Patient Condition
1 2 3
Clobazam Any Patient Epilepsy
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Schedule 3A, and its Scottish equivalent had been put together.16 Although 
it had been intended that the two lists were to be identical, there were some 
differences due to drafting anomalies. For example, Vicks Cold Care 
capsules were included in the English Schedule 3A, but were not black­
listed under the Scottish Regulation. Conversely, Vicks inhaler was 
restricted in Scotland but remained unrestricted in England. Furthermore the 
printed Regulations laid before Parliament contained a number of (allegedly 
barely legible) hand-written additions to the printed text. Despite these 
anomalies, and the consequent suspicion that the Regulations had been 
prepared with excessive haste, the Regulations were passed by the 
Commons, and entered into effect without further amendment.
An initial challenge to the compatibility of the Limited List with 
European Law was mounted in the case of R v Secretary o f  State for Social
1 7Services, ex parte Schering Chemicals Ltd. Schering, a German 
pharmaceutical company, manufactured a drug marketed under the brand 
name Noctamid, whose generic name was lormetazepan. Initially, the DHSS 
proposed that the product should be black-listed on the ground that it served 
no clinical need that was not satisfied by temazepam, which was cheaper. 
Following the publication of the draft list, Schering sought to have its 
product reinstated, at the same time, lowering the price so that it was no 
more expensive than temazepam. The DHSS acceded to the request to retain 
lormetazepan on the selected list, but scheduled the brand-name ‘Noctamid’. 
The effect of this was that the product could be prescribed by its generic 
name only, and when Schering’s patent on the product expired, it would 
have been open to pharmacists to choose between Noctamid and a generic 
version. Schering challenged this move under Article 30 (as it was prior to
16 See for example, Parliamentary Debates, Sixth Series, HC Vol. 75, col. 681, 
18th March 1985 (Mr. Donald Dewar).
17 [1987] 1 C.M.L.R. 277.
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the Treaty of Amsterdam renumbering exercise, now Article 28) as a 
measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction on imports, 
claiming also that the measure deprived them of their intellectual property 
rights to the brand name ‘Noctamid’. The claim was rejected by the High 
Court, arguing that although Schering was likely to have lost sales as a 
result of the decision, there was nothing in the Limited List scheme that was 
inherently discriminatory against the imported product. The main strand of 
the DHSS strategy, effectively introducing compulsory generic substitution, 
albeit within a relatively narrow range of clinical activity, thus survived the 
only legal challenge until the Viagra cases, discussed infra.
5.2.4 The Advisory Committee on NHS Drugs
As noted in Section 5.2.2, one of the points conceded by the DHSS 
was for the creation of an ‘appeal mechanism’, through which black-listed 
drugs could be reconsidered. This proposal was fleshed out, into the 
establishment of an Advisory Committee on NHS Drugs (ACD), which was 
to play a role in keeping current the content of the black and grey lists. The 
ACD comprised fifteen persons drawn from the professions (doctors, 
dentists, pharmacists) with expertise within one or more of the therapeutic 
categories covered by the scheme, and was chaired by the Deputy Chief 
Medical Officer. Under its initial terms of reference, the ACD was charged 
with advising UK health Ministers on an ongoing basis as to the 
composition of Schedule 3 A and “in order that drugs to meet all real clinical 
needs at the lowest possible cost to the NHS” across the nine categories
1 ftcovered by the Limited List scheme were available.
18 The content of Schedule 3 A also subject to recommendations of a separate 
committee, the Advisory Committee on Borderline Substances (ACBS). The 
function of the ACBS was to advise whether particular substances, preparations
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The working methods of the ACD, and the relationship between the 
ACD and the DHSS more generally can be described briefly.19 The 
Committee would meet roughly once per year, at which time it would 
typically consider a single therapeutic category. Prior to the meeting, the 
secretariat to the ACD would gather data on the prices of drugs within that 
category, and would rank them in order of price, from the cheapest to the 
most expensive. The Committee would meet and consider the price-ranked 
list of drugs. Proceeding from the cheapest to the most expensive, it would 
set a ‘guide-price’ corresponding to the price at which it was agreed that all 
clinical needs could be met, i.e. the price of the most expensive drug in the 
list considered to be clinically necessary. The ACD would then formulate a 
recommendation that all drugs more expensive than the guide-price should 
be black-listed. The manufacturers were then notified by the Committee, 
and were invited to appeal. Where the manufacturers could show that the 
product in question fulfilled a clinical need which could not be met by the 
other products, or where the manufacturer agreed to lower the price to the 
level of other, equally effective products (as in the case of lormetazepan in 
the Schering case, discussed in Section 5.2.3 above), then it would be 
‘reprieved’. If the manufacturer did not appeal, or if its submissions were 
not considered to be persuasive, then the Committee would advise that the 
product should be ‘black-listed’.
Once the ACD had formulated its advice to Ministers, there would 
follow a one month period for broader consultation, during which patient 
groups or other interested parties could make representations to the DHSS. 
On the basis of the advice of the Committee, and on the public consultation,
or items should not be treated as drugs under the relevant General Medical 
Services Regulations.
19 This description draws heavily on interview 121.
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officials would compile advice to the Minister (known as a ‘solution’) 
regarding whether to accept or reject the recommendations of the 
Committee. Typically, official advice would follow the expert opinion of 
the committee, but might differ if  it was feared that a particular decision 
might be susceptible to possible legal challenge. For example, the 
Committee may have had based its decision on the judgement that two 
products were equivalent, while the manufacturer of a more expensive 
product had asserted that some extra benefit—perhaps it came with an 
applicator, for example—justified a higher price. This cautious approach 
stemmed from the fact that the ACD secretariat felt that it did not have the 
resources, either in terms of funding or manpower, to become involved in 
litigation.
Not all black-listing decisions followed the recommendation from 
the ACD. In 1993, Ministers took the decision that the NHS should not 
fund nicotine replacement therapy (NRT), despite evidence that this was 
effective in helping smokers to quit. The various brands of nicotine patches 
and chewing gum that were then available were black-listed.20 A subsequent 
memorandum between civil servants explained the reasoning behind this 
decision:
Nicotine patches do have a role in helping some people to stop 
smoking, but there is no reason why their cost should be met by the 
NHS. People who can afford to smoke can also afford to buy the 
products, which may help them to stop smoking. It is also worth 
emphasising that there are around 11 million ex-smokers in this 
country—and the vast majority have given up without 
pharmacological help.21
20 More recently, following the advice of NICE, all but two of the six products 
initially ‘black-listed’ were de-Scheduled.
21 Extract from a document obtained from the Department of Health following a 
Freedom of Information Act request. Ref. DE6008103.
135
This reveals a fundamentally different decision-making process to that of 
the ACD. Whereas the ACD’s procedures were designed so that effective 
treatments would remain available, in the case of NRT, a conscious decision 
seems to have been taken to exclude a product, which was assumed to be 
effective, on the grounds that those who could benefit from NRT could 
afford to pay for it privately.
5.2.5 The Extension of the Limited List
The Limited List scheme had originally been added onto the 1974 Terms of 
Service. When the new GP contract was introduced in 1992, the relevant 
provisions were carried forward into the new regulations, the National 
Health Services (General Medical Services) Regulations 1992.22 S. 44 of the 
Regulations re-enacted S36A, while the new Schedules 10 and 11 replaced 
Schedules 3 A and 3B respectively. This continuity gave no indication of the 
Government’s intention to introduce more fundamental changes to the 
scheme. In November 1992, the Department of Health announced the 
extension of the Selected List into ten categories: appetite suppressants; 
antidiarrhoeal drugs; drugs acting on the skin; drugs acting on the ear and 
nose; drugs for vaginal and vulval conditions; contraceptives; drugs for 
allergic disorders; topical antirheumatics; hypnotics and anxiolytics; drugs 
used in amnesia. These categories were, according to the government, 
“chosen on the basis that they contained a wide range of medicines of 
apparently similar therapeutic effects at significantly different prices, that 
they were categories that incurred substantial prescribing costs, and they did 
not relate to life-threatening conditions.” In order to accommodate the
22 S.I No 635 of 1992
23 Secretary of State for Health (1994) Government Response to the Second 
Report from the Health Committee. Session 1993-94, Cm 2683, London, 
HMSO,p. 10.
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necessary expertise to deal with the additional categories within the ACD, 
membership of the Committee was increased from fifteen to twenty persons.
Although the expansion of categories was dismissed by some within 
the medical community as a “diversion rather than threat”,24 in principle, 
this represented a major expansion of the Limited List scheme. Apart from 
benzodiazepines and tranquillisers, the original seven categories covered 
mainly the ‘symptomatic’ treatment of mainly self-limiting conditions; 
overall prescribing within the original categories covered perhaps 5-10% of 
prescribing within general practice. The new categories, by contrast, 
covered major areas of essential drug therapy, and would have extended the 
coverage of the Limited List scheme to around a third of all prescribing by 
GPs. An entire medical specialty—dermatology—was restricted by the 
single new category of drugs acting on the skin.
This extension was perhaps more apparent than real, not least 
because of the delays by the ACD in developing recommendations within 
any of the new categories. It took almost two years following the 
announcement of the two categories for the ACD to develop 
recommendations in any of the new categories. Patient advocacy groups, 
some funded by the pharmaceutical interests, intensively opposed black­
listing decisions, taking advantage of the procedure outlined in Section 
5.2.4. For its part, the Department of Health found consultation with patient 
groups to be a convenient excuse for limited action within the new 
categories.
24 Bateman (1993). "The Selected List." BM J306: 1441-2.
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5.2.6 The Limited List Sans ACD
A more significant reason for the absence of progress within these new 
categories was that the Committee stopped meeting after 1998. A number 
of reasons have been put forward for this. A Ministerial Submission of 3rd 
February 2003 recommended the dissolution of ACD suggesting that: “The 
key reason [for dissolving the ACD] is the development of the National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) which amongst other things looks 
at the clinical and cost-effectiveness of drugs.” It was also suggested (121), 
however, that a key circumstance surrounding the abeyance of the 
Committee in 1998 was the expiry (in April 1998) of the Pharmaceutical 
Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS), the voluntary agreement between the 
Department of Health and the pharmaceutical industry which regulated the 
price paid for drugs by the NHS. On this account, the renegotiation of the 
PPRS occurred at the same time as the ACD was preparing to develop 
recommendations in some of the post-1992 categories. The Department of 
Health did not wish to allow this to prejudice negotiations with the ABPI, 
and took the decision to have the ACD ‘stood down’. This, it was claimed, 
was at not originally intended to be more than a temporary hiatus, until 
negotiations with the ABPI could be concluded.
Despite the dissolving of the ACD, the power to place drugs on 
Schedule 11 was used to limit the use of sildenafil (Viagra), a revolutionary 
drug in the treatment of erectile dysfunction (ED). On conventional 
assessments of cost-effectiveness Sildenafil (Viagra) performs favourably 
compared to alternative treatments. 26 At the same time, erectile dysfunction
25 Freedom of Information Act request, ref. DE6008103
26 Stolk, Brower and Bussbach (2002). "Rationalising Rationing: Economic and 
Other Considerations in the Debate About Funding Viagra." Health Policy 59
138
has often been regarded as a natural part of the aging process, and treatment
7 7of the elderly for ED has been seen as a ‘lifestyle choice’. At the same 
time, the licensing of sildenafil had serious resource implications. It has 
been reckoned that some 1.8 million men in the UK suffer from ED, and up 
to a further 8 million from partial ED. At £4.84 per 50mg tablet, the cost to 
the NHS if Viagra were to be made available to all who could benefit from 
it has been estimated to be as high as £1 billion per annum, though a more 
conservative estimate (put forward by Pfizer, the drug’s manufacturer) was 
a much more modest £50 million after five years.
As an interim measure, the government took action to exclude 
Viagra froom the NHS. On 16 September 1998, one day before sildenafil 
was due to be approved by the European Medicines Evaluation Agency, the
7 0NHS Executive issued a Health Service Circular advising that doctors 
should not prescribe sildenafil, and that Health Authorities should not 
support its use “other than in exceptional circumstances which they should 
require be cleared in advance with them.” This followed advice from the 
Standing Medical Advisory Committee (SMAC) that pending a more 
considered evaluation, Viagra should be excluded from prescription on the 
NHS, to avoid a situation where patients who might not meet future 
eligibility criteria received Viagra, only to have it later withdrawn. HSC 
1998/158 declared itself to be “ ...for guidance only and aims to share good 
practice on a particular issue.” Nonetheless there was a high degree of 
compliance, perhaps because of competing demands on resources, and
(1): 53-63, p. 54. See also Smith and Roberts (2000). "The Cost-Effectiveness 
of Sildenafil." Annals o f Internal Medicine 132 (12): 933-937.
27 Stolk, Brower and Bussback, op. cit., p 55.
28 Brooks (1998). "Viagra is Licensed in Europe But Rationed in Britain." BMJ 
317: 765, 19 September 1998.
29 HSC 1998/158, 16 September 1998.
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because a final position was expected within a few weeks.30 Many GPs 
reportedly deferred treatment of patients with ED in anticipation of final 
guidance, which was issued (some four months later) only after the General 
Practitioner Committee threatened to develop its own guidance, if a final 
position were not reached by the time it met on 21 January 1999.
On BBC Radio 4’s Today programme on the morning of 21 January, 
the Secretary of State announced the promulgation of draft Regulations, 
based on advice received from the SMAC some 10 weeks earlier, that 
sildenafil should be restricted to certain categories of patents and forms of 
ED, by placing it in Schedule 11 (the grey list). Viagra was to be restricted 
to patients with ED arising from restrictively specified underlying causes (in 
total amounting to around 15% of ED to sufferers who might benefit from 
Viagra).32 The restriction took initial effect on June 10 1999, and (after a 
review and consultation) became ‘permanent’ on October 10 2000. The 
result of the review was that Viagra was made available to a slightly more 
expansive range of ‘acceptable’ conditions, covering up to 20% of those 
who might potentially benefit. Patients receiving drug treatment for 
impotence on or prior to 14 September 1998 were to be eligible. In addition, 
men who suffered “severe distress” as a result of ED, but who were not 
otherwise eligible, could receive Viagra on the NHS, but only after 
specialist assessment. This use of the Secretary of State’s power to restrict 
the availability of drugs through Schedule 11, based on the aetiology
30 Between September and December 1998 an average of only 108 NHS 
prescriptions for Viagra were issued each week.
31 Chisolm (1999). "Viagra: A Botched Test Case for Rationing." BM J318: 
273-4.
32 National Health Service (General Medical Services) Regulations Amendment 
(No. 2) Regulations 1999, S.I. No. 1627 of 1999. See also Beecham (1999).
"UK Issues Guidance on Prescribing Viagra." BMJ318: 279, 30 January 1999.
33 Ferriman (1999). "UK Government Finalises Restrictions on Viagra 
Prescribing." BMJ318: 1305, 15 May 1999.
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(underlying cause) of a disease was unprecedented, and in two separate 
cases, Pfizer, the drug’s manufacturers, challenged the interim Health 
Service Circular guidance and the inclusion of sildenafil on the grey list.
In the case of R v Secretary o f State for Health, ex p. Pfizer34 the
interim guidance was declared unlawful under both domestic and European
law. The manufactures argued that the guidance interfered with the duty of
GPs under their Terms of Service to provide all “necessary and appropriate”
services to their patients. This was accepted by Collins J, who reasoned that:
To state in bald terms that Viagra should not be prescribed save in 
(undefined) exceptional circumstances is tantamount to telling the 
recipients of advice to follow it. They cannot know how their 
professional judgement should be influenced by the advice.35
The court also found that the Circular guidance breached Article 7 of
Directive 89/105 EEC on transparency of pricing in medicinal products,
which required that any decision to exclude a medicinal product from
national health care coverage must be based on objective and verifiable
criteria, published in advance and communicated to the persons responsible
for the product. At the time, the UK had not notified to the Commission the
criteria under which products could be excluded. The Court held that Article
7 of Directive 89/105 EEC applied not only to complete exclusion, but also
to restrictions on coverage by the NHS falling short of complete exclusion.
In the second Viagra case, R (on the Application o f  Pfizer Ltd) v 
Secretary o f  State for Health the decision of the Secretary of State, to 
place sildenafil/Viagra on the Schedule 11 ‘grey’ list was challenged, in 
terms of its compliance with Article 7 of the ‘Transparency’ Directive
34 [1999] 3 C.M.L.R. 875.
35 [1999] 3 C.M.L.R. 875, at p. 887.
36 [2003] 1 C.M.L.R. 19. This case is discussed at length in Syrett (2004). 
"Impotence or Importance? Judicial review in an era of explicit NHS 
rationing." Modern Law Review 67 (1): 5-33.
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89/105. The applicants argued that the Directive required the Secretary of
State, in advance of restricting the availability of a drug, conduct a full
analysis of the reasons for Scheduling. The Court rejected this
interpretation, pointing out that the Directive required only that the criteria
under which medicinal products are excluded, not the application of those
criteria in particular circumstances, were required to be objective and
verifiable and published in advance. The UK had, by this time, finally
notified to the Commission, pursuant to Art. 7.2 the following criterion:
A medicinal product or a category of medicinal products may be 
excluded entirely from supply on NHS prescription. It may 
alternatively be excluded except in specified circumstances, or 
except in relation to specified conditions or categories of condition, 
or specified categories of patient. A medicinal product or category of 
them may be so excluded where the forecast aggregate cost to the 
NHS of allowing the product (or category of products) to be supplied 
on NHS prescription, or to be supplied more widely than the
permitted exceptions, could not be justified having regard to all the
relevant circumstances including in particular: the Secretary of 
State’s duties pursuant to the NHS Act 1977 and the priorities for 
expenditures of NHS resources.
The Court found that these criteria met the requirements of the directive.
Further, since decisions of affordability were essentially political decisions, any 
more explicit ranking of NHS priorities would have been artificial. Compliance 
with the requirements of the Transparency Directive was the only grounds of 
challenge in this case. Thus, the Court found the restrictions on sildenafil 
(Viagra) to be lawful, the established procedures having been followed.
5.3 The Effectiveness of the Limited List
It has been argued that success and failure in public management is often a
question of ones’ perspective. The approach taken in this chapter, and in 
the following two chapters, is to assess the effectiveness of regulatory 
reforms against their intended, publicly pronounced policy goals. As 
discussed in Section 4.6, evidence of effectiveness was gained primarily 
from ‘official’ assessments of performance, and from assessments in the
37 Hood (1998). The Art o f the State: Culture, Rhetoric and Public 
Management. Oxford, Clarendon Press, p. 24.
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medical literature. This is supplemented by evidence from the secondary 
literature.
Although the introduction of prescribing restrictions could 
potentially have served a number of objectives, controlling the rate of 
increase in the NHS drugs budget was the overriding policy goal of the 
Limited List scheme, at least in the original categories (II, 15, 117, 121), 
though benzodiazepine sedatives and tranquillisers represented a partial 
exception. As discussed in Section 5.2.2, after the initial ‘downgrading’ of 
expectations, the Limited List scheme was intended to save £75 million per 
year on the NHS drugs bill in the year 1985-6; further, it was expected that 
this sum would increase over time, as generic versions of an increasing 
number of proprietary drugs became available. In addition to these direct 
savings, it was claimed that the initiative had led to a more general 
awareness among the profession of the system-wide effects of individual 
prescribing practices. As the Secretary of State for Health and Social 
Security, Mr Norman Fowler, put it: “An advantage of the debate that we 
had is that there is now much more concern about prescribing habits, and I 
hope to be able to follow that with further advice from the Department.”
Against these claims, evidence of success of the Limited List scheme 
is patchy, to say the least. In evidence to the Health Select Committee, the 
Department of Health claimed that the anticipated savings had been realised 
in the first year, but that monitoring of the impact of the Limited List
o n
scheme had been discontmued thereafter. The Audit Commission 
examined the impact of the Limited List as part of a broader investigation of
38 Parliamentary Debates, Sixth Series, H.C. Vol. 75, col. 137 (1985) 12 March 
1985 (Mr. Norman Fowler).
39 House of Commons Health Committee (1994) Priority Setting in the NHS: 
The NHS Drugs Budget, HC 80-1, London, HMSO, p. xxv.
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prescribing in general practice, and concluded that the introduction of the 
Selected List led to a “one-off reduction in prescribing costs”, but found “no 
evidence that it stemmed the rate of increase in drug expenditure.”40
At the same time, as Figure 5.1 below shows, Fowler’s claim that the 
initiative had indirect as well as direct benefits, in terms of increased 
awareness about prescribing habits may not be without foundation. 
Following the introduction of the Limited List, there was a sharp, and 
constant increase in the proportion of generic drugs prescribed on the NHS. 
This contrasts sharply with a roughly constant proportion of generic 
prescribing in the years leading up to the introduction of the Limited List.
40 Audit Commission (1994) A Prescription for Improvement: Towards More 
Rational Prescribing in General Practice, London, HMSO, p. 9.
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Figure 5.1: Level of Generic Dispensing as a Percentage of 
Prescriptions Dispensed (1977-1996)
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The House of Commons Health Committee undertook a detailed 
official assessment of the Limited List in 1993-4, as part of a broader 
investigation of the NHS drugs budget, which also looked at the PPRS.41 
The Committee endorsed the “principle” of the Limited List and the “right 
of the NHS, as the major purchaser of medicines in the UK, to decide which 
drugs can be bought on the NHS.”42 Nonetheless, it was highly critical of 
the operation of the scheme, especially regarding the openness and
41 House of Commons Health Committee (1994) Priority Setting in the NHS: 
The NHS Drugs Budget, HC 80-1, London, HMSO.
42 Ibid. para. 119.
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transparency of the decision over which categories should be included 
within the scheme.43
Against this mixed evidence of the initial success of the Limited 
List, the development of the scheme following its extension after 1992 
counts more clearly as a failure. As with the initial introduction of the 
Limited List, the Department of Health had intended to monitor the impact 
of the scheme on the NHS drug budget for one year. Due to delay on the 
part of the ACD in developing recommendations within the new categories, 
as well as the eventual falling of the Limited List scheme into abeyance, this 
in fact never happened. Moreover, it has been suggested that 
pharmaceutical companies had, by this time, begun to challenge the ACD 
through strategies of creative compliance (121). Specifically, because the 
policy of the ACD had been to promote the prescribing of generics as far as 
possible, many preparations were ‘black-listed’ by brand name. In response, 
some manufacturers would re-brand their product under a different 
proprietary name, thus circumventing the black-listing, forcing the 
Department of Health either to allow the prescription under the new 
proprietary name, or to start over. Moreover, the lengthy procedure of 
notification, appeal, the preparation of a ‘solution’ by officials, the ‘laying’ 
of regulations before Parliament, prior to a product becoming officially 
Scheduled, as well as the potential for legal challenge by the manufacturers, 
made it difficult for the Department of Health to respond effectively to such 
strategic behaviour.
More recently, use of the ‘grey list’ to restrict the prescribing of 
sildenafil may be judged to have generated more significant savings, though 
as Section 5.2.6 noted, estimates of the resource implications of permitting
43 Ibid. para. 123-6.
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unrestricted prescribing of the drug varied enormously. Prior to the licensing 
of sildenafil, the NHS had spent around £12 million per year in treating 
impotence. In evidence presented on behalf of the Secretary of State for 
Health in the second Viagra case, it was suggested that this had risen to £25 
million, whereas the cost of making Viagra available to all those who could 
benefit from it was around £125 million. At the same time, such savings 
were not made by restricting ineffective and harmful treatments, the original 
objective of the initiative, but by restricting the availability of a cost- 
effective treatment. It is arguable whether this figure can therefore be 
described as a ‘saving’, since the ‘cost’ was passed onto patients, either 
through self-funding or through ‘going without’. The same can be said for 
NRT.
Summarising this section, the Limited List can be said to have been, 
for the most part, a failure. The Limited List scheme was not seen to have 
resulted in any significant reduction in the NHS drug budget and where 
significant savings to the NHS were achieved, for example in restricting 
sildenafil (Viagra) to patients whose ED stemmed from specific underlying 
causes, this was not achieved through eliminating ineffective or harmful 
treatment. The next section relates this failure to poor regulatory design.
5.4 Commitment, Governance and the Limited 
List
This section attempts to assess the extent to which the governance structure 
of the Limited List scheme provided for credible commitment, applying the 
modified version of Levy and Spiller’s three-level framework of analysis set 
out in Section 4.5. Accordingly, the following four sub-sections deal 
respectively with substantive written restraints, restraints based on structure
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and process, constraints on system changes, and the broader institutional 
endowment for enforcing lower-level commitment mechanisms. On the 
basis of this analysis, it is argued that the Limited List scheme failed to 
engender credible commitment, and that this contributed to the failure of the 
Limited List scheme.
5.4.1 Substantive Written Restraints
The Limited List scheme vested regulatory authority in the DHSS (and later, 
the Department of Health), through the power of the Secretary of State, 
under Section 19 (2) to make regulations providing for the definition of 
“personal medical services” to be provided by general practitioners. This 
Act did not impose any specific, substantive restraints on the exercise of this 
power, although it was qualified, in a vague sense, by the duty imposed on 
the Secretary of State under Section 1 of the Act, to “...continue the 
promotion in England and Wales of a comprehensive health service.” The 
one potentially significant substantive restraint on the exercise of ministerial 
regulatory authority derived from the Transparency Directive 89/105 EEC. 
As a result of this measure, the Department of Health could only restrict 
products through their inclusion in Schedule 10 and 11 in accordance with 
objective and verifiable criteria published in advance. In practice, this did 
not provide an effective restraint on the Secretary of State’s authority, firstly 
because the UK was extremely slow in notifying its criterion to the 
Commission, submitting criteria nearly 10 years after the time limit, and 
secondly because the terms eventually communicated to the Commission 
were extremely broad. As demonstrated by the second Viagra case, the 
broad criteria set by the UK government were incapable of preventing 
significant drift from the original purposes of the Limited List Scheme. 
Overall, therefore, the legal framework of the scheme provided for few 
substantive written restraints on regulatory discretion.
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5.4.2 Restraints Based on Structure and Process
Although the Limited List scheme provided few substantive restraints on the 
discretion of the Secretary of State, the procedures under which the Limited 
List was maintained were arguably a little more significant. As discussed in 
Section 5.2.4, after the creation of the initial lists, decisions as to the 
composition of the black and grey lists, for the most part originated in 
recommendations from the ACD. By placing substantial agenda-setting 
power in the hands of an expert committee, with a professional membership, 
this arguably made the resulting decisions more in line with implicit 
understandings about the scope of prescribing freedom. As the House of 
Commons Health Committee put it: “The very existence of this technical 
committee, working at arm’s length from Ministers and departmental 
management, represents a significant improvement over the way the initial 
decisions on the scheme were taken in 1986 [sic].”44
But although this may have made routine decision-making more 
respectful of the medical profession’s zone of acceptance of ministerial 
regulatory authority, it can be said to have been relatively ineffective as a 
commitment strategy. First, unlike the approach adopted by NICE (and 
discussed in the next chapter), the ACD did not adopt a transparent ‘gold- 
standard’ evidence-based evaluation: “There was very little in the way of 
clinical judgement, apart from the fact that particular products were 
equivalent.” (121). Second, Ministers could (and did) take black-listing 
decisions without reference to the Committee. This was evident in the case 
of NRT, where the decision was taken by the Department of Health that it 
should not provide funding for this treatment. Furthermore, the ACD did not 
meet after 1998, and was dissolved in 2003. In dealing with the resource
44 Op. cit, para. 122.
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implications of the introduction of sildenafil (Viagra) the Secretary of State 
did consult medical opinion through the SMAC.
5.4.3 Constraints on System Changes
Moving from the level of operational rules to collective choice rules, 
it can be argued that restraints on changing the regulatory system were 
relatively slight. It was noted in Section 5.4.1, that the Limited List scheme 
was given legal effect by statutory instrument, using the Secretary of State’s 
power under Section 29 (2) of the National Health Service Act 1977 to 
make regulations providing for the definition of personal medical services to 
be provided by GPs. As set out in Section 126 of that Act, this power was 
“ ...exercisable by statutory instrument...” and was “ ...subject to annulment 
in pursuance of a regulation of either House of Parliament”, thus bringing 
the Secretary of State’s regulatory power within ambit of the Statutory 
Instruments Act 1946, which provides for established procedures for 
Parliamentary oversight and challenge.45 Briefly, in accordance with the 
standard procedure provided by the Statutory Instruments Act 1946 there 
was a forty-day period for the ‘laying’ of regulations, during which time a 
Member of Parliament can move a ‘prayer’ for annulment by Order in 
Council; if, after the forty day period no successful challenge has been 
made, the regulations take effect. No such provisions governed the 
establishment or dissolution of the ACD, which had no basis in statute. 
Furthermore, although ministerial approval for the dissolution of the 
Committee was not given until 2003, it had not met for some time 
beforehand, surviving ‘on paper’ only, with no appointees and no chairman 
at the time it was dissolved.
45 Statutory Instruments Act 1946, S. 1.
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In terms of the analytical framework presented in Section 4.5,
informal institutions also play a role in restraining arbitrary changes to the
regulatory system. An example offered in Section 4.5.4, was Spiller and
Vogelsang’s suggestion that the convention whereby major policy changes
are preceded by the publication of White Papers prevents hasty changes
without consultation. This, it was argued, prevented major changes of
regulatory policy being presented as a fa it accompli, allowing for the
mobilisation of opposition. At the same time, experience of the Limited List
scheme calls into question the effectiveness of this particular convention.
Not only was there no White Paper in advance of the scheme, the DHSS
limited consultation to the content of the Limited List, making it clear that
the major decision on principle had been taken. Furthermore, as discussed in
Section 5.2.3, the draft regulations laid before parliament (quite literally)
bore the mark of being hastily put together, with the detailed institutional
arrangements for revision of the scheme, including the ACD left to be
worked out later. Similarly, there was no consultation prior to the extension
of the scheme in 1992. This drew criticism from the Health Select
Committee, which was critical of the fact that:
...neither the industry, nor the NHS, nor representatives of patients, 
nor even the Advisory Committee itself, is consulted before 
decisions are taken by Ministers on the inclusion of new therapeutic 
categories within the Scheme.46
Overall, therefore, it can be said that although structural and procedural
arrangements allowed for some sensitivity to respective duties and
entitlements under the concordat over routine issues. At the same time, the
possibility of disregarding these arrangements limited the extent to which
they could provide the basis for commitment to the implicit concordat.
46 House of Commons Health Committee, op. cit., para. 123.
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5.4.4 Enforcement of Lower-Level Commitment 
Mechanisms
Turning to the level of constitutional choice rules, this section considers the
role of legislative, executive and judicial institutions in enforcing lower-
level commitment mechanisms.
«
Taking first the legislative institutions of the United Kingdom 
Parliament, the procedures for parliamentary scrutiny of delegated 
legislation seem to have been little used, although the initial changes to the 
National Health Service (General Medical Services Regulations) 1974 
introducing the black and grey lists were considered both by the Standing 
Committee on Delegated Legislation and on the floor of the House of 
Commons. Furthermore, there was a debate on an early day motion over the 
1992 extension of the categories covered by the Limited List.47
In terms of executive institutions, regulatory authority was vested in 
the Secretary of State, and although the ACD enjoyed some agenda-setting 
power, the Committee had no executive authority. As a consequence of this 
absence of genuine regulatory independence, executive institutions may be 
regarded as providing a poor mechanism for establishing neutrality between 
political and professional interests. Furthermore, it was possible to ‘stand 
down’ the committee, and later to dissolve it, purely through the exercise of 
ministerial authority.
Judicial institutions provided for relatively most effective 
enforcement of restraints on the arbitrary exercise of discretion. On three 
occasions, decisions to exclude or restrict drugs were challenged: the
47 Parliamentary Debates, Sixth Series, H.C. Vol. 229 cols. 948-966, 26 July 
1993.
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Schering case, and the first and second Viagra cases. Although there has 
been no successful challenge to the substance of a decision, in the first 
Viagra case the courts enforced procedural restraints on regulatory 
discretion. In that case it was held that HSC 1998/158, advising GPs not to 
prescribe Viagra except in undefined “exceptional circumstances” interfered 
with the ability of a GPs to perform their duties under their Terms of 
Service. In that case, the Court emphasised the availability of Schedules 10 
and 11 as established means of excluding or restricting particular drugs, and 
overturned the guidance, which it saw as an attempt to circumvent these 
procedures. This did at least prevent the government from evading 
procedures for the scrutiny of delegated legislation, although this section has 
argued that these were not particularly effective, after the detailed scrutiny 
of the initial establishment of the Limited List scheme.
The role of the judiciary has consequently been restricted to the 
enforcement of proper procedures, as in the second Viagra case, discussed 
above. Even here, however, this has been limited to preventing attempts to 
circumvent the statutory Scheduling procedures where this interfered with 
GPs’ statutory duties. No argument was raised that black- or grey-listing a 
product without a recommendation to that effect by the ACD was a breach 
of proper procedures. Nor was the issue raised of the lawfulness of using the 
Schedule 11 procedure, not to ensure that clinical need was met as cost- 
effectively as possible, but in order to ration access to treatment.
Concluding this section, it can be said that the governance structure 
of the Limited List scheme was poor, in terms of substantive restraints, 
structural and procedural restraints, and constraints on changing the 
regulatory structure of the scheme. In the absence of an effective 
governance structure, even the willingness of the judiciary to enforce 
procedural requirements was not particularly effective. At all three levels of
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analysis, therefore, the legal and administrative framework of the Limited 
List did not provide for effective regulatory commitment.
5.5 Conclusions
It can be seen from Section 5.3 and 5.4 that the Limited List was relatively 
ineffective, and that, in line with the regulatory commitment hypothesis, this 
corresponded to a governance structure that did not engender effective 
regulatory commitment. Furthermore, as the narrative of Section 5.2 
showed, there was significant slippage of the Limited List scheme over 
time. Initially intended as a means of cutting out ineffective and harmful 
treatment, the Limited List was extended in 1992 into more controversial 
categories in which it could no longer strictly be claimed that patients were 
not being denied effective treatment. The NRT and Viagra episodes, 
moreover, demonstrate that both Labour and Conservative governments 
were prepared to use the scheme to restrict access to treatments that were 
not thought to be wasteful in any of Blunstein and Marmor’s senses. 
Moreover, this was predicted from the outset. For example, in the debate 
over the introduction of the scheme, several MPs expressed concern that the 
scheme would later be extended into other areas and declined to accept 
reassurances from the Secretary of State. For example, Mr Willie Hamilton 
quoted a letter from one of his constituents, Dr G. Lindsay Smith who 
feared that “Once this list has been introduced there is nothing to prevent the 
Government extending it to cover other groups of drugs.” Hamilton added, 
“Despite the Minister’s assurance this afternoon, we do not believe him. 
Despite what he says, this is the thin end of a sinister wedge.”
48 Parliamentary Debates, Sixth Series, H.C. Vol. 75. col. 732, 18 March 1985 
(Mr Willie Hamilton). See also For example, Parliamentary Debates, Sixth 
Series, H.C. Vol. 75. col. 692,18 March 1985 (Mr Colin Shepard).
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In spite of these predictions, it is difficult to assert with confidence 
that the disappointing results of the introduction of the Limited List were 
caused by the absence of a credible governance structure. For one thing, 
unlike the example of NICE discussed in the next section, from the point of 
view of the GPs whose prescribing practices were regulated by it, 
enforcement was automatic, in the manner of the ‘enforcement machines’ 
discussed by Hood.49 There was therefore little scope for the sort of 
subversive strategies outlined by Davies and discussed in Section 4.4, 
above. At the same time, it can plausibly be argued that the limited initial 
ambition of the scheme, including the downgrading of the expected savings 
from £100 million to £75 million was in part due to professional opposition.
Although the evidence is consistent with the regulatory commitment 
hypothesis, it could be counter-argued that the failure of the Limited List 
scheme resulted from causes other than inadequate institutional 
commitment. Plausible alternative reasons include the opposition of the 
pharmaceutical industry, as well as the intrinsic difficulty of the regulatory 
task itself, which may have been underestimated by the architects- of the 
scheme. Although a study such as this could not hope to disentangle the 
relative effects of each of these, some further comments on the plausibility 
of the regulatory commitment hypothesis are appropriate.
Firstly, in the case of alternative possible explanations, such as the 
sustained opposition of the pharmaceutical industry, or the intrinsic 
difficulty of the regulatory task, it can be argued that the effects of these 
factors were exacerbated by the lack of credible commitment to the implicit 
concordat. For example the success of creative compliance on the part of the 
pharmaceutical companies through the strategy of re-branding products
49 Hood (1986). Administrative Analysis: An Introduction to Rules,
Enforcement and Organisation. Brighton, Wheatsheaf Press, Chapter 3.
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discussed in Section 5.3 arguably depended on the connivance of general 
practitioners prepared to prescribe proprietary products under new brand 
names. Similarly, it can be argued that the intrinsic difficulty of the 
regulatory task was heightened by the lack of support from the medical 
profession—the boycotting of the BMA of consultation on the content of the 
Limited List is perhaps the clearest example. Finally, the existence of other 
factors contributing to the failure of the Limited List scheme does not take 
away from the fact that the lack of credible commitment was one factor 
contributing to this failure independently of other factors.
The more significant point is that although the evidence presented in 
this chapter may be, for the most part, equally consistent with alternative 
accounts of regulatory failure, it is nonetheless highly consistent with the 
hypothesis put forward in this thesis. In particular, as Section 5.2 
demonstrated, the expansion of the scheme occurred more or less exactly in 
the manner that might have been expected, given the framework put forward 
in Chapter 4. Furthermore, had the analysis shown the Limited List scheme 
to be a great success, in spite of an inadequate governance structure, or had 
poor performance occurred in spite of more effective commitment 
mechanisms, this would have counted as evidence against the commitment 
hypothesis. That this was not observed must count as a success.
At the same time, a major puzzle remains: why did the DHSS in 
1985 choose an institutional design that, as suggested here, clearly lacked 
credibility? It could be argued that this was simple miscalculation on the 
part of the government. As the Minister of State for Health, Mr Kenneth 
Clarke is reported to have said, “I knew the [pharmaceutical] industry would 
be upset, but I didn’t count on such a vehement response from the
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doctors.”50 At the same time, as the discussion has shown, it was widely 
(and correctly) feared that the introduction of the Limited List scheme in 
1985 was to be “the thin end of the wedge.” If opposition MPs could predict 
this, why couldn’t the Government? After all, if the argument of this thersis 
is correct, it is in the interest of the Government as well as of the profession 
that the former should be able to commit credibly to the implicit concordat. 
Chapter 8 returns to this puzzle.
50 “Take Only as Directed: UK Health Costs.” Financial Times, 29 January 
1985.
Chapter 6
The National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence
Some commentators have argued that the Government should 
prescribe at national level what treatments the NHS should provide.
« The Government does not believe that this is right. No such list of 
treatments could ever hope to accommodate the range and 
complexity of the different cases which individual clinicians face all 
the time. There would be a real risk of taking decisions out of the 
hands of the clinicians treating patients and into the province of 
others who possess neither the experience of caring for patients nor 
the expertise to makes such decisions.1
6.1 Introduction
Geographical differences in the availability and quality of clinical care have 
always been a feature of the NHS. The Health Service was created out of a 
pre-existing array of local authority services and voluntary hospitals as well 
as the great teaching hospitals. Beginning in the 1970s, successive attempts 
were made to address this problem through targeting funding towards 
under-resourced areas, through the Resource Allocation Working Party 
(RAWP). With the introduction of the purchaser-provider split in the 1990s, 
the RAWP formula, which had determined the allocation to the regions and 
districts was replaced, though the basic underlying approach remained.
1 Secretary of State for Health (1996) The National Health Service: A Service 
With Ambitions, cm 3425, London, The Stationery Office, p. 39.
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From the early 1990s, there was a renewed interest, initially led by 
the medical royal colleges, in the use of clinical standards as instruments to 
address questions of appropriate treatments for particular conditions, and for 
promoting ‘best practice’. Despite this proliferation of interest, official 
interest in formal clinical standards developed only slowly. This changed 
dramatically following election of the Labour Government in 1997. The 
new administration’s plans for the reform of the NHS included the 
establishment of a new National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) “to 
provide new coherence and prominence to information about clinical and 
cost effectiveness.” Since its establishment in 1999 the Institute has played 
a prominent role, producing and disseminating various forms of guidance 
for use in the NHS.
The establishment and subsequent development of NICE makes an 
appropriate episode of regulatory reform for examination for at least three 
reasons. First, the establishment of the Institute brought into sharp relief 
themes related to the issue of commitment to the implicit concordat that is 
central to this thesis. Second, the emergence of a centralised standard- 
setting body for the NHS raised questions relating to the boundaries 
between cutting waste and rationing similar to, but arguably more acute than 
in the case of the Limited List scheme, discussed in the previous chapter. 
While there was broad support for the role of NICE in promoting clinical 
and cost-effective treatment, there was also widespread suspicion that the 
Institute was (or would become) an instrument for deciding on the 
affordability of expensive treatments. An assessment of the ability of 
NICE’S governance structure to allow it to perform the former functions 
effectively while restraining drift towards the latter provides for a further 
evaluation of the theoretical framework set out in Chapter 4, relating the
2 Secretary of State for Health (1997) The New NHS: Modern, Dependable, Cm 
3807, London, The Stationery Office, para. 7.11.
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effectiveness of regulation inside the NHS to the credibility of the 
governance arrangements. Third, in contrast to the other episodes of 
regulatory reform discussed in this thesis, NICE has been subject to detailed 
institutional analysis by other scholars, notably Keith Syrett, who deploys 
an alternative theoretical perspective, based on the legitimacy claims of the 
Institute. An analysis of NICE using the framework of analysis set out in 
Chapter 4 therefore allows for an examination of the advantages of that 
framework vis-a-vis competing approaches.
The organisation of this chapter is as follows. Section 6.2 outlines 
the approach of the work of Syrett, which can be seen as a competitor to the 
approach of this thesis, though the approaches are not necessarily 
fundamentally incompatible. Section 6.3 relates the background to NICE, its 
establishment, and subsequent evolution. Two particular controversial 
decisions of NICE, relating to zanamivir (Relenza) for influenza and beta 
intereron for multiple sclerosis are examined in detail in 6.4. Moving from 
description to analysis, Section 6.5 considers the effectiveness of NICE, 
while Section 6.6 applies the three-level framework for assessing regulatory 
governance set out in Section 4.5. By way of conclusion Section 6.7 
considers the extent to which the evidence of this chapter supports the 
argument of this thesis, and returns to the contrast between the present 
approach and rival theoretical perspectives.
6.2 Existing Institutional Analyses of NICE
Across a series of articles, Keith Syrett has developed a compelling thesis 
about the performance of NICE. The fundamental problem, as he sees it, is
3 Syrett (2002). "NICE Work? Rationing, Review and the 'Legitimacy Problem' 
in the New NHS." Medical Law Review 10 (1): 1-27; Syrett (2003). "A
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that as responsibility for deciding on the appropriateness of different 
treatments in different situations has passed from individual doctors to 
organisations such as NICE, it brings into focus within the political realm 
decisions involving the denial of effective treatment to patients. For Syrett, 
this gives rise to a legitimacy problem: “why should patients or clinicians 
accept the authority of such organisations to make ‘moral decisions’ which 
limit the access to healthcare and therefore affect individual well-being?”4 
The response of the Blair government, through the establishment of NICE, 
has been to base rationing decisions on scientific evaluation and economic 
analysis of health outcomes. Syrett regards this as a “technocratic fix”, 
meaning that it aims to present what are essentially political judgements as 
the result of a purely technical processes involving the application of neutral 
criteria of the clinical and social sciences. Such a strategy is unlikely to 
produce socially acceptable outcomes, he argues, because claims towards 
legitimacy on this basis cannot withstand critical scrutiny. Syrett argues for 
a turn towards the public law values of participation and accountability, as a 
means of providing the basis for an ongoing dialogue. Such a ‘responsive’ 
approach, he argues, is more likely to be capable of establishing the 
acceptability of ‘rationing’ decisions, compared with attempts to establish a 
once-and-for-all solution, based on an appeal to technocratic expertise.
This view of the use of economic and clinical evaluation makes an 
interesting contrast with the contending approach of Moshe Maor, discussed 
in Section 4.5.3. It will be recalled that, for Maor, one advantage of the use
Technocratic Fix to the "Legitimacy Problem"? The Blair Government and 
Health Care Rationing in the United Kingdom." Journal o f Health Politics, 
Policy and Law 28 (4): 715-746, 2003; Syrett (2003). "Legitimating 'Fourth 
Hurdle' Pharmaceutical Regulation in Europe: Learning the NICE Way?" 
European Public Law 9 (4): 509-532.
4 Syrett (2002). "NICE Work? Rationing, Review and the 'Legitimacy Problem' 
in the New NHS." Medical Law Review 10 (1): 1-27, p. 6.
161
of evidence-based evaluation within drug reimbursement decisions is that 
this injects a greater degree of certainty into decision-making processes, 
which he likens to a ‘gold standard’.5 Such an approach, it can be argued, 
allows governments to make credible commitments. His analysis of drug 
reimbursement policies in New Zealand, Australia and British Columbia 
suggests that where a shared scientific standards exists for assembling, 
evaluating and interpreting evidence, this provides an alternative 
commitment strategy to delegation to independent authorities. Unlike 
Syrett’s analysis, the significance of evidence-based approaches to decision­
making for Maor is not so much that they allow moral and political 
decisions to be presented as neutral technocratic decisions but rather 
because they make departures from pre-established criteria highly visible, 
thereby preventing veiled changes to the criteria used in decision-making.
6.3 NICE: Origins, Implementation and 
Development
This section provides an account of the background to NICE, its 
introduction and subsequent evolution, focussing on the stated aims of the 
Institute and the legal and administrative framework through which these 
were pursued. Section 6.3.1 outlines the proposals of the post-1997 Labour 
government, setting them in the context of the earlier approach of the 
preceding Conservative Government and looking also at the reaction to the 
proposals. The establishment of NICE is considered in Section 6.3.2, while 
Section 6.3.3 looks at the subsequent reforms of NICE.
5 Maor (2004). ’’Competing Commitments? Independence versus "gold 
standard" for policy choice in the reimbursement of pharmaceutical drugs". 
20th Anniversary SOG Research Committee of the International Political 
Science Association, Vancouver.
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6.3.1 The Government’s Proposals For NICE
As the introduction to this chapter noted, tentative steps towards national 
standards relating to clinical and cost-effectiveness were made during the 
early 1990s, mainly under the auspices of the medical royal colleges.6 By 
and large, however, the Conservative Government of the 1990s foreswore 
more prescriptive, centralized clinical standards, as shown by the epigram to 
this chapter taken from the White Paper A Service With Ambitions. NHS 
Executive involvement was limited to the encouragement (including the 
funding) of standard-setting initiatives by different professional groups. This 
avowed self-restraint was arguably due to an absence of credibility on the 
part of the Conservatives. Consistent with this interpretation, the Service 
With Ambitions White Paper has been described as “ ...an exercise in 
political persuasion and reassurance” at a time when the Conservative 
Government was seen as antagonistic towards the NHS.7
By contrast, the Labour government elected in May 1997 followed a 
more interventionist approach, reflecting scepticism within government at 
approaches based on exhortation (118). In December 1997, the government 
issued a White Paper The New NHS, setting out its proposals for reform of 
the Health Service. Included in the White Paper were proposals for a 
number of new measures for the setting and monitoring of national clinical 
standards within the NHS. These were developed further in a subsequent 
Department of Health consultation document on quality in the NHS, A First
6 For an account of clinical guidelines in the UK during the 1990s, see Day and 
Klein (1998). "The UK Experience: Control Over, or By, The Medical 
Profession?" in Day, Klein and Miller (ed.) Hurdles and Levers: A 
Comparative US-UK Study o f Guidelines. London, The Nuffield Trust.
7 Klein (2001). The New Politics o f the NHS. 4th Edition, Harlow, Prentice 
Hall.
163
o # #
Class Service. In addition to the establishment of NICE, the government’s 
proposals included a programme of National Service Frameworks and a new 
national Performance Assessment Framework, while the Commission for 
Health Improvement was intended to monitor compliance of NHS 
organisations with quality standards.9
Two central, inter-related preoccupations emerged from the White
Paper and A First Class Service. First, that the NHS was beset by
“unjustifiable variations” in the quality of care across Health Authorities.10
Second, that there was a need for a more consistent approach within the
NHS to setting clinical standards based on “best evidence” of clinical and
cost-effectiveness.11 NICE was to ensure that “ ... interventions with good
evidence of clinical and cost-effectiveness will be actively promoted, in
order that patients would have faster access to treatments known to work.
Equally, it will help protect patients from new interventions with inadequate
10evidence of clinical and cost effectiveness...”
Against these publicly pronounced policy objectives, some detected
a hidden agenda, namely that the Government were attempting to implement
‘rationing’ within the NHS. Ministers denied this charge, as did the
Chairman-elect of NICE, Professor Sir Michael Rawlins, in evidence to the
1 ^House of Commons Health Committee. However, the opposition remained
8 Department of Health (1998) A First Class Service: Quality in the New NHS, 
HSC 1998/113, London, Deparment of Health.
9 NSFs were discussed briefly in Section 3.3.3, above. CHI is discussed in 
detail in the following chapter.
10 For an extreme example of what has been called the ‘postcode lottery’, see 
the case of of R v. North West Lancashire Health Authority, ex parte A, D. & G, 
discussed in Section 4.5.5.
11 The New NHS, para. 7.5
12 A First Class Service, para. 2.17.
13 House of Commons Health Committee (1999) Minutes o f Evidence for 
Thursday 4 February 1999—National Institute for Clinical Excellence:
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unconvinced, drawing attention to the government’s intention that NICE 
was to be established by statutory instrument as a Special Health Authority. 
This, it was alleged, was an attempt to avoid the Parliamentary scrutiny 
accorded to those aspects of the reforms contained in the 1999 Health Bill.14 
Liberal Democrat health spokesman Dr Evan Harris did not explicitly assert 
a hidden agenda, but he observed that by not including NICE in the Health 
Bill, the door had been left open to the possibility that “ ...a  future 
Government might use NICE to make rationing decisions instead of doing 
so themselves.”15
The overall response of the BMA was positive. In its response to A 
First Class Service, it welcomed the introduction of NICE, describing the 
“principles” on which it was based as “long overdue”.16 Nonetheless, 
specific issues raised by the BMA indicated concern to ensure greater 
medical control, insisting that NICE “ ...must include medical 
representatives from all sectors (including primary care, secondary care and 
public health.”17 In order to ensure the “...confidence of the profession...
1 fiany guidelines should be fully referenced and scientifically robust.” 
Moreover, it was important to the BMA that the work of NICE should not
Professor Sir Michael Rawlins, Dr Gina Radford and Dr Timothy Riley, HC 
222-i, London, The Stationery Office.
14 House of Commons Session 1998-1999, Third Standing Committee on 
Delegated Legislation, National Institute for Clinical Excellence (Establishment 
and Constitution Order 1999, Wednesday 10 March 1999. Mr Phillip 
Hammond: “Many people... will have assumed that, as NICE is a key part of 
the Government’s health programme, the provisions to establish it would be 
found in the Government’s keynote Health Bill. Not so. By creating NICE as a 
special health authority, the Government are sneaking it into being through the 
back door without proper scrutiny of its real function...”
15 House of Commons Health Bill [Lords] in Standing Committee A, 11th 
sitting, 11 May 1999 (afternoon) Part II.
16 BMA (1998) Response to 'A First Class Service: Quality in The New NHS\ 
London, BMA, August 1998, p. 1.
17 Ibid. p. 3.
18 Ibid. p. 5.
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“...lead to ‘managed care’ which would interfere with doctors’ clinical 
freedom to treat each and every patient in his/her best interests.”19
6.3.2 The Establishment of NICE
NICE was established as a Special Health Authority on 1 April 1999.20 The
original remit of the Institute was to “perform such functions in connection
with the promotion of clinical excellence as the Secretary of State may 
 ^1
direct.” In practice, this was to amount to the promulgation of three mam 
forms of guidance. Clinical guidelines covered the treatment of specific 
diseases and conditions. Clinical audit methodologies were procedures 
through which clinicians could evaluate their practice against the standards 
set out in clinical guidelines. More importantly and controversially, NICE 
was to be responsible for technology appraisals of new and existing 
medicines and treatments for use within the NHS. Although most of the 
guidance products of NICE (at least in the period under study) were to take 
the form of technology appraisals, no specific mention was made of this 
function in the White Paper, although there was a fairly detailed discussion 
in A First Class Service and in a subsequent consultation document Faster
y y
Access to Modern Treatment.
The Institute originally consisted of a Chairman, seven non­
executive members and four executive officers.23 The National Institute for
19 Ibid.
20 National Institute of Clinical Excellence (Establishment and Constitution 
Order) S.I. No. 220 of 1999.
21 S.I. No. 220 of 1999, Regulation 3.
22 A First Class Service, para. 2.13. A further discussion paper set out in detail 
the proposed technology appraisal function of NICE. See Department of Health 
(1999) Faster Access to Modern Treatment: How NICE appraisal will work, 
Leeds, NHS Executive..
23 S.I. No. 220 of 1999, Regulation 4.
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Clinical Excellence Regulations 1999 gave further shape to the structure of 
the Institute.24 These provided for the establishment of two NICE advisory 
Committees. A Partners’ Council, comprising members drawn from 
patient groups, health professions, NHS managers, the pharmaceutical 
industry, trade unions and other organisations responsible for the quality of 
health care, was required to review the Institute’s annual report, but in fact 
met regularly as a ‘sounding board’ to the Institute. The Appraisal 
Committee had mainly ‘expert’ composition (though it also reflected a more 
‘political’ balance of interests, including patient groups, industry 
representatives, and NHS interests) and was responsible for NICE 
technology appraisals. In addition to these two committees, whose existence 
was required by the regulations, NICE was empowered to establish 
additional committees. A Guidelines Advisory Committee was established 
in May 2000 under this power, which had again mainly ‘expert’ 
composition, but with some representation from industry, consumers and the 
NHS. The work of the Institute was supported by a staff initially of around 
10 people, originally seconded from the Department of Health, with 
operating costs of around £9.5 millions in its first year of operation, funded 
mainly by the Department of Health.
6.3.3 The Evolution of NICE
From the very outset, the role of NICE was intended to be an evolving one. 
As the White Paper had stated, “The Government will consider developing 
the role and function of the National Institute as it gathers momentum and
24 S.I. No. 260 of 1999.
25 S.I. No. 260 of 1999, Regulation 9.
26 S. 9 (4).
27 National Institute for Clinical Excellence (2000) Annual Accounts 1999- 
2000, London, NICE., p. 16, 18.
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experience.” This evolution had, as discussed, in a sense, begun even 
before the Institute came into existence, as its intended responsibilities were 
developed from the skeletal account in the White Paper, including the 
incorporation of a technology appraisal function.
A more substantial change occurred within months of the 
establishment of NICE, which seemed to confirm fears expressed by the 
opposition that the Institute would, over time, be transformed into an 
instrument of cost-reduction. Whereas the Government had from the outset 
spoken of NICE’S role in relation to both clinical and cost-effectiveness, the 
functions conferred on the Institute by S.I. No. 220 of 1999 referred only to 
“such functions in the promotion of clinical excellence in the health service
90as the Secretary of State may direct.” An amendment laid in August 1999 
conferred on NICE the additional responsibilities with respect to promoting 
“...the effective use of available resources.” This choice of wording 
apparently went beyond the original intention that the Institute should have 
regard to issues of cost-effectiveness, to include considerations of 
affordability. The move was seen by some as a betrayal of assurances given 
by ministers in debates on the Health Bill and on S.I. No. 220 of 1999 that 
NICE would not undertake ‘rationing’ decisions that were properly the 
responsibility of the Secretary of State. As the pugnacious Conservative 
shadow health secretary, Dr Liam Fox later alleged: “The Government 
changed the criteria for NICE because that was merely another spin trick for 
Ministers who wanted an arms-length rationing mechanism as they were too
n 1
cowardly to take decisions directly.” The controversy was further
28 Secretary of State for Health (1997) The New NHS: Modern, Dependable,
Cm 3807, London, The Stationery Office., para. 7.12.
29 S.I. No 220 of 1999, Regulation 3
30 S.I. No 2219 of 1999, Regulation 2 (2).
31 Parliamentary Debates Sixth Series, H.C. Vol 353, col. 146, 4th July 2000 
(Mr Liam Fox).
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compounded because the Order had been laid during the summer recess, 
leading to accusations that this had been an attempt to introduce the 
amendment without proper scrutiny. The change, and the specific choice 
of wording, was ostensibly a response to legal advice received in the light of 
the Viagra cases. In the episode surrounding those cases the Secretary of 
State had been advised that it was not appropriate to refer sildenafil (Viagra) 
to NICE, because the issue at hand was not the clinical effectiveness but the 
overall affordability of sildenafil (Viagra) and political priorities over the 
use of funds.
A second significant change concerned the status of NICE guidance. 
From 1 January 2002, Directions to Health Authorities, Primary Care Trusts 
and NHS Trusts in England34 required Health Authorities to fund 
interventions recommended by NICE Technology Appraisal Guidance, and 
prescribed by a doctor or otherwise recommended in the course of 
treatment, within three months of the Guidance being issued. Primary Care 
Trusts, and NHS Trusts, for their part, were required to apply funds received 
from Health Authorities in accordance with this obligation. This followed 
concern that certain NHS organisations had decided not to follow NICE 
guidance on various matters. For example, the largest PCT, Hillingdon, 
rejected NICE guidance on cardiac care, while in a widely publicised move,
32 See for example H.C. Session 1998-1999, Third Standing Committee on 
Delegated Legislation, Wednesday 10 March 1999 (Mr Philip Hammond): 
“Like a sneak thief, the Government—having given Opposition Members all 
the reassurances that they reasonably could in Committee on the Health Bill 
and in the debates on the NICE regulations—went away over the summer 
saying nothing about their intentions. They waited until everyone had gone on 
holiday... to lay a regulation on 6 August that fundamentally changed the 
nature of the National Institute for Clinical Excellence.”
33 Discussed at Section 5.2.3, above.
34 Directions to Health Authorities, Primary Care Trusts and NHS Trusts in 
England, 11 December 2001. See also Kmietowicz (2001). "Government Insists 
NHS Pays For Drugs Approved By NICE." BMJ323: 1386, 15 December 
2001.
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a mid-Devon PCT rejected NICE’S technology appraisal of zanamivir 
(Relenza).35
Further changes followed Learning from Bristol, the Report of the 
Kennedy Inquiry into paediatric cardiac surgery at Bristol Royal Infirmary 
(although the government did not accept the recommendations of the 
Kennedy Inquiry in full) as well as the Health Committee report into the 
National Institute for Clinical Excellence Most importantly, from the end 
of 2002, changes were made to the process by which topics were selected 
for NICE appraisal, intended to make the process more open and 
transparent. A second set of amendments changed the membership of 
NICE Board, removing the requirement of the Secretary of State to appoint 
the Chief Officer.38
Other significant changes included the assumption of responsibility 
for appraising whether ‘interventional procedures’, that is, procedures 
undertaken by surgeons and other specialists for the diagnosis and treatment 
of patients were safe enough for routine use within the NHS. An
35 See further Section 6.4, infra.
36Kennedy (Chairman) (2001) Learning From Bristol: The Report o f the Public 
Inquiry into Childrens Heart Surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995, 
London, The Stationery Office.; House of Commons Health Committee (2002) 
National Institute for Clinical Excellence: Second Report o f2001-02, HC 515- 
I, London, The Stationery Office. The government’s response to the Kennedy 
Report can be found in Secretary of State for Health (2002) Learning from 
Bristol: The Department o f Health’s Response to the Report o f the Public 
Inquiry into Children's Heart Surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984- 
1995, Cm 5363, London, The Stationery Office.
37 Department of Health (2002) National Institute for Clinical Excellence: 
Arrangements for Topic Selection, London, Department of Health.
38 The National Institute for Clinical Excellence (Amendment) Regulations 
2002. S.I. No. 1759 of 2002, Regulation 2.
39 The Interventional Procedures Programme: Working with the National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence to promote safe clinical intervention, HSC
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Interventional Procedures Advisory Committee of NICE was established 
within NICE (chaired by Professor Bruce Campbell) to replace the existing 
Safety and Efficacy Register for New Interventional Procedures (SERNIP), 
an initiative of the Royal Colleges. A further committee of NICE, the 
Citizens’ Council was established in 2004, based on the model of the 
citizens’ juries polled by the King’s Fund, to advise NICE on social value 
judgements.40
6.4 Technology Appraisals of Zanamivir and 
Beta Interferon
An examination of two controversial NICE technology appraisals, of 
zanamir (Relenza), an anti-viral inhaler for the treatment of influenza, and 
beta interferon for multiple sclerosis provides further insight into the ability 
of NICE to sustain credible commitment. It is important to note that these 
are not intended as ‘representative’ examples; rather, by selecting episodes 
in which the credibility of the Institute was questioned, these examples help 
to illustrate the limits of institutional commitment engendered by NICE’S 
governance structure.
6.4.1 Zanamivir (Relenza)
Zanamivir (Relenza) was included in the first NICE work programme. 
While a full technology appraisal, lasting around eight months was 
underway, a ‘fast-track’ assessment was conducted, in order that interim 
NICE guidance was available in advance of the 1999-2000 ’flu season. The
2003/011; see also Campbell and Maddem (2003). "Safety And Efficacy of 
Interventional Procedures." BMJ326: 347-8.
40 Rawlins and Culyer (2004). "National Institute for Clinical Excellence and its 
Value Judgements." Ibid. 329: 224-7.
171
specially created Rapid Assessment Committee, chaired by NICE Chief 
Executive Andrew Dillon, made the recommendation (which was leaked to 
the press) that for 1999-2000, zanamivir (Relenza) should not be prescribed. 
After an internal appeal to NICE Board by the manufacturer failed,41 NICE 
made a final recommendation against use of the drug in the treatment of 
influenza. This recommendation received the endorsement of the Secretary 
of State, allowing NICE to issue its guidance to the NHS. NICE’S decision 
was based on findings that for the population at large, the use of zanamavir 
(Relenza) within 48 hours of the onset of influenza symptoms, reduced the 
median duration of symptoms from six to five days, while the Institute was 
unable to conclude “ ... that the product reduces the frequency of serious 
secondary complications...” for ‘at risk’ patients (including the elderly, 
those with cardiovascular disease, asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease or immunosuppression).42 No explicit cost-effectiveness analysis 
was undertaken. However, the Rapid Appraisal Committee did undertake an 
analysis of the resource implications, tentatively estimating a cost of 
between £9.9 million in a ‘normal’ year, rising to £15 million in an 
epidemic if zanamivir was to be freely available, while finding insufficient 
support for the manufacturer’s claim that there was a corresponding benefit 
that patients taking zanamivir could return to work sooner.43
NICE’S decision was supported by the Royal College of General 
Practitioners, who argued in favour of increased immunisation against 
influenza for at risk groups. However, the profession and the pharmaceutical
41 Anonymous (1999). "NICE Rejects Glaxo Wellcome Appeal Against 
Relenza NHS Ban." The Pharmaceutical Journal 263 (7066): 561, 9 October 
1999.
42 National Institute for Clinical Excellence (1999) Rapid Assessment - 
Zanamivir (Relenza), London, National Institute for Clinical Excellence, 12 
October 1999., para. 6.2.
43 Ibid., para. 6.4.
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industry challenged it on different fronts. The BMA General Practitioners 
Committee criticised the failure to give the NICE ruling legislative force, by 
placing zanamivir (Relenza) on the Schedule 10 black list, lamenting that 
this would make it difficult for GPs to adhere to the recommendation in the 
face of pressure from patients.44 The manufacturer warned that 
pharmaceutical companies would go elsewhere if the UK environment 
became “antagonistic” to the industry, while rumours of a drawn-out legal 
challenge to the Institute circulated in the press.45
Following a full appraisal, the interim guidance was revised in 
November 2000. While zanamivir was still not recommended for general 
use, under the revised guidance it was recommended for at risk adults 
presenting within 36 hours of developing symptoms, when influenza is 
circulating in the community (i.e. when there are more than 50 cases per
100,000 GP consultations as determined by a reporting system operated by 
the Royal College of General Practitioners). This change was ostensibly 
based on new research by the manufacturers which showed an average 
reduction in the duration of flu symptoms in at risk patients by 1.2 days, 
from six to five days, with a 6% reduction in complications requiring the 
use of antibiotics.46 This new evidence was controversial, because it was not 
made public until some time after the new guidance was issued, ostensibly 
on the grounds of commercial confidentiality. The Appraisal Committee 
relied on an economic model which suggested an incremental cost per
“ Yamey (1999). ’’Dobson Backed NICE Ruling on Flu Drug.” BMJ319: 1024, 
16 October 1999.
45 See for Example, The Guardian, “Anti-Flu Drug Relenza Rejected for NHS, 
The Guardian, 2 October, 1999; The Guardian, “Dobson Rejects Flu Drug 
Despite Threats” 8 October 1999.
46 National Institute for Clinical Excellence (2000) Guidance on the Use o f 
Zanamivir (Relenza) in the Treatment o f Influenza, London, National Institute 
for Clinical Excellence, November 2000.; OTSfeale Roache (2000). "NICE 
Recommends Flu Drug For "At Risk" Patients." BMJ321: 1305, 25 November 
2000.
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QALY of £38,000 for adults when influenza is circulating, while for at risk 
adults, it estimated an incremental cost per QALY of between £9,300 and 
£31,000 when influenza is circulating.47
As noted in passing in Section 6.3.3 NICE’S final guidance was 
rejected by a mid-Devon PCG representing some 70 GPs in twenty 
practices. In support of this decision they cited the poor evidence base of the 
NICE recommendation, the erosion of their clinical responsibility, the high 
cost of the drug as well concern at the recommendation that Relenza was to 
be prescribed by nurses and GPs based on generalised GP supervision, 
given also particular difficulties in the diagnosis of influenza48 Though 
warned of the likelihood of adverse consequences by Sir Michael Rawlins, 
and by the Department of Health, their position was given credibility by the 
Drug and Therapeutics Bulletin. The Bulletin, a highly regarded 
independent publication of the Consumers’ Association, edited by Professor 
George Collier of St George’s Hospital Medical School, advised that there 
was still insufficient proof that zanamivir was effective in the treatment of at 
risk patients and that claims that the product prevented serious 
complications were unfounded.49 Furthermore, it was warned that the drug 
may have adverse effects in patients suffering from asthma or lung 
disease.50 This latter point was reinforced by a product warning issued by 
Glaxo Wellcome that zanamivir (Relenza) could cause bronchospasm and
47 National Institute for Clinical Excellence (2000) Guidance on the Use o f 
Zanamivir (Relenza) in the Treatment o f Influenza, London, National Institute 
for Clinical Excellence, November 2000., para. 4.2.
48 The Observer, “GPs Warned as They Snub Advice on Anti-Flu Drug”, 
December 10,2000; The Guardian, “GPs Rebel Against Flu Drug Advice”, 11 
December 2000.
49 Anonymous (2001). "Why Not Zanamivir?" Drug & Therapeutics Bulletin 
39: 9-10.
50 Ibid.
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serious respitatory deterioration, and advising special caution when treating 
patients with asthma or chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.51
6.4.2 Beta Interferon
The treatment of beta interferon by NICE and the Department of Health has 
already attracted attention within the regulatory state literature. Beta 
interferon drugs had been introduced in the mid-1990s, amid fears that, at a 
cost of £10,000 per patient per year, the treatment could absorb as much as 
10 per cent of the NHS drugs budget, were it made available to all patients 
with the relapsing and remitting form of multiple sclerosis. Guidance was 
issued at the time by the NHS Executive, under which only consultant 
neurologists were able to prescribe interferon drugs to patients, when 
referred by their GP according to a referral protocol. Health Authorities 
were required to make provision to fund treatment in accordance with the 
guidance. Following the decision by a number of Health Authorities not to 
fund beta interferons in defiance of the NHS Management Executive, a legal 
challenge was successfully brought against one such authority, in the case of 
R. v. North Derbyshire HA, ex p. Fisher.54
It was in the context of this controversy that the appraisal of beta 
interferon drugs was included in NICE’S first work programme in August 
1999. After lengthy consultations with manufacturers, patient groups and 
professional bodies, and having commissioned a review of the published
51 Yamey (2000). "Drug Company Issues Warning About Flu Drugs." BMJ 
320: 334, 5 Febraury 2000.
52 Crinson (2004). "The Politics of Regulation Within the 'Modernised NHS: 
The Case of Beta Interferon and The 'Cost-Effective' Treatment of Multiple 
Sclerosis." Critical Social Policy 24 (1): 30-49.
53 New (1996). "The Rationing Agenda in the NHS." British Medical Journal 
312: 1593-601,22 June 1996.
54 [1997] 8 Medical Law Reports 327. This case was discussed in Section 4.5.5.
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evidence on clinical and cost effectiveness, the Appraisal Committee arrived 
at a Provisional Appraisal Determination (PAD), recommending that, based 
on the high cost of the drug and evidence of modest clinical effectiveness, 
the treatment should not be extended to patients not already receiving beta 
interferon drugs. The PAD was leaked to the BBC and details were 
broadcast on the evening News on June 20. The broadcast led to an outcry 
from the Multiple Sclerosis (MS) Society, which accused NICE of being 
“ ...uncooperative, uncommunicative and biased towards health economic 
data...” and for treating “...patients, support groups and pharmaceutical 
companies with disdain”.55 The Appraisal Committee was apparently 
unmoved at this criticism, and arrived at a Final Appraisal Determination 
(FAD) on 27 July 2000, and draft guidance was circulated.
Eight internal appeals were lodged, from manufacturers, patient 
groups including the MS Society and professional bodies including the 
Association of British Neurologists and the Royal College of Nursing. The 
appeals were upheld in part on the grounds of failure to give sufficient 
notice of consultation to the MS Society, failure to explain the basis on 
which the drugs were found not to be cost-effective, and failure to give 
adequate weight to long-term benefits of beta interferon.56 NICE then asked 
the Appraisal Committee to reconsider the evidence, and also to consider 
new economic evidence submitted by Schering, one of the manufacturers, 
during the appeal hearing. On 13 December the Appraisal Committee 
reiterated their original view that beta interferon (and now glatiramer 
acetate) was not cost-effective. However, the Committee expressed serious
55 Kmietowicz (2000). "NICE’S appraisal procedures attacked." BMJ 321: 980, 
21 October 2000.
56 National Institute for Clinical Excellence (2000) Appraisal o f the Use o f Beta 
Interferons in the Treatment o f Multiple Sclerosis - Decision o f the Appeal 
Panel, London, NICE, 8 November 2000.; Dobson (2000). "NICE to 
Reconsider Evidence on Interferon Beta." BMJ321:1244, 18 November 2000.
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reservations about the economic models which they had considered. On the 
basis of these reservations, NICE agreed to an extension of the timetable for 
appraisal, in order to commission new economic modelling (which was 
expected to take around five months). After further consultation, the 
Appraisal Committee met again on 26 July 2001 and a new PAD was issued 
on 4 August, and a FAD was issued on 30th October. The new economic 
model, which used additional clinical data supplied by Schering and 
Bigogen, estimated a cost per QALY gained of upwards of £35,000 and on 
this basis recommended, against the use of beta interferon and glatiramer 
acetate.
Seven appeals were again lodged, this time unsuccessfully, against 
the FAD. NICE guidance recommending that neither beta interferon nor 
glatiramer acetate should be made available to new patients was finally
» r o
published m January 2002. However, parallel developments had by this 
time overtaken NICE’S decision. Since November 2001, the Deparment of 
Health had been in negotiations with manufacturers of beta interferon drugs 
and with patient groups to make the treatment available.59 Negotiations 
centred around the idea of a risk-sharing scheme, under which the drugs 
would be funded for patients with relapsing and remitting multiple sclerosis 
on the basis of a ‘sliding scale’. Under an agreement arrived at by these 
various parties, the NHS would fund for treatment to be prescribed by a 
consultant neurologist, while an ongoing study of patients prescribed the 
drugs would provide additional data against which cost-effectiveness could
57 National Institute for Clinical Excellence (2002) Appeal o f the Use o f Beta 
Interferons in the Treatment o f Multiple Sclerosis, London, NICE, 25 January 
2002. .
58 national Institute for Clinical Excellence (2002) Beta Interferon and 
Glatiramer Acetate for the Treatment o f Multiple Sclerosis, Technology 
Appraisal No. 42, London, NICE, January 2002..
59 Mayor (2001). "Health Department to Fund Interferon Beta Despite 
Institute’s Ruling." BMJ323: 1087,10 November 2001.
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be assessed. If treatment proved to be less effective than expected, the cost 
of drugs would be adjusted, and sums refunded to the NHS.60 Around
10,000 patients were expected to receive treatment under the scheme, at a 
cost of £6000-£9000 per patient per year.61 The scheme was nonetheless
cry
criticised for undermining the authority of the Institute. As a result of the 
risk-sharing agreement, NICE’S guidance on beta interferon and glatiramer 
acetate was not approved by the Secretary of State.
6.5 Effectiveness of NICE
In assessing the effectiveness of NICE, it must first be noted that those 
involved with the establishment of the Institute had high expectations for it 
(17,18,114,115,119). Moreover, NICE was the focus of the hopes of many 
within the NHS who may also have had competing expectations of the 
Institute. For example, some saw it as a champion of evidence based 
medicine, while others, accepting rationing as inevitable, were 
disappointed in their assessment of the extent to which they thought the 
Institute was leading to a more rational approach.64
There were three main ‘official’ assessments of NICE during the 
period under examination. First, Learning from Bristol, the Report of the 
Kennedy Inquiry looked into the work of NICE, as part of an assessment of
60 For a critical account, see Sudlow and Counsell (2003). ’’Problems With UK 
Government's Risk Sharing Scheme For Assessing Drugs For Multiple 
Sclerosis." Ibid. 326: 388-392.
61 Little (2002). "NHS to Fund Treatment for 10,000-Patients With MS." Ibid. 
324: 316, 9 February 2002.
62 Mayor (2001). "Health Department to Fund Interferon Beta Despite 
Institute’s Ruling." Ibid. 323: 1087, 10 November 2001.
63 Sculpher, Drummond and O'Brien Ibid."Effectiveness, Efficiency and 
NICE." 322: 943-944, 21 April 2001.
64 Smith (1999). "NICE: A Panacea for the NHS?" Ibid. 318: 823-4, 27 March 
1999.
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leadership and of appropriate standards of care in the NHS.65 Second, the 
Health Committee of the House of Commons undertook a detailed 
investigation into NICE during the 2001-2002 parliamentary session.66 
Finally, following the Health Committee’s criticisms of NICE, the institute 
invited the World Health Organisation (WHO) to undertake an evaluation of 
the scientific validity of NICE’S technology appraisal process.67 All of these 
sources were broadly favourable to NICE, to a greater or lesser extent 
finding criticism of particular aspects of the work of the Institute. These 
‘official’ views are supplemented here by a consideration of the conclusions 
of the relevant professional medical literature.
The Report of the Kennedy Inquiry focussed mainly on the 
institutions of regulation inside the NHS, and their relation to patient 
confidence. Learning from Bristol argued for a clear separation between the 
Department of Health, as the headquarters of the NHS, and bodies, 
including NICE, whose role was in relation to the regulation of health care. 
With respect to the latter, regulatory function, the proper role of the 
Department of was restricted to establishing the framework for regulation.68 
Accordingly, the report emphasised the need to strengthen the independence 
of NICE, noting the close involvement of the Department of Health in 
developing guidance for the NHS.69 The Inquiry criticised the insufficient 
co-ordination of standards produced by a variety of bodies, which it claimed
65 Kennedy (Chairman), op. cit., note 36, chapters 24 and 27.
66 House of Commons Health Committee, op. cit., note 36.
67 WHO (2003) Technology Appraisal Programme o f the National Institute o f 
Clinical Excellence: A Review by WHO, Ref. no. 5045738, Copenhagen, WHO 
Regional Office for Europe.
68 Learning from Bristol, Chapter 24, paras. 34-46.
69 Ibid. Chapter 24, para. 39.
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created the potential for confusion.70 Furthermore, there were inadequate
* 71mechanisms to enforce the observation of NICE guidance.
The report of the Health Select Committee welcomed the 
introduction of NICE, as did the majority of those submitting evidence to it. 
Nonetheless, it found evidence both of under- and over- implementation of 
NICE guidance.72 It was claimed on the one hand that NICE had struggled 
to establish pre-eminence over other, more established sources, such as the 
Consumer Association’s Drug and Therapeutics Bulletin, and that there was 
insufficient collaboration between different authorities on clinical 
effectiveness. It was also argued that implementation of NICE guidance 
was given a low priority by some, given other targets, such as those relating 
to emergency care. In this context, it was suggested that guidance from the 
Secretary of State requiring Health Authorities fund treatments within three 
months of approval by NICE had the reverse effect of diverting resources 
away from other treatments, thus making treatment more inconsistent.74 
Furthermore, evidence to the Health Committee raised concerns highly 
pertinent to the approach of this thesis. In evidence to the House of 
Commons Health Committee Dr Deirdre Cunningham expressed succinctly 
the problem of bureaucratic drift: “NICE was set up to give robust guidance 
on the basis of evidence, and it appears now to be almost being asked to do
70 Ibid., Chapter 27, paras. 14-16,
71 Ibid., Chapter 24, para. 42; Chapter 27, para. 29-30.
72 House of Commons Health Committee (2002) National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence, HC 515-1 Session 2001-02, London, The Stationery Office, paras. 
70-76.
73 Ibid.
74 {House of Commons Health Committee, 2002 #19@paras. 60-67}; see also 
Burke (2002). "NICE May Fail to Stop "Postcode Prescribing," MPs Told." 
BM J324: 191, 26 January 2002; Burke (2002). "No Cash to Implement NICE, 
Health Authorities Tell MPs." BMJ324: 258,2 February 2002.
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resource allocation by the Department of Health.”75 Similarly, the North 
Liverpool Primary Care Trust submitted that in comparison to rival sources 
of information, “NICE is widely viewed as pursuing a political agenda at the
n r
expense of clinical credibility.”
By contrast, WHO was upbeat about NICE’S technology appraisal 
process, delivering what has been described as a “ringing endorsement”,
7 7despite numerous recommendations suggestions for its strengthening. The 
Institute was praised for its “commitment to the use of rigorous
70
methodology throughout the [technology appraisal] process”. The review 
concluded that, “in only four years, NICE has developed a well-deserved 
reputation for innovation and methodological development that represents
7 0an important model for technology appraisals internationally.”
At the same time, there was evidence that NICE guidance had not 
always been systematically implemented. A study by Sheldon et al. 
suggested that the Institute had led to faster uptake of some technologies, 
such as taxanes for cancer and orlistat for obesity, but that implementation
DA
had been variable overall. Similarly, a study by Wathen and Dean 
examined the impact of NICE guidance on GP prescribing and found that
75 House of Commons Health Committee (2002) National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence, HC 515-11 Session 2001-02, London, The Stationery Office.
76 Ibid., Ev. 68.
77 Devlin, Parkin and Gold (2003). "WHO Evaluates NICE." BMJ327: 1061-2, 
8 November 2003.
78 WHO (2003) Technology Appraisal Programme o f the National Institute o f 
Clinical Excellence: A Review by WHO, Ref. no. 5045738, Copenhagen, WHO 
Regional Office for Europe.
79 Ibid.
80 Sheldon, Cullum, Dawson, Lankshear, Lowson, Watt, West, Wright and 
Wright (2004). "What’s The Evidence That NICE Guidance Has Been 
Implemented? Results From a National Evaluation Using Time Series Analysis, 
Audit of Patients’ Notes, and Interviews." BMJ 329: 999-1004, 30 October 
2004.
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NICE guidance, in isolation, had negligible impact on prescribing patterns, 
although where recommendations coincided with other sources or practical
A 1
experience it led to increased prescribing. Furthermore, they reported that 
NICE guidance on zanamivir (Relenza) had been almost universally 
rejected, and that this had undermined overall confidence in NICE. 
Implementation tracking of NICE guidance commissioned by the Institute 
itself supports this overall conclusion. Although take up of NICE- 
approved treatments had increased, out of 28 individual pieces of NICE 
guidance, only 12 were judged by the study to have good compliance. A 
further 12 sets of guidance were insufficiently acted upon, while the 
remaining four were ‘over-implemented’.84
In interpreting the findings of this section, it should be pointed out 
that, compared with the Limited List scheme discussed in the previous 
chapter, as well as with the drug reimbursement policies operated by some 
other countries such as Australia and New Zealand, the effectiveness of 
NICE depended much more on active (and from the clinician perspective, 
largely voluntary) compliance with guidance. The impact of NICE guidance 
on clinical practice has, according to official evaluation, been somewhat 
diminished by confusion and lack of co-ordination between NICE and other 
sources of guidance. Consistent with this, academic studies have pointed to 
variable rates of implementation with NICE guidance. At the same time,
81 Wathen and Dean (2004). "An Evaluation of the Impact of NICE Guidance 
on GP Prescribing." British Journal o f General Practice 54: 103-107.
82 Ibid.
83 Abacus International (2004) NICE Guidance Implementation Tracking Data 
Sources, Methodology and Results, London, NICE, 29 June 2004.
84 Ibid.; White (2004). "NICE Guidance Has Failed To End "Postcode 
Prescribing"." BMJ 328 29 May 2004.
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notwithstanding some sources of dissent,85 the overall assesment has been, 
in a broad sense, favourable towards NICE.
6.6 Governance, Commitment and NICE
Following the approach of the previous chapter, this section attempts to 
assess the extent to which the governance structure of NICE provided for 
credible commitment, applying the modified version of Levy and Spiller’s 
three-level framework of analysis set out in Section 4.5. Section 6.6.1 deals 
with substantive written restraints on the discretion of NICE. Section 6.6.2 
looks at the effectiveness of restraints based on structure and process. 
Section 6.6.3 looks at the constraints on changing the regulatory system, 
while Section 6.6.4 deals with the institutions for enforcing these lower- 
level commitment mechanisms. On the basis of this analysis, it is argued 
that the governance structure of NICE was relatively credible, based 
primarily on structural and procedural restraints, though the analysis also 
identifies some institutional weaknesses.
6.6.1 Substantive Written Restraints
As discussed in Section 6.3.2, NICE was established as a Special Health 
Authority, that is, in exercise of the Secretary of State’s power under S. 11 
of the National Health Service Act 1977 to establish special bodies “...for 
the purpose of performing any functions which he may direct the body to 
perform on his behalf...” Although formally separate from the Department 
of Health, the Institute was nonetheless subject to the direction of the 
Secretary of State, and (in Wales) the Welsh Assembly. The original
85 For example Smith (2000). "The Failings of NICE." BMJ321: 1363-4,2 
December 2000.
86 National Health Service Act 1977 Section 11 (1).
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delegation of functions to the institute was extremely broad, and was 
broadened still further by S.I No 2219 of 1999. This extension of power 
rectified the anomaly that while from its inception in the White Paper, NICE 
had been intended to have a role in promoting cost- as well as clinical 
effectiveness. However the precise choice of the words, “effective use of 
available resources” was, as discussed, apparently broader than necessary to 
correct this anomaly, and can therefore be interpreted as an initial instance 
of coalitional drift, opening up the possibility that NICE might rule on the 
affordability, as distinct from the cost-effectiveness of expensive treatment.
The substantive breadth discretionary authority can be gauged by the 
technology appraisals of zanamir and beta interferon, discussed in Section 
6.4. In the former case, the fast track appraisal recommendation, that 
zanamivir should not be used in the treatment of influenza, was based not on 
an explicit cost-effectiveness analysis, but on an assessment of the overall 
resource implications of making the treatment generally available. In the 
case of beta interfemons and glatiramer, NICE’S recommendation against 
the use of the treatment was in effect (without implying that this was part of 
a ‘master plan’) the opening gambit in negotiations between the Department 
of Health and the manufacturers to make the drug available at a lower (and 
risk-adjusted) price. These two appraisals, and surrounding events led to 
suggestions (denied by NICE) that the Government and the Institute were 
applying an upper limit of £30,000 per QALY on NHS-funded treatments.87 
The point here is that the legal framework within which NICE was 
operating was sufficiently flexible to accommodate these developments. It 
therefore seems highly plausible to suppose that the absence of significant
87 Mayor (2001). "Health Department to Fund Interferon Beta Despite 
Institute's Ruling." BMJ 323: 1087, 10 November 2001; House of Commons 
Health Committee (2002) National Institute for Clinical Excellence, HC 515-1 
Session 2001-02, London, The Stationery Office, para. 103.
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substantive written restraints, and especially the broad scope of the 
amendment of S.I. No. 2219 of 1999 contributed substantially to the belief 
(especially among Members of Parliament) that NICE had been established 
with cost-containment as a primary objective.
6.6.2 Restraints Based on Structure and Process
By contrast, structure- and process-based restraints played a relatively 
important role in restraining the arbitrary exercise of discretionary powers 
on the part of NICE and the Department of Health. As a Special Health 
Authority, NICE was intended to operate at “arm’s length” from the 
Department of Health, although it remained “accountable to the Secretary of 
State.”88 This organisational separation between NICE and the Department 
of Health focuses attention on the allocation of agenda-setting and veto 
power between them. The extent of competition between NICE guidance 
and that of other organisations, the kind of expertise possessed by the 
agency and the extent to which different interests were enfranchised within 
the decision-making process are in addition relevant to an assessment of the 
restraints on arbitrary action.
In Directions to the National Institute for Clinical Excellence, the 
Secretary of State gave himself substantial agenda-setting as well as veto 
power over decisions of NICE. Direction 2 (1) (a)-(c) provided for the 
Institute to produce guidance on such topics “as may be notified by the 
Secretary of State or the National Assembly for Wales.” By Direction 2 (1) 
(d) the Institute is directed to disseminate guidance, “subject to the approval 
of the Secretary of State and the National Assembly for Wales”. By 
Direction 2 (2) the Institute could exercise its own initiative to endorse
88 Department of Health (1998) A First Class Service: Quality in the New NHS, 
HSC 1998/113, London, Deparment of Health, para. 2.29.
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guidance produced by bodies other than NICE itself, and to develop clinical 
audit methodologies, but again this was “subject to the approval of the 
Secretary of State and the National Assembly for Wales.” The Government 
accepted the recommendation of the Kennedy Report in favour of removing 
the requirement of approval from the Secretary of State and the Welsh
O Q
Assembly for disseminating NICE guidance. No revisions to the 
Directions had been made during the period under examination. 
Furthermore, there was initially a perception that the process of topic 
selection was not transparent, leading some to advocate that NICE should be 
empowered to determine its own work programme.90 The government 
rejected this proposal, but published a consultation document suggesting 
ways in which the process could be opened out to wider consultation.91
In terms of inter-agency competition, there was (formally, at least) 
initially no requirement that Health Service Organisations should adhere to 
NICE guidance. To this extent, NICE was effectively in competition with 
other organisation producing clinical guidance. This, it can be argued, was a 
significant restraint on the discretion of NICE to the extent that it required 
NICE to develop guidance that would serve the needs of the users, if it was 
to be accepted. An example of competition between rival guidance was 
given in Section 6.4.1. As discussed in that section, a Devon PCG 
prominently rejected NICE’S final guidance on zanamivir, relying instead
89 Secretary of State for Health (2002) Learning from Bristol: The Department 
o f Health's Response to the Report o f the Public Inquiry into Children's Heart 
Surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995, Cm 5363, London, The 
Stationery Office.
90 House of Commons Health Committee (2002) National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence, HC 515-1 Session 2001-02, London, The Stationery Office., paras. 
117-118.
91 Department of Health/ National Assembly for Wales (2002) Clinical 
Guidance from the National Institute for Clinical Excellence - Timing and 
Selection o f Topics for Appraisal, London, Department of Health/National 
Assembly for Wales.
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on the recommendations of the Drug and Therapeutics Bulletin. In the light 
of this analysis, the Secretary of State’s Directions to Health Authorities, 
Primary Care Trusts and NHS Trusts, requiring Health Authorities to fund 
NICE-approved treatments, and requiring NHS Trusts and PCTs to apply 
funds received from Health Authorities in accordance with this obligation, 
takes on special significance. By this measure, NICE in effect acquired 
greater latitude to develop guidance at variance from that sought by 
clinicians.
As the discussion has observed, NICE incorporated considerable 
clinical and latterly economic expertise. Quite apart from the legitimating 
function of this “technocratic fix” discussed by Syrett, this emphasis on 
technocratic expertise may have contributed to the effectiveness of NICE’S 
governance structure, committing the Institute to reaching its decisions in 
accordance with technocratic procedures and values. Following the 
arguments of Moshe Maor (whose contribution is discussed in Section 6.2) 
it could be argued that embedding the ‘gold standard’ of evidence-based 
medicine, with its accepted modes of argument and its acknowledged 
hierarchy of evidence, into the decision-making framework of NICE, time- 
inconsistencies were more transparent, and therefore subject to criticism and 
rebuke. As discussed in Section 6.5, following initial doubts raised by the 
House of Commons Health Committee, NICE was praised by WHO for its 
methodological rigour, which was impressive by any standard, despite 
alleged lapses. The decision of the Department of Health to reject NICE’S 
appraisal of beta interferon and glatiramer acetate and instead to agree a 
lower (and risk-adjusted) price with the manufacturers was interpreted by
92 See Section 6.2, above.
93 Maor (2004). "Competing Commitments? Independence versus "gold 
standard" for policy choice in the reimbursement of pharmaceutical drugs".
20th Anniversary SOG Research Committee of the International Political 
Science Association, Vancouver.
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some as a change of policy forced by patient pressure, in spite of weak 
clinical evidence.94 But given the procedures of NICE, including its 
evidence-based standards of evaluation, it was at least transparent, and 
could be judged on its merits.
As discussed in Section 4.5.3, a key claim of Macey, and of 
McCubbins, Noll and Weingast is that by selectively enfranchising certain 
interest groups, agency decision-making procedures can replicate the 
political environment existing at the time of the creation of a regulatory 
agency, ensuring that issues arising subsequent to the creation of the agency 
are decided in the interests of the enacting coalition. Similarly, according to 
this literature consultation and evidential requirements shape the kind of 
information on which bureaucrats base their decisions. In addition to the 
general requirement to “endeavour to conduct its business in an open and 
transparent manner”, the governance structure of NICE incorporated a 
number of such procedural devices.95 Foremost among these was NICE’S 
committee structure. This included NICE Partners Council, made up of 
representatives of different key interest groups, including patient groups and ' 
health professionals, which had a formal function of receiving the annual 
report of the Institute, but operated as a general ‘sounding board’ for NICE. 
Furthermore, the processes through which technology appraisals (and other 
forms of guidance) were produced were designed to facilitate input from 
interested groups, and this commitment has been strengthened over time. 
And while patients groups, such as the MS society criticised the process, if 
the arguments discussed in Section 4.5.3 about administrative structure and
94 Mayor (2001). "Health Department to Fund Interferon Beta Despite 
Institute's Ruling." BMJ 323: 1087, 10 November 2001; House of Commons 
Health Committee (2002) National Institute for Clinical Excellence, HC 515-1 
Session 2001-02, London, The Stationery Office.
95 Secretary of State’s Directions to the National Institute of Clinical 
Excellence, S. 2.
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process are correct, this could arguably be interpreted less of a democratic 
deficit than means of establishing credible commitment in the face of high 
uncertainty.
6.6.3 Constraints on System Changes
Moving to the level of collective choice rules, as discussed in Section 6.3.2, 
NICE was a special health authority established by statutory instrument. It is 
not necessary to repeat here the discussion of Section 5.4.3 concerning the 
procedures for parliamentary scrutiny of delegated legislation under the 
Statutory Instruments Act 1946. At any rate, following the extension of 
NICE’S functions under S.I. No 2219 of 1999, conferring upon the institute 
responsibility “for the effective use of available resources”, it is difficult to 
see that the statutory instrument provisions provided any substantive 
restraints on NICE’s regulatory discretion.
In terms of procedural requirements, these were derived partially 
from statutory instrument, but largely from directions issued by the 
Secretary of State. By contrast with the provisions for scrutiny of statutory 
instruments, ministerial directions, which as we have seen were concerned 
mainly with process-based restraints, could have been introduced without 
any ‘laying’ requirement or any other formal process for notifying changes 
to Parliament; nor was there any well-established Westminster-based 
scrutiny procedure, equivalent to the work of the Standing Committee on 
Delegated Legislation with respect to statutory instruments. The National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence (Establishment and Constitution) Order, S.I. 
No. 220 of 1999 was described as:
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.. .an empty piece of secondary legislation, with the meat to be put 
on it by directions from the Secretary of State that will not be subject 
to any form of parliamentary scrutiny.96
While these criticisms have some force, it is also worth noting that under 
devolution arrangements, directions were agreed jointly by the Secretary of 
State for Wales and by the National Assembly for Wales. To some extent, 
what was absent in Westminster, in terms of restraints on changing the 
regulatory system through directions issued by the Secretary of State, may 
have been provided in Cardiff. Furthermore, the necessity of obtaining the 
consent of both bodies (the Department of Health and the Welsh Assembly) 
may therefore have provided a degree of restraint against arbitrary system- 
changes.
Moving to a discussion of informal institutions, in Section 4.5.4 it 
was suggested, following Spiller and Vogelsang, that the British convention 
that major policy changes are preceded by the publication of a government 
White Paper served to discourage rapid policy changes without prior 
consultation with affected parties. At the same time, it was noted in Section 
5.4.3 that in the case of the Limited List, the scheme was implemented, 
extended, and the ACD ‘stood down’ and later dissolved, all without 
recourse to a White Paper. In the present case, the establishment of NICE 
was preceded with the publication both of a White Paper as well as the 
consultation document on quality, A First Class Service, and a further 
consultation paper Faster Access to Modern Treatment, which specifically 
dealt with NICE’S technology appraisal function At the same time, the
96 Third Standing Committee on Delegated Legislation 1998-99,10 March 
1999 (Mr Phillip Hammond).
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White Paper outlined a role for NICE only in terms of clinical guidelines 
and clinical audit methodologies; the more controversial technology 
appraisal role was gradually revealed in A First Class Service, and 
concretised in Faster Access to Modern Treatment, albeit still providing 
opportunity for affected parties to make their views known. Adherence with 
such norms of publicity did not however prevent a number of drafting 
anomalies in the relevant statutory instruments. These included not only the 
lack'of authority to consider cost-effectiveness discussed in Section 6.3.2, 
but also included failures to correctly cite the authority under which the
Q7delegated power was exercised. Similarly, although the initial Directions 
to the National Institute for Clinical Excellence were not made the basis of a 
broad consultation, proposals to amend the Directions were announced in 
the relatively high-profile Government’s response to the Report of the 
Kennedy Inquiry.
6.6.4 Enforcement of Lower Level Commitment 
Mechanisms
The constitutional level of analysis looks at the broader legislative, judicial 
and executive institutions within which regulatory reforms are embedded. 
Taking first the legislative institutions, the role of Parliament in enforcing 
restraints was further limited by the fact that the Government declined to 
enshrine the functions of NICE in legislation. As discussed in Section 6.3.1, 
this led to accusations that the Government was trying to avoid the scrutiny 
accorded to the legislation, as well as to suggestions that NICE was being 
set up in such a way as to allow it, further down the line, to divert 
responsibility for decisions on the affordability of treatments away from the 
government. The decision to avoid the use of primary legislation certainly
97 Corrected by the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (Amendment) 
Regulations, S.I. No. 2218 of 1999.
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made it easier for the Government to expand the Institute’s responsibility to 
include “the effective use of available resources”, notwithstanding scrutiny 
of the relevant delegated legislation. This amendment, it will be recalled, 
had been introduced during the 1999 summer recess, amid accusations that 
the Government was attempting to evade accountability for reneging on 
undertakings that NICE would not be involved in resource allocation 
decisions. It is worth stressing, however, that if evading Parliamentary 
scrutiny had been the intention for the timing of the amendment, it failed 
spectacularly, since the Standing Committee on Delegated Legislation took 
time to debate the provisions in detail.
An examination of the relevant instruments seems to indicate that 
they did not provide a substantial role for the judiciary in ensuring that 
NICE remained true to its original purposes, other than through the 
enforcement of proper procedures. The role of the judiciary was however 
not tested during the period under investigation, though pharmaceutical 
companies did on occasion threaten legal action against the Institute. Legal 
challenge from pharmaceutical companies is most foreseeable as part of an 
attempt to overturn a decision by NICE not to recommend a treatment. This 
may not always have been in what the medical profession perceived to be its 
best interests. The zanamivir (Relenza) episode provided an illustration of 
this, in that the ‘fast-track’ appraisal was attacked by the manufacturs for 
being to restrictive, and by the BMA general practitioner committee for 
being not strict enough—they wanted zanamivir black-listed under Schedule 
10 in order to alleviate pressure on GPs from patients to provide the 
product.
The role of executive institutions in enforcing restraints on system 
changes is particularly important in the present case, given the emphasis on 
regulatory processes and structures to provide the necessary credibility. This
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effectiveness of executive institutions depends, in turn, on the existence of a 
strong bureaucracy. Wade and Forsyth note the UK Civil Service’s
• • OR • ' •“combination of executive ability with political neutrality.” While with 
regard to departments of central government, it was long held that Crown 
servants are not the delegate but the alter ego of the Secretary of State," this 
of course does not apply to statutory authorities such as NICE, which is 
independent as well as neutral. This follows a longstanding use of stand­
alone national organisations sponsored by the Department of Health 
undertaking a variety of executive functions.100
Again, because of the substantial powers of the Secretary of State
and Welsh Assembly with respect to determining NICE’S programme of
work, and approving its guidance for dissemination, full use was not made
of this mechanism. The extensive powers the Secretary of State enjoyed
over the personnel of NICE is relevant in this regard. These included the
power to appoint the Chairman as well as non-officer members of NICE
Board.101 The chief officer was appointed by the Institute, but subject to the
approval of the Secretary of State.102 As an opposition member of the
Standing Committee on Delegated Legislation put it, in effect, “the
Government [was to] have an in-built majority of five out of eight placemen
on NICE, so that the Secretary of State can, in effect control it.”103 The
power to veto appointment initially extended to members of the NICE
Partners’ Council and NICE Appraisal Committee, although this control
•
98 Wade and Forsyth (2004). Administrative Law. 9th Edition, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, p. 53.
99 R v. Home Secretary ex p. Oladenhinde [1991] 1 AC 254, at 284.
100 See for example, Department of Health (2004) Reconfiguring the 
Department o f Health's Arm's Length Bodies, London, Department of Health.
101 S.I. No. 260 of 1999, S. 2(1).
102 S.I. No. 260 of 1999, S. 4 (2).
103 H.C. Session 1998-1999, Third Standing Committee on Delegated 
Legislation, Wednesday 10 March 1999 (Mr Geoffrey Clifton-Brown).
193
was subsequently removed in 2002, in response to the recommendations of 
the Kennedy Report.104 The level of the Secretary of State’s control was 
diminished somewhat in 2002, with the increase in the size of the 
Institute105, and with the removal of the requirement for the Secretary of 
State to approve the chief officer of the institute, and to approve the 
appointment of members of the Partners’ Council.106 Overall, a gradual 
increase in emphasis on executive institutions to generate credibility can 
therefore be seen.
6.7 Conclusions
The evidence from NICE is broadly in line with the observable implications 
of the theory put forward in Chapter 4. At the level of operational rules, 
while NICE was relatively unencumbered by substantive restraints on its 
regulatory discretion, it benefited from a number of substantive and 
procedural restraints, which included, most importantly, an embedded ‘gold 
standard’ of evidence-based medicine and initially at least, competition 
between NICE and other sources of guidance.
Procedural arrangements were not in every respect supportive of the 
credibility of NICE. For example, as discussed in Section 6.6.2, the 
Department of Health enjoyed substantial agenda-setting and veto power, in 
terms of control over the work programme of NICE, as well as control over 
the final decision to disseminate NICE guidance to the NHS. In terms of 
NICE’S work programme, although moves were made in 2002 to make the
104 S.I. No, 260 of 1999, S. 9 (3), repealed by the National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence (Amendment) Regulations, S.I. No. 1759 of 2002, S. 3 (3).
105 National Institute for Clinical Excellence (Establishment and Constitution) 
Amendment Order 2002. S.I. No. 1759 of 2002.
106 National Institute for Clinical Excellence (Amendment) Regulations 2002. 
S.I. No 1760 of 2002.
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selection of topics more transparent, and to consult a wider range of 
interests over the selection of topics, this did not significantly shift control 
away from the Department of Health comparable with making the Institute 
responsible for determining its own programme of guideline development 
and technology appraisals. Similarly, although the Department of Health 
accepted the recommendations of the Kennedy Inquiry to remove the 
requirement of the Secretary of State for the dissemination of NICE 
guidance, the necessary changes in the Directions to the National Institute 
for Clinical Excellence had not been made by the end of 2004.
At the level of collective choice rules, there were few formal
restraints on changes to the regulatory system. Not only was NICE
established under delegated legislation rather than by Act of Parliament, but
many of the most important constraints were imposed by means of
Directions issued by the Secretary of State, which did not require the
notification of Parliament. Interestingly, institutional credibility did not
seem to be an issue in choosing for NICE the form of a special health
authority. In a summary answer obtained under the Freedom of Information
Act it was explained that:
There is no prescribed way of assessing the appropriate status for 
bodies such as NICE... If the body will provide a service to the NHS 
as a whole, then Special Health Authority status is appropriate... 
[NICE was established] ... specifically to provide a national resource 
on behalf of and as part of the NHS.1 7
Furthermore, the Department of Health rejected calls to enshrine NICE in
primary legislation. Most prominently, The Kennedy Report recommended
that NICE should be reconstituted along the lines of the Food Standards
agency (which would have included reconstituting the body under primary
107 Freedom of Information Act request for information to the Department of 
Health, Ref. DE6008103.
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1 Ofilegislation). This suggestion was, however, rejected by the Department of 
Health, which cited its “...wish to minimise the disruption caused by the 
establishment of new bodies or changes in the existing bodies.”109
Informal constraints appear to have been relatively more effective. 
The establishment of NICE was announced in a White Paper, albeit only in 
the most skeletal terms, and a more substantial discussion paper followed. 
Other changes, such as those concerning the procedures for selecting topics 
for appraisal were also subject to consultation in advance. At the same time, 
incremental changes, such as the Directions under which Health Authorities 
were required to fund NICE-approved treatments, were not pre-announced 
in any form of consultation paper.
Finally, at the level of enforcement of these lower level commitment 
mechanisms, the main instrument was through delegation across tier of 
executive government. Whatever powers of direction, of agenda setting and 
of veto power were enjoyed by the Department of Health, NICE was an 
independent legal entity with its own Board. The significance of this may 
however have been diminished by significant power of control over 
appointments on the part of the Secretary of State.
Given this description of the overall institutional arrangements 
within which NICE undertook its functions, it is consistent with the theory 
set out in detail in Chapter 4 that evidence of implementation of NICE 
guidance was varied. As with the discussion of the Limited List scheme 
discussed in the previous chapter, it is worthwhile to consider how far the
108 Learning from Bristol, Chapter 24, para. 43.
109 Secretary of State for Health (2002) Learning from Bristol: The Department 
o f Health's Response to the Report o f the Public Inquiry into Children’s Heart 
Surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995, Cm 5363, London, The 
Stationery Office, para. 4.5.
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evidence suggests that the (in the case of NICE, partial) failure to achieve 
publicly pronounced policy goals can be attributed to a lack of credibility on 
the part of NICE. There is some evidence, discussed in Section 6.5 
suggesting that the perception that NICE was perceived within the NHS as 
having drifted into a resource allocation role or was pursuing a political 
agenda. Furthermore, in contrast with the Limited List scheme, the 
effectiveness of NICE was highly dependent on the willingness of clinicians 
to implement NICE guidance, and credibility was therefore more clearly 
connected with effectiveness.
Finally, it is worthwhile to contrast the interpretation put forward in 
this chapter with the arguments of Syrett, discussed in Section 6.2. Clearly 
there are many similarities between the two accounts. Both suggest that the 
institutional arrangements through which clinical guidance is developed is 
likely to impact on the extent to which guidance is accepted and 
implemented. But while Syrett presents a sophisticated normative analysis 
of NICE, it can be argued that the present account provides a superior 
explanation for the degree of regulatory effectiveness of NICE, on both 
theoretical and empirical grounds.
First, regulatory legitimacy is a normative assessment and cannot be 
directly observed. As Baldwin and Cave (on whose framework Syrett relies 
in the original statement of his views110) acknowledge: “Judging the extent 
to which regulation is legitimate is not to offer a sociological assessment of 
the actual support that a regulator enjoys...; it is, rather to make an 
assessment of the legitimacy that a regulatory deserves”111 Second, even
110 Syrett (2002). "NICE Work? Rationing, Review and the 'Legitimacy 
Problem' in the New NHS." Medical Law Review 10 (1): 1-27, pp. 7-14.
111 Baldwin and Cave (1999). Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and 
Practice. Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 82.
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measuring empirical criteria against the normative framework of Baldwin 
and Cave and others, it may be impossible to assess reliably whether 
legitimacy has increased, especially where complex trade-offs between 
different bases of legitimacy are involved. While the present approach is by 
no means free from this problem (certain reforms may equally enhance 
some aspects of the governance framework while weakening others), at least 
in principle, the framework applied here is empirically testable. Thirdly, the 
present approach is more general than that of Syrett, who develops his 
account only in the context of NICE. Finally, one of the observable 
implications of the present approach, not present in Syrett’s account, is the 
mechanisms of bureaucratic and coalitional drift are likely to play a role in 
relating institutions to any lack of acceptance on the part of clinicians, and 
this seems to be supported by the evidence.
In conclusion, without claiming that the account offered in this 
chapter is superior to the work of Syrett as a normative assessment of NICE, 
taking Syrett’s analysis as the leading contending scholarly account, it can 
be argued that this chapter contributes to the literature by developing a more 
testable explanatory theory. Insofar as an assessment is possible, it appears 
that the evidence supports the theory. The performance of NICE fell short of 
expectations, while the governance structure also was weak in several 
respects. Furthermore, there is some empirical support for a widespread 
perception that an absence of credibility was a cause of mixed evidence of 
compliance.
Chapter 7
The Commission for Health 
Improvement
It must be asked whether CHI is a genuine experiment in quality control 
which will be sensitive to local operating conditions, or whether it is a 
tool of central government ideologically committed to central control of 
professional groups. The answer will not be known for many years, but 
it is likely to be a mixture of both.1
7.1 Introduction
This chapter looks in detail at the Commission for Health Improvement 
(CHI), the independent body which acted as an inspectorate of the NHS 
from1999 until 2004, when its functions were transferred to a new 
Commission for Healthcare Audit and Inspection (CHAI, or ‘Healthcare 
Commission’). The Commission was established ostensibly in response to a 
perceived crisis in the quality of care in the NHS, following a number of 
high-profile service failures, most prominently, in paediatric cardiac surgery 
at the Bristol Royal Infirmary over a decade or so between the mid-1980s 
and the mid-1990s.
1 Power (2000). "The Evolution of the Audit Society, its Politics of Control and 
the Advent of CHI", in Miles, Hampton and Hurwitz (ed.) NICE, CHI and the 
NHS Reforms: Enabling Excellence or Imposing Control? London, 
Aesculapius Medical Press., p. 132.
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Although hailed by the government as the first independent 
inspectorate of the NHS, CHI had a number of antecedents. As discussed 
in Section 3.3.1, the NHS Hospital Advisory Service (HAS), later the Health 
Advisory Service, was responsible for the inspection of long-stay 
institutions, until 1997. Further, the Clinical Standards Advisory Group 
(CSAG), established under Section 62 of the National Health Service and 
Community Care Act 1990 performed a broadly similar investigative and 
advisory function, until it was abolished by Section 25 of the Health Act 
1999. CHI nonetheless was a more high profile and far-reaching institution 
than these two bodies.
There are important differences between CHI and the other two 
episodes of regulatory reform discussed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. Unlike 
the Limited List scheme and NICE, CHI was not involved in assessing 
which treatments should be provided by the NHS, although CHI did play a 
role in monitoring compliance with NICE guidance. The establishment of 
the Commission did not therefore raise issues of bureaucratic and coalitional 
drift across the boundaries between waste-cutting and rationing, in the way 
that these other two regulatory reform initiatives did. At the same time, the 
Commission raised questions of commitment to the implicit concordat in 
other ways. The quotation by a leading academic accountant at the head of 
this chapter suggests that there was an initial uncertainty about the role that 
CHI would play in the NHS, and whether it would lead to increased central 
control over the profession. As discussed in Section 2.4.2, for Klein, it was 
the combination of centralised financial power and decentralised clinical 
power that allowed the implicit concordat to endure. Based on the theory put 
forward in Chapter 4, the extent to which the governance structure of CHI
2 See, for example, Secretary of State for Health (2000) The NHS Plan: A Plan 
for Investment, a Plan for Reform, Cm 4818-1, London, The Stationery Office, 
para. 2.29.
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restrained the possibility that the Commission might serve as an instrument 
for centralising clinical power might therefore be thought to be crucial to its 
effectiveness as a mechanism for quality control. If the theory is correct, 
then one might additionally expect to observe careful attention paid to the 
institutional arrangements for CHI. Furthermore, shortcomings of regulatory 
design would be expected to result in the failure of CHI to achieve its policy 
objectives.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 narrates the history of 
CHI, recounting its background, establishment, reform and eventual abolition. 
Section 7.3 examines evidence of CHI’s effectiveness, while Section 7.4 
applies the framework for analysis set out in Section 4.5 in order to assess the 
degree of credibility engendered by CHI’s governance structure. Section 7.5 
then considers the plausibility of the regulatory commitment hypothesis in the 
light of evidence from CHI, concluding that there is insufficient evidence to 
provide substantial support for the hypothesis. Despite this absence of support, 
it is argued that the application of the framework of Chapter 4 to CHI is 
instructive, raising a number of interesting insights and questions about the 
development over time of CHI, and also pointing to the limitations of the 
framework. Furthermore, although the evidence does not support the 
hypothesis, it is important to stress that nor does it contradict it.
7.2 CHI: Origins, Implementation and Reform
This section sets out the background to CHI, its introduction, reform and 
eventual replacement by CHAI in the Health and Social Care (Community 
Health and Standards) Act 2003. Section 7.2.1 looks at the initial proposals for 
the Commission and the response by the profession and in Parliament. Section
7.2.2 looks at the establishment of CHI by the Health Act 1999 and the related 
subordinate legislation while Section 7.2.3 describes the reforms of CHI made
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by the National Health Service Reform and Health Care Professions Act 2002. 
Finally Section 7.2.4 looks briefly at the abolition of CHI under the Health and 
Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Act 2003.
7.2.1 The Government’s Proposals and the Response 
of the Profession
The government’s plans for the Commission for Health Improvement were 
first set out in The New NHS White Paper. The purpose of this new body, 
according to the White Paper, was to “ ...ensure that the drive for excellence 
is instilled throughout the NHS...” and to “ ...offer an independent 
guarantee that local systems to monitor, assure and improve clinical quality 
are in place.”4 The proposals were fleshed out in the quality consulation 
paper, A First Class Service.5 As set out in the consultation paper, the role 
of the Commission was to be closely related to the government’s proposals 
to establish a system of clinical governance, under which NHS provider 
organisations were required to put in place and maintain arrangements for 
improving the quality of the care they provide.6 CHI was to provide advice 
and guidance on clinical governance arrangements7 and to review local 
arrangements, through a rolling programme of ‘clinical governance reviews’
o
of NHS Trusts and PCTs, and to conduct national service reviews on the 
implementation of NSFs and NICE guidance.9 In addition, the Commission
3 Secretary of State for Health (1997) The New NHS: Modern, Dependable, Cm 
3807, London, The Stationery Office.
4 Ibid. para. 7.13.
5 Department of Health (1998) A First Class Service: Quality in the New NHS, 
HSC 1998/113, London, Deparment of Health, paras. 4.3-4.45.
6 The New NHS paras 6.12-6.15; A First Class Service, paras. 3.2-3.27; Scally 
and Donaldson (1998). "Clinical Governance and the Drive for Quality 
Improvement in the New NHS in England." BMJ311: 61-65, 4 July 1998.
1A First Class Service, paras. 4.8-4.9.
8 Ibid., paras. 4.10-4.16.
9 Ibid., paras. 4.17-4.21.
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was to have a role in investigating serious or persistent problems.10 CHI was
thus to serve a number of different policy goals:
The Commission for Health Improvement will provide an 
independent reassurance to patients that effective systems are in 
place to deliver high quality services throughout the NHS. It will 
also be able to offer rapid support where there is a need to help local 
NHS organisations resolve particularly difficult problems. The 
Commission has an important role in working to reduce variations in 
services across the NHS through its systematic reviews of services, 
providing feedback into the National Service Frameworks and its 
monitoring of the uptake of NICE guidance.11
The BMA gave the government’s proposals a cautious welcome,
“...provided that the Commission adopts a supportive, and not a critical
approach.”12 In its comments on the details of the government proposals, the
Association was keen to ensure that CHI worked closely with the BMA, and
to ensure adequate medical representation among the members of the
Commission.
As with NICE, some asserted a hidden agenda on the part of the
government. Fears that the establishment of CHI was part of a ploy to shift
responsibility for poor performance in the NHS away from the Secretary of
State were apparently exacerbated by the fact that CHI’s remit focussed on
providers and not commissioners of care. As Liberal Democrat health
spokesman, Dr Evan Harris put it:
If I were suspicious—which I am—I would say that the Government 
deliberately do not want their quality inspectorate to look at the 
types of decisions that are being made about commissioning because 
the inspectorate may find that the guidance being given to
10 Ibid., paras. 4.22-4.31.
11 Ibid., para. 4.45.
12 British Medical Association (1998) Response to 'A First Class Service: 
Quality in the new NHS', London, BMA, August 1998, p. 13.
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commissioners, or the policy being taken by commissioners because 
of financial stringencies leads to poor quality services.13
Conservative Members, for their part, claimed to detect a different agenda,
namely that the purpose of CHI was to “...impose a centralised command
and control structure on the health service.” Thus, although clinical
autonomy was formally to be preserved, “ ...the potential threat of being
named and shamed by [CHI] will provide them with an in-built incentive to
act in the one prescribed manner approved by Government”14 Equally, it
was feared that the Commission could become a loose cannon, spending
“.. .too much time chasing high profile media-driven imperatives rather than
concentrating on its core function of a rolling programme of improving
clinical standards.”15
7.2.2 The Health Act 1999
Unlike NICE, CHI was established under primary legislation.16 Section 20 
of the Health Act 1999 set out the functions of the Committee in line with 
the tasks of the Commission elaborated in A First Class Service (discussed 
above in Section 7.2.1). First, the Commission was to provide advice or 
information with respect to the arrangements by PCTs and NHS Trusts for 
the purpose of monitoring and improving the quality of care for which they
1 7have responsibility. Secondly, CHI was given the function of conductmg 
reviews of, and making reports into the clinical governance arrangements
13 H.C. Standing Committee A, Thursday 13 May 1999 (Morning), Health Bill 
[Lords], Dr. Evan Harris.
14 H.C. Standing Committee A, Thursday 13 May 1999 (Morning), Health Bill 
[Lords], Miss Ann Widdecombe.
15 H.C. Standing Committee A, Thursday 13 May 1999 (Afternoon), Health 
Bill [Lords], Mr David Amess.
16 Health Act 1999, Section 19 and Schedule 2. For a critical analysis of the 
Health Act more generally, see Davies (2000). "Don't Trust Me, I'm a Doctor: 
Medical Regulation and the 1999 NHS Reforms." Oxford Journal o f Legal 
Studies 20 (3): 437-456.
17 Health Act 1999 Section 20 (1) (a).
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put in place by NHS Trusts’ and PCTs.18 Third, it was empowered to 
undertake investigations into the “management provision or quality of 
health care” for which NHS bodies have responsibility.19 Fourth, CHI was 
to conduct reviews of the “management, provision or quality of, or access to 
or availability of, particular kinds of health care” for which NHS bodies or
9 0service providers were responsible. This latter function related to the 
intended role of NICE with respect to national service reviews.
In addition to these enumerated powers, the Secretary of State was 
given substantial delegated authority over the Commission’s exercise of its 
functions, including the power to make regulations conferring further 
functions relating to the “ ...management, provision or quality of, or access 
to or availability of, health care for which prescribed NHS bodies or 
prescribed service providers have responsibility”, and to make regulations
99and to give directions to CHI governing the discharge of its functions. 
These powers over the Commission were exercised initially in The 
Commission for Health Improvement (Functions) Regulations 2000 S. I. No. 
662 of 2000, and the Commission for Health Improvement (Functions) 
Amendment Regulations 2000, S. I. No. 797 of 2000 (though the latter 
merely corrected referencing errors in the former). Regulation 2 of S.I. No. 
662 of 2000 addressed, albeit by subordinate instrument, the criticism 
articulated by Dr Harris that CHI did not have oversight over the activities 
of Commissioning bodies (including the commissioning functions of PCTs), 
also extending its remit to Special Health Authorities.
18 Section 20 (1) (b).
19 Section 20 (1) (c).
20 Section 20 (1) (d).
21 Section 20 (1) (e).
22 Section 20 (2) and (3);
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7.2.3 NHS Reform and Health Care Professions Act
2002
CHI had been in operation for little more than a year when the Government 
introduced reforms intended to enhance the independence of the 
Commission, as well as expanding its role. Two policy developments set 
the context for the legislative changes introduced by The NHS Reform Bill. 
The first was The NHS Plan,24 the Department of Health’s ten-year strategy 
to increase funding of the NHS combined with reforms designed to improve 
‘delivery’ in the NHS. The second was the Learning from Bristol report, and 
the response to it by the Department of Health. These two separate 
influences on the Act covered some similar ground, although they differed 
in their emphasis. Between them, they set out a number of themes that form 
the background to the NHS Reform Act.
A first theme was the institutionalisation of a more complete 
separation of the roles of CHI and the Department of Health than existed 
under the 1999 Act. As noted in Section 6.5, the Kennedy Report had 
argued for a clear separation between the roles of regulation and 
management of health care. Section 14 (2) of the NHS Reform Act 
addressed a key limitation on the independence of CHI, namely the powers 
of the Secretary of State and the Welsh Assembly to appoint the chairman 
and other members of the Commission, and to determine the conditions of 
appointment and tenure of Commissioners. It did so by empowering the 
Secretary of State to delegate this function to “ ...a Special Health
23 Dobson (2001). ’’Standards Watchdog to Get a Bigger Role in NHS.” BMJ 
323: 1145,17 November 2001.
24 Secretary of State for Health (2000) The NHS Plan: A Plan for Investment, a 
Plan for Reform, Cm 4818-1, London, The Stationery Office, for comment, see 
Dixon and Dewar (2000). "The NHS Plan.” BMJ321: 315-316, 5 August 2000.
25 Learning from Bristol, Chapter 24, paras. 34-46.
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Authority.” This enabled these functions to be passed to the NHS 
Appointments Commission, which had been established in fulfilment of 
undertakings in The NHS Plan to depoliticise appointments to NHS Trusts 
and Health Authorities. The Act did not, however, repeal Section 20 (2) 
and 20 (3) of the Health Act 1999, so the Secretary of State retained his 
powers to make regulations and give directions governing the work of the 
Commission (how far these powers represented a significant limitation on 
the formal independence of CHI is discussed in Section 7.4 below). Nor did 
the 2002 Act implement the Kennedy Report’s proposal, accepted by the 
Department of Health,27 for the establishment of a Council for the Quality 
of Healthcare to co-ordinate the activities of NICE, CHI and other bodies 
responsible for the safety and quality of healthcare. Accordingly, this 
function remained within the responsibilities of the Department.
A second theme related to performance standards, and the 
assessment against such standards by CHI. Unlike the Clinical Standards 
Board for Scotland, the Commission did not conduct clinical governance 
reviews against explicit standards. This was addressed, in different ways, by 
The NHS Plan and by the Kennedy Report. The NHS Plan had proposed an 
extension of the existing NHS Performance Assessment Framework, which 
was initially focussed on Health Authorities, to cover NHS Trusts and PCTs 
providing community services. Publication of the results of the expanded 
Performance Assessment Framework was to be transferred to CHI. The
26 Secretary of State for Health (2000) The NHS Plan: A Plan for Investment, a 
Plan for Reform, Cm 4818-1, London, The Stationery Office, para. 6.54-6.55.
27 Learning from Bristol, Chapter 24, para. 36; Recommendations, para. 39; 
Secretary of State for Health (2002) Learning from Bristol: The Department o f 
Health's Response to the Report o f the Public Inquiry into Children's Heart 
Surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995, Cm 5363, London, The 
Stationery Office, para. 4.3.
28 Secretary of State for Health (2000) The NHS Plan: A Plan for Investment, a 
Plan for Reform, Cm 4818-1, London, The Stationery Office, para. 6.19.
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Kennedy Report similarly proposed that CHI investigations should take 
place against a framework of ‘generic standards’ (that is, standards 
operating at the level of the healthcare organisation as a whole). To bring 
together and to co-ordinate national-level monitoring, the Kennedy Report 
proposed the establishment of an independent Office for Information on
9 0Healthcare Performance. The Act addressed these proposals in two 
principal ways. First, CHI was charged with reviewing and reporting on the 
quality of data and the methodology of data collection and analysis by NHS
•5 A
bodies or service providers. As part of its responsibilities for reviews and 
investigations, CHI was authorised to collect and analyse data, and to assess 
performance against criteria.31 Relatedly, the Commission was given the 
responsibility of preparing an annual report on its findings with respect to 
NHS bodies and service providers. In keeping with the emphasis of The 
NHS Plan on the ‘patient experience’, the duty of quality, introduced by 
Section 18 of the Health Act 1999 was extended to include responsibility for
29 Recommendations, Para. 146-147; See also Chapter 27, para. 54 proposing 
an “Office for Monitoring Healthcare Performance.”
30 NHS Reform and Health Care Professions Act Section 12 (2).
31 National Health Service Reform and Health Care Professions Act 2002, 
Section 12 (3). This amendment equally reflected the Kennedy Report’s 
emphasis on ‘generic standards for healthcare organisations’; see , Chapter 37, 
paras. 31-45. The Commission’s constitution was amended, allowing for the 
subcommittee(s) of the Commission exercising this latter function to be 
designated The Office for Information on Healthcare Performance. Section 14 
(4). The publication of NHS performance ratings, as proposed in The NHS Plan 
was envisaged to be a key function of the Office for Information on Health 
Care Performance, thus bringing together the two ‘streams’ of influence.
32 Section 14 (5). The first report, a highly glossy affair, was published in May 
2003. See Commission for Health Improvement (2003) Getting Better? A 
Report on the NHS, London, Commission for Health Improvement, 9 May 
2003.; Coombes (2003). "Improvements in the NHS Are Patchy, Report Says." 
BMJ 326: 1052, 17 May 2003..
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the environment in which health services were provided, thus enabling the 
Commission to deal directly with those aspects of NHS performance.
Closely related to the theme of assessing performance against 
standards, was the insistence, particularly in the Kennedy Report, that 
standards should apply uniformly regardless of where NHS Patients were 
treated, including in the private and voluntary sectors: “It is plainly not 
acceptable for a patient to receive care paid for by the NHS in a private 
sector hospital if the standards of care are below those which apply to NHS 
hospitals.”34 Consequently, the Health Act 1999 was re-worded to provide 
for this. For example, the new function of carrying out inspections extended 
not only to “NHS bodies and service providers” but also to “persons who 
provide or are to provide health care for which NHS bodies or services 
providers have responsibility.”
A third theme, on which The NHS Plan and the Kennedy Report 
took somewhat different approaches, related to compliance strategy. 
Learning from Bristol proposed a shift of philosophy, from an approach 
based on ‘inspection’ to one of ‘validation’, that is, from discrete and 
infrequent episodes of oversight with “punitive overtones”, towards a 
“constructive and continuous process... to help in the improvement of the 
quality of health care.” If anything, the 2002 Act represented a shift in the 
opposite direction. Section 13 (1) conferred on CHI the function of carrying 
out “inspections” which had not been part of the Health Act 1999. The
33 National Health Service Reform and Health Care Professions Act 2002, 
Section 11; see Secretary of State for Health (2000) The NHS Plan: A Plan for 
Investment, a Plan for Reform, Cm 4818-1, London, The Stationery Office, 
para. 3.15.
4 Learning from BristoJ Chapter 27, para. 41.
35 National Health Service Reform and Health Care Professions Act, Section 13 
(1).
36 Learning from Bristol, Chapter 27, para. 34.
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legislation also reflected the Department of Health’s rather than Kennedy’s 
views on the consequences of non-compliance. The Kennedy Report had 
proposed that CHI should have the power to place an NHS organisation on 
‘validation watch’ and in more serious cases of non-compliance, to 
withhold, suspend or even withdraw validation.
The Department of Health rejected this proposal on the grounds of 
the potentially “ ....detrimental impact on the delivery of services to sectors 
of the population...” that could arise if CHI were effectively able to shut 
down a Trust, citing also the Secretary of State’s statutory duty for the 
provision of health services. Instead, the Act gave CHI an advisory role in 
relation to the powers of intervention by the Secretary of State that had been 
outlined in The NHS Plan?9 The Health And Social Care Act 2001, Section 
13 had given the Secretary of State the power to issue ‘intervention orders’ 
to Health Authorities and Special Health Authorities, NHS Trusts and PCTs 
which were failing adequately to perform any of their functions, or where 
there were significant failings in the way the body was being run.40 Under 
Section 13 (1) (b) of that Act, the Commission was required to report to the 
Secretary of State where it had formed the view that care was “of 
unacceptably poor quality” or where there were “serious failings” in the 
running of services, and was empowered to recommend to the Secretary of 
State that he take “...special measures in relation to the body or service 
provider.” No definition of ‘special measures’ was given (nor was any
37 Learning from Bristol, Chapter 27, para. 37.
38 Secretary of State for Health (2002) Learning from Bristol: The Department 
o f Health's Response to the Report o f the Public Inquiry into Children's Heart 
Surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984-1995, Cm 5363, London, The 
Stationery Office, para. 4.21.
39 Secretary of State for Health (1997) The New NHS: Modern, Dependable,
Cm 3807, London, The Stationery Office., paras. 6.39-6.45.
40 Under an intervention order, the Secretary of State could require the 
suspension or replacement of some or all of the board members of an NHS 
body, and to give directions to the body to which the order related.
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explicit mention made the ‘intervention orders’ of Section 13 of 2001 Act). 
The power to recommend special measures did not extend to services 
provided in the private or voluntary sectors.
The reaction to the reforms of the Commissions functions and 
powers was largely positive. The BMA had expressed its support for the 
objective of CHI’s increased independence from the Department of 
Health.41 Likewise, Liberal Democrat Health Spokesman, Dr Evan Harris 
praised this change, but noted that the Government’s commitment to 
enhancing the Commission’s independence did not extend to abolishing the 
Secretary of State’s power under Section 20 (2) and 20 (3) to make 
regulations and give directions relating to the way in which CHI undertook 
its work.42 The broadening of CHI’s oversight received broad support. A 
major concern remained the multitude of inspecting bodies, and the lack of 
co-ordination between them. The BMA likened the resultant disruption to 
the ‘hole in the road’ scenario, in which different utility providers 
repeatedly dug up the same patch of tarmac, and called on the Government 
to initiate a review of the various inspection and monitoring procedures 
aimed at reducing what it saw as the existing level of overlap, duplication 
and disruption 43
7.2.4 Health and Social Care (Community Health and 
Standards) Act 2003
These changes had yet to take effect when the Government announced a 
further set of reforms. On 17 January 2002, the Secretary of State for
41 BMA (2001) Commission for Health Improvement: Review o f the various 
inspection mechanisms, December 2001..
42 H. C. Session 2001-02, Standing Committee Debates, NHS Reform and 
Health Care Professions Act, Column 202, Tuesday 4 December 2001.
43 BMA (2001) Commission for Health Improvement: Review o f the various 
inspection mechanisms, December 2001..
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Health, Alan Milbum announced: “Steps will be taken at the earliest 
opportunity to rationalise the number of bodies inspecting and regulating 
health and social care.”44 These were eventually enacted by the Health and 
Social Care (Community Health Standards) Act 2003. Section 44 (1) 
abolished the Commission for Health Improvement, replacing it with a new 
Commission for Health Audit and Inspection (CHAI). A detailed analysis of 
the new legal and administrative arrangements for CHAI introduced by that 
Act is beyond the scope of this thesis, but a brief discussion is warranted 
insofar as this can shed light on the ‘official’ verdict about CHI, analogous 
to economists’ use o f ‘revealed preferences’.
As noted above, the BMA had expressed concern at the multitude of 
organisations inspecting health care. During the passage of the 2002 Act, the 
BMA had called for a merger of CHI with the National Care Standards 
Commission (NCSC) “to achieve uniform, high quality patient care across 
both these [public and private] health sectors, avoiding unnecessary 
duplication.”45 Similarly, the Kennedy Report had highlighting what the 
inquiry saw as “the need for reappraising” the value-for-money role of the 
Audit Commission, now that CHI had been established.46 In Delivering the 
NHS Plan, setting out the Department of Health’s progress to date and 
proposed next steps in implementing The NHS Plan, the government 
accepted the force of these criticisms.47 In place of the existing 
arrangements, the Department of Health proposed a Commission for Health 
Audit and Inspection (CHAI), incorporating the previous work of CHI,
44 Freedom of Information Act request, Department of Health, ref. DE6008103.
45 BMA (2002) NHS Reform and Health Care Professions Bill: Committee 
stage, House o f Lords, March 2002.
46 Learning from Bristol, Chapter 27, para. 50.
47 Secretary of State for Health (2002) Delivering the NHS Plan: Next steps on 
investment, next steps on reform, Cm 5503, London, The Stationery Office, 
April 2002., paras. 10.6-10.8.
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NCSC and the Audit Commission (although the latter was to continue to
perform its work as financial auditor to the NHS). The move from CHI to
CHAI in many ways represented a continuation of the theme of separation
from the Department of Health. As Delivering the NHS Plan put it:
The new Commission will be more independent of Government than 
the Audit Commission, CHI, or the NCSC. Commissioners will be 
appointed by the independent Appointments Commission, rather 
than by Ministers, and in accordance with the Nolan rules. The 
Commissioners, rather than Ministers, will appoint a Chief Inspector 
of Healthcare.48
In other ways, too, the changes represented a development of earlier themes. 
As one might have expected, given that the BMA had advocated this move, 
the reforms received broad support from the profession, although a 
comment in the BMJ expressed concern that the new proposals for CHAI, 
“...mix[ed] up independence and developmental intent with a limited and 
tightly controlled political mandate.”49
7.3 The Effectiveness o f CHI
An assessment of the success of CHI is even more problematic for a number 
of reasons. CHI had a shorter lifespan than either NICE or the Limited List, 
also getting off to what was arguably a slow start. There is therefore less 
evidence on which to base an assessment compared to these other two 
reform initiatives. Second, CHI does not appear to have attracted the same 
degree of official attention compared with NICE, limiting the potential for 
an assessment based on reputational evidence. Third, while it is possible to 
assess the activity of CHI, say in promoting clinical governance, the 
relationship between the implementation of clinical governance
48 Ibid., para. 10.8
49 Dewar and Finlayson (2002). "The I in the new CHAI." BMJ325 (19 
October 2002): 325-6.
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arrangements and the broader goal of improving the quality of care 
experienced by patients remained obscure, including to CHI itself.50
The most prominent official assessment of the effectiveness of CHI
was a VFM study by the National Audit Office into the progress made by
NHS Trusts in implementing clinical governance arrangements.51 The report
found that structural and organisational arrangements for clinical
governance had been put in place in nearly all Trusts, though it suggested
that there was further work to be done in getting beyond the organisational
and structural aspects of clinical governance. Nonetheless, the report found
evidence that clinical governance had contributed to improved
organisational culture, and even to improved patient care. Significantly, of
the various stimuli for change, the report found that CHI clinical governance
reviews were perceived to have had the greatest impact:
...even though most trusts considered that the reviews rarely 
identified wholly new information and that the review process had 
largely confirmed their own perceptions of the areas for 
development or need of change or their own assessment of the 
position.53
In addition to this official assessment, two major academic studies 
into the effectiveness of CHI clinical governance reviews.54 Of these two
50 Bawden and Lugon (2002). "The Role of the Commission for Health 
Improvement." Clinical Risk 8: 148-152; Degeling, Maxwell, Coyle and 
Macbeth (2003). "The Impact of CHI: Evidence from Wales." Quality in 
Primary Care 11: 147-154.
51 National Audit Office (2003) Achieving Improvements Through Clinical 
Governance: A Progress Report on Implementation by NHS Trusts, HC 1055, 
Session 2002-2003, London, The Stationery Office, 17 September 2003.
52 Ibid. paras. 4.3,4.8.
53 Ibid. para. 2.19.
54 Benson, Boyd and Walshe (2004). Learning from CHI: The Impact o f 
Healthcare Regulation. Manchester, The Manchester Centre for Healthcare 
Management; Day and Klein (2004). The NHS Improvers: A Study o f the 
Commission for Health Improvement. London, King's Fund.
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studies, that of Day and Klein is the more critical, as a result of which it 
attracted some attention.55 But although they criticise the CHI’s review 
methods for sacrificing reliability for greater validity, in terms of the effects 
of CHI’s clinical governance review, Day and Klein do not take a position. 
Having reviewed their data, drawn primarily from detailed interviews, they 
remain “agnostic”, commenting that: “As researchers, we can only 
sympathise with CHI’s problem in obtaining ‘evidence’ about its 
effectiveness...”56 Moreover, they acknowledge the achievements of the 
Commission in establishing itself in such a short period, and in completing 
their goal of inspecting every acute Trust within four years.
Benson et al. present a more positive impression, concluding that 
“...CHI’s clinical governance reviews have had a significant effect on NHS 
trusts and their performance...”57 Arguably, the difference between these 
two accounts lies less in the nature of the evidence they collected, but in 
their differing methodological assumptions with respect to the way they 
attribute causation. Day and Klein are reluctant to attribute to CHI all of the 
credit for changes recommended by the Commission: not all of these may in 
fact have been implemented; furthermore, because (as they found) in many 
cases NHS Trusts were already aware of areas identified by CHI as 
requiring action they did not attribute to the Commission credit for 
subsequent improvements. Benson et ah, for their part, were willing to give 
the Commission credit for the whole range of direct and indirect effects of 
inspection. While direct effects included only changes in inspectees’
55 Singh (2004). "CHI's Methods for Inspecting Trusts Are Flawed Says King's 
Fund." BM J328: 542-3, 6 March 2004.
56 Day and Klein (2004). The NHS Improvers: A Study o f the Commission for  
Health Improvement. London, King’s Fund, p. 35.
57 Benson, Boyd and Walshe (2004). Learning from CHI: The Impact o f 
Health Care Regulation. Manchester, The Manchester Centre for Healthcare 
Management, p. 40.
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behaviour that are directly initiated or recommended by the regulator, other
effects of regulation range from the effects of a regulatory agency’s mere
existence, including voluntary compliance with its standards of ‘good
practice’, improvements brought about in preparation for an inspection as
well as the changes that follow from a regulatory intervention that are not
directly recommended or explicitly sought. Benson et al. are well disposed
to the possibility that these indirect effects are likely to be far more
significant overall.58 Commenting on the observation that clinical
governance reviews tended to “...confirm local understanding and
knowledge of problems and need for action...”, they remark:
Of course, the fact that an issue had been raised in an NHS trust in 
the past, perhaps on many occasions, is no reason to conclude that 
action would have followed without CHI’s intervention. Indeed, the 
converse could be argued: that longstanding problems that had been 
raised but not solved locally were eventually addressed (perhaps 
successfully) through CHI’s external review.59
Seen in this light, an evaluation of CHI’s effectiveness ought to take account
of such ‘catalytic’ effects. That these two studies, by Day and Klein and by
Benson et a l , could have reached substantially different conclusions, based
less on access to different information but on methodological differences in
attributing improvements to regulations only serves to underscore the
difficulties in making confident evaluative assertions about the effectiveness
of CHI in relation to this aspects of its work.
There was a general neglect of CHI in the professional journals. To 
provide a comparative illustration, an Ovid Medline search for 
“Commission for Health Improvement” at the end of 2004 yielded 14 
results, compared with 152 for “National Institute for Clinical Excellence. 
One of the few opinion pieces to have offered judgement was contained in
58 Ibid., p. 5.
59 Ibid., p. 36.
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The Lancet of October 6 2001. Noting the high ideals of the Commission, it
suggested the reality was less impressive:
Results from CHI’s first 18 months suggest that it might not be up to 
its task, nor is its role clear. At present it is a routine inspection 
agency, a special investigations force, a jury that assesses the 
evidence and pronounces the verdict, and the judge who can order
sanctions against hospitals that it perceived to have failed in some
60way.
7.4 Governance, Commitment and CHI
This section applies the framework set out in Section 4.5 in order to assess the 
credibility engendered by CHI’s governance structure. Section 7.4.1 assesses 
the substantive written restraints on the discretion of CHI. Section 7.4.2 looks 
at restraints based on structure and process. Constraints on changing the 
regulatory system are considered in section 7.4.3, while Section 7.4.4 discusses 
enforcement of these lower-level commitment by judicial, legislative and 
executive institutions.
7.4.1 Substantive Written Restraints
Compared with the other regimes examined in this thesis, careful efforts 
were made to insert substantive restraints on the discretion of CHI. The four 
principal functions initially performed by the Commissions—clinical 
governance reviews, investigations, national service reviews and advice and 
guidance, were all explicitly set out in statutory rules, with further details set 
out in regulations. Significantly, CHI did not initially have the authority to 
inspect services provided by PCTs and NHS Trusts; rather, their remit was 
in respect of “...arrangements...for the purpose of monitoring and improving
60 Anonymous (2001). "How (Not) to Improve a Health Service." The Lancet 
358: 1111,6 October 2001.
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the quality of care...”61 According to one interviewee, this was part of a 
conscious strategy by officials to avoid CHI becoming “...the NHS version 
of OFSTED... We thought we had very cleverly, in the way in which the 
legislation was framed moved ministers away from this...” (124). This was 
altered by the NHS Reform Act, which conferred the additional function of 
carrying out inspections. Due to the abolition of CHI, it was not possible to 
see how these changes played out.
7.4.2 Restraints Based on Structure and Process
A number of structure and process-based restrains were evident in the 
regulatory governance of CHI. The Commission was established, as 
discussed in Section 7.2.2, as an independent statutory authority accountable 
to the Secretary of State. A first set of issues relates to the agenda-setting 
and veto power of the Department of Health. A second set of issues, include 
such issues as inter-agency competition, agency expertise, and the 
‘enfranchisement’ of different interest groups in decision-making.
Legislative provisions gave the Secretary of State substantial 
agenda-setting power. Under Regulation 3 the Commission for Health 
Improvement (Functions) Regulations 2000, the Commission was required 
to prepare an annual work programme, relating initially to advising on 
clinical governance arrangements, clinical governance reviews, and national 
service reviews.62 Regulation 3 required the Secretary of State not only to 
approve the Commission’s annual work programme, but also to vary the 
plan, and to veto variations proposed by CHI. This power was singled out 
in the Kennedy report as an example of the existing limitations upon the
61 Health Act 1999, Section 20 (1) (b).
62 S. I. No. 662 of 2000, Regulation 3 (2).
63 S. I. No. 662 of 2000, Regulation 3 (2) and (3).
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credibility of healthcare regulators: “ ...CHI’s independence cannot be 
manifested or enjoyed as long as it is the Department rather than CHI itself 
which sets the targets for the number of trusts which must be inspected each 
year.”64 Day and Klein similarly interpret the exercise of this authority as an 
attempts by the Department of Health to use this provision to “performance- 
manage” the Commission.65
Perhaps the most controversial power of the Secretary of State, at
least as judged from Parliamentary debates, related to the power of the
Secretary of State to order CHI investigations. Mr. David Amess expressed
concern that this power might be used as a means by which the Government
might be used as a blame-shifting strategy:
The calling in of Chimp... should not simply be an arbitrary decision 
for the Secretary of State to take in response to political or media 
pressures... It should be clearly set out in regulations when it will be 
necessary for the Chimp to intervene.”66
Despite these concerns, the Regulation 11 o f the 2000 Regulations (which
were never debated by the Standing Committee on Delegated Legislation)
sets out CHI’s role vis-a-vis investigations in the most general terms. The
Commission was required to undertake an investigation when requested to
fndo so by the Secretary of State. Additionally, it was empowered to carry 
out an investigation when empowered to do so by any person or body, or
r o
where it otherwise appeared to the Commission to be appropriate.
64 Learning from Bristol, Chapter 27, para. 42.
65 Day and Klein (2004). The NHS Improvers: A Study o f the Commission for 
Health Improvement. London, King’s Fund., p. 11.
66 H. C. Standing Committee A, Thursday 13 May 1999 (afternoon) Health Bill 
[Lords] (Mr David Amess.)
67 S. I. No. 662 of 2000, Regulation 11(1).
68 S. I. No. 662 o f2000, Regulation 11 (2).
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It is worth emphasising that this broad power of the Secretary of 
State to order an investigation also included the decision not to require a 
decision. In other words, the ability of the Secretary of State to ‘bypass’ 
CHI constituted a potential limitation on the ability of CHI to act as an 
‘intermediary organisation’. For example, when photographs of deceased 
persons stored in the chapel of Bedford Hospital NHS Trust (which had 
been used as a makeshift, un-refrigerated mortuary) appeared in the press,69 
the Secretary of State ordered an investigation not by CHI but by the NHS
7fiRegional Office. It was suggested (123) that the resignation of the Trust 
Chief Executive had been driven by the media, and that had the Secretary 
State ordered a CHI investigation, it may have acted more as an ‘insulator’ 
than as a ‘political lightning rod’. To this extent, inter-agency competition, 
such that it existed, differed fundamentally from the case of NICE. The 
choice of agency, in this case, was made by the Secretary of State, rather 
than by the organisation under investigation.
In terms of agency expertise, Commissioners came from a variety of 
backgrounds, including academic and practicing medicine, and voluntary 
sector work. The Director of Health Improvement, Dr Peter Homa, on the 
other hand, had previously been the NHS waiting list ‘czar’ (his ‘Dr’ was a 
PhD in management, not a medical qualification). Review teams themselves 
were dominated by the clinical professions, and included an NHS doctor, 
nurse and allied professional, as well as an NHS manager and a lay member. 
Review team members remained in their existing positions (usually in the 
NHS), and were seconded to up to two clinical governance reviews per year. 
Similarly, investigation teams, comprised of an investigation manager (a
69 See The Sunday Telegraph, 14 January, 2001.
70 For the outcome of the investigation, see NHS Executive Eastern Regional 
Office (2001) Investigation into Mortuary Arrangements at Bedford Hospital 
NHS Trust, NHS Executive, 31 January 2001.
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full-time employee of CHI), a lay member and a number of members chosen 
according to the requirements of each investigation, but who were usually 
NHS employees. Following the arguments of Macey,71 outlined in Section 
4.5.3, the NHS domination of review and investigations might be regarded 
as an important factor in providing credibility.
In the case of NICE, discussed in the previous chapter, it was argued 
(drawing on the work of Moshe Maor), that reliance on the ‘gold standard’ 
of evidence-based medicine was an important factor in the credibility of the 
Institute. By contrast with NICE (and also, incidentally, with CHI’s Scottish 
counterpart, the Clinical Standards Board for Scotland. CHI did not follow a 
strategy of reviewing NHS organisations against an explicit set of standards. 
Thus while the Commission may have asserted that it has been “evidence 
based”, this claim may not have had the force that NICE could assert, with 
studies questioning the consistency of CHI reviews.
To summarise this part of the section, CHI enjoyed considerable 
independence. At the same time, the Secretary of State still enjoyed some 
influence, in terms of power over CHI’s work programme, and in terms of 
the power (not enjoyed solely by the Secretary of State) to initiate a CHI 
investigation. The expertise of the Commission was primarily drawn from 
the constituency of the NHS and other medical interests, but unlike NICE, 
decision-making was not hardwired to the ‘gold standard’ of EBM.
71 Macey (1992). "Organizational design and Political Control of 
Administrative Agencies." Journal o f Law, Economics and Organization 8 (1): 
93-110.
72 Hine, Homa and Patterson (2001). "Quality of Patients' Care in the UK 
National Health Service." The Lancet 358: 1454-5,27 October 2001..
73 Day and Klein, op. cit.
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7.4.3 Constraints on System Changes
In contrast with the other two reform initiatives examined in this thesis,
NICE and the Limited List, the initial legal basis for CHI was set out in
primary legislation, The Health Act 1999. At the same time, under Section
20 (1) (e) and under Section 20 (2) and 20 (3), the Secretary of State was
given the authority to prescribe further functions of the Commission and to
govern the details of the manner in which CHI exercised its functions.
Given the divergent expectations of Ministers on the one hand, and civil
servants and the Commission on the other, noted above, it might have been
expected that these powers would have been used to confer greater
discretionary power on CHI. This was the concern of Conservative MP for
Southend West, Mr David Amess, who drew attention to the potential
loophole, arguing that:
... Chimp’s powers are not clearly set out in the bill... Chimp’s 
potential powers are currently set out in regulations, with the 
Secretary of State given wide-ranging powers to extend the scope 
and range of Chimp’s activities... 4
Against this, it has to be noted that such extensions of the Commission’s
functions that did occur under regulations were arguably used to make the
Commission more credible. As discussed in Section 7.2.1, some suspected
that the decision to exclude reviewing commissioning bodies from CHI’s
functions under the Health Act 1999 reflected a strategy to divorce
responsibility for the quality of care from funding decisions. The
Commission for Health Improvement (Functions) Regulations 2000
resolved this state of affairs. The Regulations extended the existing powers
of CHI to review and to provide guidance to PCTs on the implementation of
arrangements for clinical governance to cover not just “health care for
which they have responsibility” but also over “health care provided by their
74 H.C. Session 1998-1999, Health Bill [Lords] in Standing Committee A, 13 
May 1999.
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relevant service providers”.75 CHI’s responsibility to provide information 
and advice was extended over Health authorities and Special Health 
Authorities and their service providers. Clinical governance reviews were 
introduced over Health Authorities and certain Special Health Authorities
77(to which the Section 18 duty of quality had been applied). CHI was
70
empowered to investigate Special Health Authorities, while the 
Commission was given an advisory role with respect to the establishment of
70health service inquires. The 2003 regulations, which replaced the 2000 
regulations made provision for the replacement of Health Authorities with
O A
the new Strategic Health Authorities. On the whole, then, the evidence 
does not suggest that the Secretary of State used his powers to circumvent 
the restraints of primary legislation. Contra any blame-shifting 
interpretation, it could be argued that this measure served to remedy a 
credibility problem, namely the suspicion that CHI was intended to shift 
blame away from funding decisions. It is noted, however, that by addressing 
this anomaly by delegated legislation, the Act gave the Secretary of State 
the power to reinstate it, if ‘necessary’.
Turning attention to informal constraints on system change, the 
establishment, reform and abolition were set out in White Papers signalling
01
m advance these policy changes. The original proposal for CHI was set out 
in The New NHS White Paper and explained in detail in A First Class
75 S. I. No. 662 of 2000, Regulation 2 (b) and (d).
76 Ibid., Regulation 2 (a)
77 Ibid., Regulation 2 (c); Those Special Health Authorities included the 
National Blood Authority, the Ashworth Hospital Authority, the Broadmoor 
Hospital Authority and the Rampton Hospital Authoirity. See The Special 
Health Authorities (Duty of Quality) Regulations 2000, S. I. No 660 of 2000.
78 S. I. No. 662 of 2000, Regulation 2 (e)
79 Ibid., Regulation 2 (e).
80 S. I. No. 1587 of 2003, Regulation
81 On the role of White Papers in restraining arbitrary policy change, see 
Section 4.5.4
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Service. The decision to extend the Commission’s remit was put forward in 
The NHS Plan, and the decision to amalgamate CHI, NCSC and the health- 
related VFM functions of the Audit Commission were publicised in the 
White Paper, Delivering on the NHS Plan. Furthermore, the original 
proposal, together with the subsequent changes, enjoyed the broad support 
of the BMA, and to an extent later changes, especially the amalgamation of 
the established inspectorates into CHAI responded to concerns from the 
medical profession at the excessive burden of inspection. The main 
organised representatives of the medical profession, and other allied 
professions subscribed to The NHS Plan, which was presented as a new 
settlement between the professions and government. Overall, therefore, the 
informal institution of publicising policy changes in advance was effective 
in this case.
7.4.4 Enforcement of Lower-Level Commitment 
Mechanisms
Turning to the constitutional level of analysis, it can be argued that CHI 
made use of legislative and executive enforcement mechanisms, with the 
potential use of judicial mechanisms following the NHS Reform Act.
Taking first legislative institutions, it was argued in Section 4.5.5, 
contra Levy and Spiller that legislative institutions can play a useful role in 
enforcing restraints on system changes. In contrast to the other regulatory 
reform initiatives examined in this thesis, CHI was established under 
primary legislation. Relatively speaking therefore, regulatory system change 
was more difficult than was the case with respect to NICE or the Limited
82 Secretary of State for Health (2000) The NHS Plan: A Plan for Investment, a 
Plan for Reform, Cm 4818-1, London, The Stationery Office. Foreword by the 
Prime Minister.
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List. This argument is not defeated by the fact that Parliament was twice 
able to alter the provisions relating^ to the CHI, extending its functions in 
2002, and abolishing the Commission in 2003. These changes had broad 
cross-party support, as well as the support of the organised interests of the 
medical and allied professions, and of private providers of health care.
In terms of executive institutions, the provisions of the Health Act 
1999 made some significant use of the Commissions arm’s length 
independence, although, as Day and Klein point out, there existed “ ...a 
certain ambiguity about just how independent it would be in practice...” In 
terms of institutional arrangements, this ambiguity was expressed in a 
number of ways.
First, the Secretary of State initially enjoyed substantial discretionary 
power over the appointment of Commissioners, and over the terms of their 
appointment. This was seen to have diminished, at least symbolically, the 
independence of CHI (124). Similarly, the decision of the Commission to 
appoint the Director of Health Improvement, CHI’s chief executive officer, was 
subject to the approval of the Secretary of State. Although the NHS Reform Act 
made provision to transfer this power to the NHS Appointments Commission, 
this did not have any practical effect on CHI until its demise in 2004.
The role of the judiciary was never tested, though some limited 
speculation may be ventured, based on an analysis of the legislative 
provisions. As noted above, notwithstanding the Secretary of State’s powers 
to lay regulations and to give directions to CHI, Section 20 (1) of the Health 
Act 1999 did place important statutory limits on the Commission. The 
legality and rationality, and procedural propriety of acts of the Commission 
itself, or the exercise of those delegated functions by the Secretary of State,
83 {Day, 2004 #96@p. 7}
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were clearly matters falling within the competence of the courts. At the 
same time, it is difficult to see who might have had both the standing as well 
as the motivation to bring such an action—certainly not NHS organisations, 
although following the 2002 Act, private providers treating NHS patients 
may have had the motive and interest, in the event of a negative inspection. 
In contrast with the previous two case studies, ACD and NICE, 
pharmaceutical companies had at best an indirect interest in the work of the 
Commission.
7.5 Conclusions
In conclusion, applying Chapter 4 framework to CHI adds to existing
understandings of regulatory governance in the NHS. First, it suggests that
the commitment issue was central to the establishment of inspection in the
NHS, though in a different way to the other episodes of regulatory reform
discussed in the previous two chapters. The Commission was bom out of a
tension between officials who emphasised the developmental role of CHI,
and ministers who saw it as the “NHS version of OFSTED” (124, discussed
in Section 7.4.1). According to Day and Klein, this tension continued even
after the establishment of the Commission:
Ministers see the commission as a quality police—identifying and 
reporting laggards—whereas the commission sees itself as a 
developmental agency, promoting “the ethos and practice of 
continuous improvement” rather than apportioning blame.84
Despite this tension, the government was able to attract the continued
support of organised medical interests for the reform and then replacement
of the Commission. Second, officials appear to have paid close attention to
the institutional arrangements, in an attempt to ‘hardwire’ the more
developmental role. Judged in terms of the framework of Section 4.5, the
84 Day and Klein (2001). ’’Commission for Health Improvement Invents Itself.’’ 
BM J322: 1502-3,23 June 2001..
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governance structure of CHI appeared overall to be relatively credible, 
based on a combination of substantive rules and structural and procedural 
arrangements at the level of operational rules, and with a requirement of 
explicit Parliamentary approval constraining changes to the regulatory 
regime.
This chapter does not claim that the evidence presented in this 
chapter provides direct support for the hypothesis advanced in Chapter 4, 
which related the effectiveness of regulation in the NHS to the governance 
structure of regulation, but nor does it refute that theory. Furthermore, using 
the framework as a mapping device, it sheds light in an area that is not well 
understood in existing law and political science research.
Chapter 8 
Conclusions
8.1 Overall Conclusions and Observations
The preceding chapters have sought to set out a framework for the analysis 
of health care regulation, and to use this framework to help to understand 
regulatory change in the NHS at the general level as well as to analyse and 
explain a number of specific episodes of regulatory reform. This concluding 
chapter attempts to draw together the various strands of this thesis, and to 
set the findings in context.
A first task of this concluding chapter, undertaken in Section 8.2, is 
to assess how far the evidence presented, taken as a whole, supports the 
theoretical claims. A second task of this concluding chapter is to evaluate 
the overall contribution of this thesis. As discussed in Section 1.2.2, King 
Keohane and Verba suggest two criteria for choosing a research topic: 
contribution to scholarly literature and importance to the real world. These 
criteria can be used to provide benchmarks against which the present 
contribution can be assessed. Section 8.3 considers the contribution of this 
thesis in terms of three distinct literatures: the literature on the regulatory 
state; the literature on health policy and regulation; and finally, the literature 
on the law and economics of regulatory design. Section 8.4 considers the 
implications for policy of the findings of this thesis, especially as it relates
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to the design of regulatory institutions. Section 8.5 addresses some of the 
limitations of the present research, while Section 8.6 offers some concluding 
thoughts relating including a brief indication of how future research can 
build on this contribution.
8.2 Findings
At the outset, this thesis identified two key hypotheses concerning 
regulation in the NHS. First, it was argued that the institutional development 
of the NHS over the past twenty years shows a transformation similar to that 
asserted by Majone and others more generally in Western European 
countries and in the EU, of a shift towards the regulatory state. Furthermore, 
it was hypothesised that the explanation put forward more generally for this 
shift could also explain comparable developments in the provision of health 
care in the UK. Second, it was argued that the effectiveness of regulation in 
the NHS depended (among other factors) on the capacity of the legal and 
administrative framework of regulation to engender credible commitment to 
the implicit concordat, understood as a set of ‘rules of the game’ governing 
relations between the medical profession and the Department of Health. 
This section first considers the extent to which the evidence supports each 
of these propositions.
8.2.1 The Regulatory State
As discussed in Section 3.2, it is useful to separate the descriptive and 
explanatory claims made associated with the regulatory state. The evidence 
presented in this thesis provides strong support for the descriptive claim that 
overall patterns of change in the provision of health care fits the claim that 
there has been a rise of the regulatory state inside the NHS. All three of the 
trends identified by Loughlin and Scott as associated with the regulatory
2 2 9
state—separation of policy-making from service delivery, the creation of 
semi-independent agencies and increased formality—were evident in the 
evolution of the governance of the NHS between 1985 and 2004. Much of 
the overall institutional change in the NHS over the last twenty years is 
captured by this descriptive claim, despite the fact that Loughlin and Scott’s 
formulation is arguably more specific than other attempts to capture what is 
entailed by the regulatory state. Although Section 3.3 pointed to some 
isolated examples of retrenchment of the regulatory state inside the NHS, 
Chapter 3 did not identify any significant counter-trends to this overall 
pattern. This is all the more remarkable because one of the reasons for 
choosing Loughlin and Scott’s formulation is that it is precise, and therefore 
helps to avoid the pitfall of identifying the regulatory state with overly- 
broad phenomena.
In terms of the explanatory claims of the regulatory state hypothesis, 
it was argued in Section 3.4.2, that the case of the NHS is consistent with 
Majone’s argument that the rise of the regulatory state has been a functional 
response to a perceived ‘mismatch’ between positive state institutions and 
contemporary policy challenges. In particular, Majone has stressed a 
renewed emphasis on efficiency as a primary policy goal as well as an 
increasing awareness of the importance of credibility to the success of 
public policies. Once the implicit concordat is taken into account in the 
analysis, Moran’s objection that in Britain the regulatory state is associated 
with expanded reach as much as with the diminished scope, and with 
continued politicisation, is not fatal to the regulatory state hypothesis. 
Intervention through regulatory-state type institutions can be understood to 
have been less disruptive to the existing organisation of the NHS, compared 
with alternative institutional arrangements for intervention. The penetration 
of the clinical realm by state institutions was, on this view, dependent on the
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increased level of credibility provided by regulatory state-type governance 
arrangements.
The detailed analyses presented in Chapters 5-7 provide some 
additional support for this view. The first episode of regulatory reform 
discussed in this thesis, the Limited List scheme, was opposed much more 
vociferously by the profession compared NICE and CHI. These latter 
reforms in fact commanded the cautious support of the BMA. Various 
suggestions have been put forward to explain why, in response to the 
Labour Government’s New NHS White Paper, “ ...the dog did not bark—let 
alone bite.”1 These included overall satisfaction on the part of the profession 
that the Working for Patients reforms had been disavowed; that the 
profession’s aspirations had changed; and that they simply did not grasp the 
implications of the Government’s reforms. The explanation suggested by 
this thesis is that these later reforms, while going much further than the 
Limited List in terms of the extent of their reach into clinical practice, at the 
same time benefited from a legal and administrative framework that 
provided greater crediblity. This explanation is at least as convincing as the 
alternatives suggested by Klein, and could be said to complement them. 
Furthermore, following the views put forward by Scharpf and Hayek, 
discussed in Section 1.2.3, it can be argued that this explanation is 
preferable as it proceeds directly from well-established hypotheses with 
some overall support within the health care sector and beyond. How far this 
explanation is empirically sustainable is taken up in the following section.
1 Klein (2001). The New Politics o f the NHS. 4th Edition, Harlow, Prentice 
Hall, p. 206.
231
8.2.2 Credible Commitment and Regulatory Design
Chapter 4 set out in detail a hypothesis relating the effectiveness of 
regulatory reform initiatives to the legal and administrative framework of 
regulation. Drawing on the work of Levy and Spiller, it was suggested that 
reforms are unlikely to achieve their publicly pronounced policy objectives 
unless the legal and regulatory framework for regulation embodied, at three 
levels, certain complementary mechanisms to secure credible commitment 
to the implicit concordat.
To what extent do the three episodes discussed in Chapters 5-7 bear 
out this prediction? Comparing the Limited List with NICE seems to show 
relative outcomes consistent with the theory developed in Chapter 4. The 
Limited List represented a reform initiative which, evaluated against the 
three-level analysis put forward in Section 4.5, did not benefit from a 
credible governance structure. Consistent with the theory, the scheme was 
generally regarded as not being particularly effective in achieving its 
intended objectives. Furthermore, the narrative of Chapter 5 suggested that 
the processes by which poor regulatory design translated into poor 
performance conformed to the expectations of the theory. The sustained 
initial opposition of the profession was seen to have contributed to the initial 
downwards revision of expected financial savings. This is significant 
because compliance with the requirements of the Limited List scheme was 
almost ‘automatic’, and so, unlike the other two episodes examined in 
Chapters 6 and 7, ex ante opposition was the main means by which the 
profession could subvert the scheme. Furthermore, there was ample 
evidence of slippage over the years, including the extension of categories in 
1992, the black-listing of nicotine replacement therapy and the grey-listing 
of Viagra in 1999. Applying Blunstein and Marmor’s taxonomy, this was
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shown to represent an expansion from its initial purpose of eliminating 
ineffective and harmful treatment.
By contrast, on the basis of the framework set out in Chapter 4, the 
legal and administrative framework of NICE provided relatively more 
credibility, notwithstanding a number of institutional shortcomings. NICE 
embodied a number of (mainly structural and procedural) restraints, 
including a commitment to transparent evidence-based evaluation. 
Nonetheless, procedures for topic selection, as well as the fact that 
dissemination of NICE guidance to the NHS required the authority of the 
Secretary of State, limited the extent to which NICE’S independence from 
the Department of Health provided an institutional basis for credible 
commitment. Significantly, unlike CHI, NICE’S status and independence 
was not enshrined in primary legislation, although successive legislative 
measures were scrutinised by the Standing Committee on Delegated 
Legislation, suggesting that enforcement of the constraints on arbitrary 
policy changes introduced by ministerial order were taken seriously, to the 
extent that this was possible.
Against this, there was some evidence of coalitional drift from 
NICE’S original remit. The added responsibility for “the effective use of 
available resources” was arguably broader than the changes minimally 
required to correct drafting anomalies, while the Secretary of State’s 
Directions to NHS organisations of December 2001 fundamentally changed 
the force of NICE guidance, imposing an obligation on Health Authorities 
to fund NICE-approved treatment. Criticism of the Institute, for example by 
the House of Commons Health Committee and by the Report of the 
Kennedy Inquiry, focussed on the credibility issue, thereby suggesting that 
there was a general awareness of the problem of bureaucratic and coalitional 
drift, and its potential impact on the effectiveness of policy. Furthermore,
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there appeared to be a degree of willingness on the part of the government 
to address the problems identified by these bodies.
It is worth noting that, compared with the Limited List, NICE was 
intended to be more far-reaching, from the outset avowedly covering (again, 
in Blunstein and Marmor’s terminology) treatment of uncertain 
effectiveness as well as treatment that was not cost-effective. Moreover, 
unlike the Limited List, NICE was not restricted, at the operational level, to 
prescribed therapeutic categories. Potentially, therefore, this episode 
represented a greater threat to the implicit concordat, consequently placing 
greater demands on institutional restraints. In spite, of this, NICE 
commanded the cautious support of the BMA and (initially at least) the 
editorial pages of the BMJ. The study of NICE in Chapter 6, especially 
when contrasted with the examination Limited List, can therefore said to 
support the regulatory commitment hypothesis, demonstrating both 
strengths and flaws in terms of its legal and administrative framework, as 
well as achievements and shortcomings in terms of its effectiveness. There 
was some evidence of slippage, but also of conditional support from the 
profession.
The study of CHI in Chapter 7 shows how the analytical framework 
developed in Chapter 4 can contribute insights into the process of regulatory 
reform in the NHS beyond issues of waste-cutting and rationing that were, 
in different ways, the focus of Chapters 5 and 6. The introduction of 
inspection by the CHI, it was argued, raised similar issues of commitment to 
the implicit concordat. As Chapter 7 demonstrated, the BMA were prepared 
to support the establishment of CHI provided that it adopted a supportive, 
rather than a critical approach. Assessments of the Commission suggested 
that the Department of Health was frustrated at CHI’s emphasis on its 
supportive role. The issue of (the avoidance) of coalitional drift was thus
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central. Furthermore, prior to the introduction of the Commission, there was 
general concern that it would function as an instrument for shifting the 
blame for poor performance away from funding decisions of government 
and onto the quality of care provided by NHS organisations, or that the 
commission would become a ‘loose cannon’, pursuing a high profile media 
agenda to the detriment of its overall mission. Although some criticisms of 
CHI were offered, including by the Kennedy Inquiry, there was no 
suggestion that these fears had significantly materialised.
Second, there was some evidence that faced with these challenges, 
officials consciously attempted to contend with these commitment issues, 
and to restrain impulses to make the Commission into the NHS version of 
OFSTED. The powers of the Commission were enshrined in primary 
legislation, although the Secretary of State enjoyed delegated authority to 
extend these powers by statutory instrument. These powers were more 
strictly defined compared with the Limited List and NICE, although the 
Department of Health retained important powers in terms of agenda-setting 
and veto power. In the case of the Commission, these were evident in terms 
of the power of the Secretary of State to require a Commission investigation 
and to sanction poor performance identified in an inspection or 
investigation. Given the fears discussed above, the fact that the BMA 
supported (albeit reservedly) the establishment of the Commission, as well 
as lending its support to successive reforms—including the replacement of 
the Commission by CHAI—aimed at strengthening inspection in the NHS— 
provides some support for the proposition that CHI, and its successor, 
CHAI, were credible institutions.
At the same time, caution should be exercised in interpreting the 
findings of Chapter 7, which also demonstrates some of the difficulties in 
applying the analytical framework developed in Chapter 4. It is possible to
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compare CHI with the other two episodes of regulatory reform only in the 
most general terms. For one thing, as an inspectorate body, the functions of 
the Commission were of a different nature than NICE and the Limited List, 
even if the commitment issues were broadly similar. Furthermore, Chapter 7 
contended with a number of problems in the assessment of the effectiveness 
of CHI: the policy objectives behind CHI were broader and less precise; 
attributing outcomes to the initial reform initiative was difficult; and it was 
not possible, within the short life-span of CHI, to assess with confidence 
whether the observed absence of coalitional drift was due to effective 
restraining mechanisms, or to the fact that they were never seriously tested.
Most importantly, although Chapter 7 arguably adds little in the way 
of hard support for the regulatory commitment hypothesis, it is important to 
note that the evidence from this chapter does not contradict the hypothesis. 
Counterfactually, had the evidence from this chapter suggested that CHI 
was an ineffective institution, or had the profession strongly opposed the 
establishment of the Commission, this may well have given grounds for 
thinking that the theory put forward in Chapter 4 was false, or at any rate 
had limited value as a tool for analysing regulatory reform in the NHS. To 
this limited extent at least, the evidence from this episode supports an 
overall favourable assessment of the regulatory commitment hypothesis.
8.3 Contribution to Scholarly Literatures
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Applying King, Keohane and Verba’s criteria2 as benchmarks for assessing 
the overall contribution of this thesis, a first issue is the contribution that it 
makes to the existing literature. The thesis contributes in different ways to 
three distinct scholarly literatures, namely: (1) the literature on the 
regulatory state; (2) the literature on health policy and regulation; and 
finally (3) the law and economics of regulatory design. Each of these three 
contributions is discussed in turn.
8.3.1 The Regulatory State
Taking first the contribution to the literature on the regulatory state, this 
thesis suggests that, by explicitly incorporating an exchange perspective, the 
regulatory state literature can generate additional analytical power. As 
discussed in Section 2.3.1, one prominent explanation explains the rise of 
the regulatory state in terms of a perceived mismatch between the 
capabilities o f  positive state institutions and the emerging challenges of 
public policy, especially given the complexity of many policy problems. 
The present analysis has attempted to show that, among the challenges with 
which health policy must contend is the difficulty of reconciling demands 
for more far-reaching intervention with existing understandings of the 
respective duties and entitlements of the government and the medical 
profession. The inability of positive state institutions to solve this problem 
(other than by the ‘solutions’ of simple non-intervention or abrogating the 
concordat) can be seen as a further limitation, to which the emergence 
regulatory state was a response. Such an explanation might potentially hold 
wherever the organisation of public services is based on a PSB or similar 
implicit understandings.
2 See Section 1.2.2, above.
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With this additional refinement, the regulatory state hypothesis can 
potentially explain patterns of regulatory reform beyond its original 
application, which was in the context of privatisation and deregulation in the 
1980s and 1990s. In many areas of public service provision, the changes of 
the last two decades or more can be seen not as a replacement of the positive 
state by the, regulatory state; rather, regulation has supplemented existing 
modes of governance and, with the overall effect being an extension rather 
than a diminution of state control. While this may sacrifice the parsimony of 
Majone’s thesis, this is more than off-set by the additional analytical power 
that comes with introducing a PSB analysis into the approach.
8.3.2 Health Policy and Regulation
As set out in Sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3, there is a lively existing literature 
which analyses UK health policy in terms of an evolving PSB or implicit 
concordat. Insofar as these accounts analyse the expansion of state 
regulatory control over the provision of health services, these accounts have 
tended to diagnose an erosion of the concordat. While the present approach 
does not deny that this may be the case, it also suggests that the fact that 
much intervention has occurred through the particular institutional forms 
associated with the regulatory state, rather than say through direct command 
by the Department of Health, may have been a way of preserving the 
concordat in some shape or form. That later reforms, including the 
introduction of NICE and CHI, commanded the cautious respect of 
organised medical interests supports this conclusion. More generally, the 
findings of this thesis support the view that, far from rendering obsolete 
analyses of the NHS based on the implicit concordat, this general approach 
can contribute to debates about regulation of health services. At the same 
time, this thesis suggests that in order to shed light on the regulation of
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health service, greater sensitivity has to be shown to the problem of 
commitment to the concordat in a changing institutional setting.
A second contribution to this literature follows from the fact that the 
determinants of the effectiveness of health care regulation are not currently 
well understood. While the effects of regulatory governance is only one 
part of the story, and the present, and an exclusively commitment-focussed 
analysis does not even attempt an overall assessment o f that part, the 
findings of this thesis suggest that the credibility of regulatory reforms may 
be one factor involved. Until now, this has been neglected in the literature 
on health policy and health care regulation.
8.3.3 Law and Economics of Regulatory Design
Chapter 4 developed in the context of the regulation o f health care a 
modified version of the framework of analysis originally proposed by Levy 
and Spiller. The main purpose of these authors was to understand the 
capacity of developing countries to develop approaches to regulation under 
which firms are willing to make financial investments in an industry in 
which there is a risk of administrative expropriation of investors’ sunk costs. 
By developing, and applying a modified version of their framework, this 
thesis contributes to existing work in the law and economics of regulatory 
design in two related ways. First, it transposes the framework into the 
context of regulation inside government, and shows that the approach can 
generate additional insights and interesting new hypotheses in this new 
setting. This is as an advance on existing understandings because although 
Levy and Spiller indicate the possibility that expropriation could occur
3 See for example the discussion of Kieran Walshe in Section 1.2.2, supra.
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within the state-owned enterprises,4 they do not develop this insight into a 
theory of regulation of the public sector. Secondly, by focussing on the 
ways in which regulation of health care can undermine the implicit 
concordat, and the way that regulatory design can alleviate (or exacerbate) 
the problem, the present account extends Levy and Spiller’s beyond the 
original problem of the willingness of private investors to make financial 
commitments. The present study shows that a similar framework can shed 
light on how other the governance structure of regulation affects the 
decisions of other kinds of actors to make other kinds of commitments.
This thesis contributes to the literature on the law and economics of 
regulatory design in another, more critical respect. Levy and Spiller’s (and 
their co-authors’) comparative analysis views the institutional endowment 
of the UK through a telescope, as it were, observing the limits of 
administrative law approaches, as well as the strengths of private law rights 
enforced by an independent judiciary. In particular, they emphasise the 
limits of legislation within Britain’s Westminster-style democracy, with its 
executive dominance of the legislature. By contrast, the magnifying glass 
approach of the present analysis calls into question some of these 
assumptions. Firstly, while this thesis broadly confirms their scepticism 
towards administrative law this has to be qualified in a number of respects. 
Firstly, the ineffectiveness of judicial review in enforcing lower-level 
commitment mechanisms, seen especially in Chapter 5, was arguably as 
much a failure of regulatory governance structures to make effective use of 
this potentially useful commitment mechanism. For example, it is plausible 
to argue that had the UK been more creative in drafting the criteria notified 
to the Commission under the Transparency Directive (discussed in Section
4 Levy and Spiller (1994). 'The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory 
Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation." 
Journal o f Law, Economics and Organization 10 (2): 201-246, fn. 10.
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5.2.6) then this could have been a more effective device for restraining 
subsequent coalitional drift, while still leaving sufficient discretion for 
eliminating wasteful treatment. Secondly, this study seems to question Levy 
and Spiller’s dismissive view of the effectiveness of legislation in 
establishing regulatory commitment. If their view was wholly correct, then 
it should not have mattered in the present studies whether operational rules 
governing regulatory discretion were set out in primary or secondary 
legislation or even in Directions from the Secretary of State. The evidence 
of this thesis does not support that view. At the very least, experienced 
legislators thought the form of legislation mattered.
Overall, then, this thesis contributes to the literature on the law and 
economics of regulatory design by extending Levy and Spiller’s analysis to 
regulation within the public sector, and to the non-financial commitments on 
which effective policy depends. At the same time, it offers some refinement 
of their view of the UK constitutional setting.
8.4 Importance to the Real World
A second benchmark against which the contribution a piece of research 
ought to be assessed, is the importance of the research to the real world. The 
point is not that certain recommendations are justified by the findings of this 
thesis but, more modestly, that the findings point in the direction of certain 
implications for policy.
The framework developed in Chapter 4 offers suggestions to 
policymakers interested in introducing reforms in order to improve the 
effectiveness of regulation in the NHS. Moreover, such advice seems likely 
to be durable. On the one hand, only on the most extreme assumptions about 
the future development of health policy could it be thought that the principal
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institutional features of the NHS—that it is overwhelmingly tax funded, 
predominantly free at the point of use, and dominated by the medical 
profession with respect to clinical decisions—will change radically, 
however much they may be eroded at the margin. In short, it may 
reasonably assumed the future development of health policy will have to 
contend with the problem of credible commitment to the concordat. 
Similarly, there are no good reasons to suppose that the rise of the 
regulatory state inside the NHS is likely to be reversed any time soon, 
though again, reform at the margins is perfectly conceivable. Together, 
these two considerations point to the continued importance of credible 
commitment to the concordat, as a precondition for successful regulatory 
reforms in the NHS. The evidence of Chapters 5-7 suggest that credibility 
has only sometimes been a key consideration of policymakers, and that 
where it has been neglected, most obviously in the case of the Limited List, 
outcomes have been disappointing.
As well as pointing the importance of credible commitment, this 
thesis also suggests ways in which the design of regulatory regimes can 
contribute to the credibility of regulatory reforms. In particular, the analysis 
suggested that collective choice rules are often neglected by policymakers 
and advocates, and that greater attention at this level could improve 
outcomes. By way of illustration, Ham and Alberti’s suggestion for a new 
explicit concordat, discussed in Section 2.4.2 may not lead to the outcomes 
they desire, unless additional attention is given to the mechanisms for its 
enforcement. While codification may well be desirable, it may not by itself 
be sufficient.
8.5 Limitations
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In order to reach an assessment of the degree of confidence appropriate to 
these findings, it is essential also to understand the limitations of the 
approach of this thesis. This section focuses on two particular limitations: 
first, the exclusive theoretical focus on the commitment problem; and 
second, the single-country focus of the research.
In terms of the exclusive focus on the commitment problem, this 
contrasts most starkly with the type of analysis undertaken by Murray Horn 
in The Political Economy o f  Public Administration. Horn develops a model 
in which commitment costs are just one of four categories of transaction 
costs faced by legislatures; the others are agency costs, decision costs and 
uncertainty costs.5 On this account, institutional design choices, for example 
the decision to delegate some administrative function, depend on the ‘cost 
profiles’ associated with different policy areas. Even Levy and Spiller 
profess to undertake an examination of the trade-off between flexibility and 
commitment in the design of regulatory regimes, though their practice, and 
that of their collaborators, has been criticised as differing from their own 
description of their approach.6
A study along these lines, especially following Horn’s approach, 
would have developed insights substantially different to those that emerge 
from the present study. For example, given an exclusive focus on the 
commitment problem, it is tempting to see the failure to create more 
credible regimes in the case of NICE, and especially in the case of the
5 Horn (1995). The Political Economy o f Public Administration: Institutional 
Choice in the Public Sector. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. See 
especially Chapter 2, “Basic Theory and Method”.
6 Stirton and Lodge (2003). "Re-Thinking Institutional Endowment in Jamaica: 
Misguided Theory, Prophecy of Doom or Explanation for Regulatory Change?” 
CARR/CRC/ABS Workshop on Risk Regulation, Accountability and 
Development, Hulme Hall, University of Manchester.
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Limited List, as an example of ‘irrational’ design. It may well be, however, 
that once the full range of transactions problems are understood, the adopted 
approaches reflected a difficult compromise between competing demands. If 
nothing else, this observation cautions against a hasty assessment of the 
policy implications of this thesis.
Notwithstanding this limitation, the present approach can be 
defended on a number of grounds. Most obviously, an understanding of 
commitment issues in isolation, while incomplete, may be a necessary 
preliminary step towards a fuller understanding incorporating an analysis of 
the compromises and trade-offs between different transaction costs faced by 
policymakers. Second, even if it is acknowledged that the commitment 
problem may not always be the paramount consideration in designing health 
care regulation, commitment issues are likely to have some importance in 
the health care sector, at least where reform initiatives seek to intervene 
within the clinical arena. For most practical purposes, the extent to which 
the design of institutions for regulation in the NHS address commitment 
issues is therefore likely to have a significant impact on the effectiveness of 
the regulatory regime.
These remarks together point to one further advantage of the present, 
commitment-based approach over an approach based on a consideration of 
the totality of transaction problems in the manner of Murray Horn: the 
present approach does at least yield clear hypotheses for investigation and 
analysis. By contrast, once multiple transacting problems are incorporated 
into the theory, many different observations are consistent with the theory. 
This does not diminish the usefulness of Horn’s approach as a ‘mapping 
tool’, i.e. as a means of exploring the choice variables of institutional design 
in the public sector, and the range of factors affecting such choices. It does
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suggest, however, that in order to develop meaningful hypotheses, it may be 
necessary to make simplifying assumptions.
The second limitation, identified above, relates to the single country 
focus of this thesis. The confidence that one can place on conclusions drawn 
from a single case study—even one which adopts an embedded research 
design as this thesis does—is naturally less than would be appropriate if the 
same hypotheses were supported by evidence from a number of countries. 
This raises the question as to how far it is possible to extend implicit 
concordat issues beyond a purely UK context.
It could perhaps be argued that the issue of cross-country 
comparison does not apply, unless it could first be established that health 
services in other countries were based on a similar bargain between the 
profession and the government. A more sophisticated approach would be to 
ask this question: if an implicit concordat (or some cognate institution) does 
not underpin health care regulation in other countries, what alternative 
arrangements exist? This question provokes us to look for ‘functional 
equivalents’ to the implicit concordat in other national settings. Functional 
equivalents might include ‘explicit concordats’—including formal legal or 
constitutional protection of the autonomy of the medical profession. 
Alternatively, in the event that no such equivalents exist in any given 
country, one might speculate that the autonomy and professional identity of 
doctors might be difficult to sustain within a systems of public provision or 
regulation of health care. Heightened professional opposition to ‘socialised 
medicine’, whether through ownership or regulation, would be expected to 
arise in such cases. This hypothesis can easily be refined to develop 
observable implications concerning govemment-profession relations across 
different countries, and concerning the effects of a shift towards regulatory 
state-type institutions within health care sectors in different countries. While
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such speculation may be interesting, the main point here is that good 
comparative analysis often proceeds from detailed knowledge of a single 
country. While acknowledging that a comparative focus could add to the 
confidence appropriate to the present findings, the single country focus of 
this study is can be said to be justifiable as a first step, on which future 
research may well profitably build in different ways.
8.6 Concluding Thoughts
The commitment frame has proved extremely productive for analysing 
regulatory reforms in the NHS. The approach developed in this thesis has 
provided both a broad interpretation of institutional change in the health 
service, as well as providing more specific insights into particular reform 
initiatives. At the same time, this thesis has no more than pointed to the 
potential of this general approach, and there is much further work to do. As 
suggested by Section 8.5, potential avenues for further research include further 
testing of the framework in cross-country comparison as well as investigating 
the trade-offs in regulatory design between credible commitment and other 
transactions problems. The contribution of this thesis is sufficient to suggest 
that further research along these lines would be highly fruitful.
Appendix
Interview Codes
Code Date Position
11 27 November 1997 Former senior politician, Scottish Office
12 27 February 1998 Former consultant geriatrician
13 5 March 1998 Senior politician, formerly DHSS
14 19 March 1998 Former office holder, BMA
15 23 March 1998 Consultant clinical pharmacologist
16 28 July 1998 Two general practitioners
17 20 August 1998 Official, Department of Health
18 27 August 1998 Official, Department of Health
19 3 September 1998 Official, NHS Executive
110 11 September 1998 Management consultant
111 22 September 1998 Former senior official, DHSS
112 11 December 1998 Manager, National Centre for Clinical Audit
113 9 July 1999 Former NHS Trust Chief Executive
114 8 July 1999 Official, NHS Executive
115 14 July 1999 Official, NICE
116 16 July 1999 Senior Official, Department of Health
117 21 July 1999 Former senior politician, Department of Health
118 12 August 1999 Senior politician, Department of Health
119 18 August 2000 Senior official, NICE
120 20 August 2000 Former NHS Trust Chief Executive
121 14 December 2001 Official, Department of Health
122 5 March 2002 Senior official, CHI
123 June 11 2002 Senior official, CHI
124 19 August 2002 Former senior official NHS Executive
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